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OPPORTUNITIES AND PITFALLS OF DETENTE

On 22 November the United States, the USSR, Canada and approximately thirty countries of East and West Europe gathered in Helsinki for preparatory talks about detente. If these preliminary discussions are successful, they will presumably lead to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to take place in June 1973 or later.

The Soviet Union has been proposing some sort of high-level East-West get-together since the Khrushchev era. While in the initial proposals the propaganda element was paramount, by the mid-sixties -- and particularly since 1969 -- the Soviet Union was clearly making a serious effort to convene a pan-European conference from which it expected to gain political as well as propaganda advantage. Thus, in the Bucharest Declaration of July 1966, the Warsaw Pact nations demanded the dissolution of the two military blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), the withdrawal of foreign forces, the liquidation of foreign military bases, as well as the recognition of East Germany and the existing frontiers in Europe. The same basic proposals for discussion were put forth in the Warsaw Pact Budapest Appeal of March 1969 but in more conciliatory language.

The Prague Declaration of October 1969 deemphasized the military aspects aimed at the West European defense effort in favor of economic and political cooperation. These proposals were expanded by the Warsaw Pact nations in the Budapest Memorandum of June 1970 to include the renunciation of force and the ensuring of European security, the expansion of commercial, economic, scientific-technical and cultural relations, and the establishment of a permanent organ to consider questions of security and cooperation in Europe. At their latest meeting in Prague, the Warsaw Pact nations offered the following list of "lofty principles and goals" which are essentially the same as the current proposals:

- a. the inviolability (or immutability) of existing frontiers;
- b. the non-use of force in relations among European states;
- c. peaceful coexistence between states belonging to different social systems;
- d. equality, non-interference, respect for independence and sovereignty;

e. mutually advantageous relations between states (economic, scientific, cultural);

f. disarmament;

g. support for the United Nations.

By the affirmation of such general and high sounding precepts, the Warsaw Pact Declaration is clearly intended to appeal to the broadest spectrum of public opinion and to permit the widest possible interpretation of its applicability. They are aimed at disguising, not revealing, real differences. How, for example is one to reconcile the principle of "non-interference and respect for independence and sovereignty" with the Brezhnev Doctrine, the avowed purpose of which is to limit the sovereignty of communist states and which provides the ideological justification for armed intervention as in Czechoslovakia in 1968?

Actually, the Soviet Union has shown a remarkable consistency in the pursuit of its European objectives. The difference at present is that the Soviet leaders appear to have recognized that forces for change are at work in both Europes and that, since it is unrealistic to try and prevent these changes, they should seek instead to shape them to their advantage. To this end, Brezhnev and some of his associates have publicly committed themselves to the principle of limited cooperation with the West. These basic Soviet goals in Europe are worth considering in terms of the Soviet role in the detente talks:

a. to prevent nuclear war;

b. to control the changes which are occurring in East Europe and to preserve the essentials of Soviet hegemony;

c. to undermine NATO and reduce U.S. troop strength in West Europe;

d. to halt or delay the process of West European unity; and

d. to expand Soviet influence in West Europe at the expense of the U.S. and of the European Community.

The nature of these objectives (detente in the West and controlled change in the East) poses a dilemma for Soviet leaders, however, since the ingredients of detente are the same ingredients which foster dissatisfaction, nationalism and revolutionary change in the East. Because Moscow cannot risk the dissolution of its own empire even for an opportunity to break up NATO and the European Community, the Soviets will seek to ensure that any conference formulations regarding freer East-West exchanges permit them to control the direction and extent of detente in East Europe.

(Soviet anxiety over its ability to control the pace of relaxation in the East is an objective factor of detente life as is East European dissatisfaction with Soviet hegemony and desire for expanded contacts with the West.) A principal Soviet objective at the talks will be to create the illusion of detente for the benefit of Western public opinion. Moscow is already working to secure its East European ideological ramparts and has let local leaders know that when it comes to detente, some parts of Europe are more equal than others.

Most East European regimes -- and certainly the peoples of East Europe -- are enthusiastic proponents of detente, but for quite different reasons than those which motivate the Soviet Union. East European countries see detente as an opportunity to expand their autonomy and to reduce Soviet interference in their internal affairs. They would also like to find new markets for their products, attract Western investments, gain access to Western technology and, if possible, find alternative sources of basic raw materials (presently supplied wholly by the USSR) in order to lessen their dependence on the Soviet Union. They are becoming aware that to compete economically with the European Community a united approach is necessary and are increasingly obliged to look to COMECON to provide multilateral banking arrangements, resource pooling, etc. (The Soviet Union, for its part, sees COMECON as an instrument for channelling and controlling East European trade efforts.) Above all, the East European states hope the detente talks will reach a written agreement which provides them with maximum juridical, political and moral protection against Soviet intervention.

It appears that the threat of "ideological diversion from the West" is troubling conservative elements in East Europe. A recent issue of a limited-circulation Polish military magazine carries an article by a Polish colonel which indicates that some of the comrades in the East are uneasy about the growing tendency to leave ideology to the party theoreticians and in daily practice to coexist comfortably and profitably with capitalism. The article, entitled "Peaceful Coexistence and Ideological Subversion," warns that "the relaxation of international tensions and peaceful coexistence have concomitants which are favorable to capitalism." Citing advantages that capitalism has over communism in the present confrontation, the colonel notes: "The advantage gained by capitalism in the scientific-technological revolution tends to reduce conflicts within the capitalist system and to lessen class tensions." These successes encourage the protagonists of democracy in communist-ruled countries. The colonel also notes that the relaxation of tensions has not been accompanied by unity within the international communist movement. This means the Soviet Bloc must fight on two fronts, against capitalism and against the Chinese heretics, politically as well as ideologically. "Such an atmosphere," the colonel warns, "may tend to make us lower our guard at home and further illusions about a permanent and all-inclusive

understanding between the two systems and about the disappearance of social and political differences between them. This could lead to 'soft' attitudes, weaken socialist vigilance, and offer the temptation to extend compromise from politics to ideology."

If the Soviet leaders (responding to their own national interests) are capable of "extending their areas of compromise," it is obviously in the West's interest to promote such a development, but it is an error to believe they will make such compromises of their own accord.

Soviet detente overtures have found a receptive audience in the West where many are convinced that basic changes have taken place in Soviet attitudes and policies. Thus, in some quarters, there is a tendency to accept detente on Soviet terms rather than to press Moscow for reasonable concessions in return for commercial and technological agreements and recognition of present geographical (but not political or cultural) frontiers. Detente also has considerable commercial appeal, and the prospect of advantageous economic dealings with the Soviet Union and East Europe is attractive to Western business interests which, in turn, exert considerable political pressure on their political leaders.

West European economic and political strength has increased in recent years. Moreover, a sense of West European identity has begun to emerge. Europe is a part of the world where the wind has continued to blow from West to East. However if this holds true in the economic, political and cultural sphere, it does not hold true in the military. The Soviet Union has been expanding its military power and political influence on Europe's periphery: in the Near East, in the Mediterranean, and on the eastern frontier of Scandinavia. And the guarantee of its Western frontiers may well serve to facilitate Soviet expansion in these other areas. China, for example, is concerned that any guarantee of the Soviet Union's Western frontiers will facilitate Soviet expansion in the Far East. Thus, while the Chinese have endorsed the European Community because they are pleased at the prospect of a strong and independent power on Russia's western flank, they are resolutely opposed to a European detente which would free more Soviet divisions and resources for the China theater.

The long-term danger for the West is that it will allow itself -- through parochialism and complacency -- to be maneuvered out of positions of strategic military and political importance. Were such an encroachment to affect its vital interests, it would then face a far more difficult choice: that of acknowledging Soviet hegemony (a la Finland) or of provoking a new and more dangerous confrontation.

Hopefully, the West will not confuse a favorable trend and opportunity with the situation that exists as of now. For the trend will continue only if the West makes the effort needed to

sustain it. How well it succeeds will eventually decide the basic questions of detente: whether the Soviets will be able to pursue relaxation in one half of Europe only; and whether the wind will continue to blow from the West.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
14 June 1972

# The new balance of power

**A** WORLD-WIDE struggle is still being waged between an expansionist Russia and the Western democracies. So the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin, with West Germany's Treaties with Poland and Russia, have cleared the way for a European security conference and, on Nato's insistence, parallel talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) have to be seen in that context.

The importance of the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, apart from saving vast expense, is that it deliberately aims to preserve the "balance of terror"—that is, the ability of both America and Russia to make a devastating nuclear riposte after having first absorbed a surprise nuclear attack by the other. This is the nuclear deterrent which prescribes the limitations within which the present struggle between Russia and the West is conducted.

This struggle can be called World War III. It is waged principally in the political, economic and psychological fields. Conventional military strength, however, plays a most important though largely passive role. It decides, for instance, which super-Power has to back down in any local crisis.

Wars by proxy, operations in which only one super-Power is directly involved (Vietnam and Czechoslovakia are examples) are not ruled out. But what is ruled out is direct military action between the two super-Powers—which can be called World War IV and would be accompanied by serious danger of a nuclear holocaust.

The Four-Power agreements on Berlin and West Germany's Eastern Treaties are directly related to World War III, as is, in Russian eyes, the whole process of détente. A paperback published last year in Moscow defined "détente" as follows: "Peaceful co-existence is war between Socialism and Capitalism in all fields of social-economic relations. It assumes a struggle between States with different social systems, but excludes (shooting) war. It is a specific form of class war in the international field."

It would be a mistake to see opportunities for good exist in these developing East-West relations; the doubt is whether the

**Brig. W. F. K. THOMPSON** outlines where most vigilance against Soviet ambition is needed

West is capable of benefiting from them. Societies do not remain static. Mr Brezhnev may seek to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia by proclaiming the doctrine that no country recognised by Moscow as "Socialist" can be allowed to change its political and social system.

The men in the Kremlin continue to declare that there can be no convergence between capitalism, as it is developing in the West, and Marxism, as interpreted by Moscow; but even as they do so convergence is taking place, though the pace may be glacial.

There will also be very grave dangers for the West unless we develop a better understanding of the nature of World War III and become more adept at combining political, economic and psychological action, supported by adequate conventional military strength, in defence of our interests.

Because in the West "those who speak to the people must say acceptable things" there is woeful ignorance of the continuous increase in Russia's forces over the past 10 years, particularly in maritime power and electronic warfare. The average Russian bears a burden of defence far heavier than anything acceptable in a democratic country, except in time of real war. The result is an accumulation of military power which, after allowing for strained relations with China, is greater than anything required purely for defence. It is legitimate to ask: why should this be?

Russia could divert large resources from defence to raise the material standards of her people. In the recent discussions between Russian, American and German leaders, Russia showed a desire to take advantage of Western technology. Any Western decision to meet this request should be made only on the basis of its World War III implications: it is a question whether we believe that fat Russians rather than thin Russians are the more likely to persuade the Kremlin to devote more resources to increased material standards, and away from imperialist expansion.

## On the flanks

Western eyes are riveted on Central Europe, where the military stalemate has been formally acknowledged by a Western guarantee of Russia's imperial frontiers, in return for concessions over Berlin.

Meanwhile, Russian power and influence have been rapidly expanding elsewhere. They have penetrated the Indian sub-continent and entered the Indian Ocean. The recent Treaty with Iraq brings Russian influence nearer the Middle East oilfields, on which the United States as well as Western Europe are expected to become increasingly dependent in the 1980s, despite alternative sources of power. In so doing, Russia has outflanked Persia, now trying to fill the gap left by Britain in the Persian Gulf.

Russia has also turned both Nato's flanks. From Egypt, where she can rapidly deploy a formidable air force in time of crisis simply by flying in pilots and ground staff, she is reaching out along the North African coast and has turned Nato's southern air defences. In the north, her expanding maritime influence is being increasingly felt in Norway, just as her more forward policy in the Baltic is being felt by Denmark.

Russia has established a permanent maritime presence as far south as a line joining southern Norway to Greenland via Iceland. If the Icelandic Nato base were neutralised—and there is political support for this in Iceland—or became available to Russia, this would invalidate most of Nato's plans for reinforcing northern Norway. Nor should it be forgotten that most of Norway's off-shore oilfields are north of this line.

The guarantee of East-West frontiers in Central Europe will do nothing to halt this expansion of power and influence; it may even accelerate it. The greatest danger to the West lies, however, in lack of will and discernment, and in disharmony, in the euphoria falsely induced by thoughts of détente, and in America's growing isolationism.

While Warsaw Pact forces become more formidable, Nato's ready forces continue to decline in numbers and quality. Ironically, this decline has been most marked since the adoption of a strategy of flexible response, whose implementation requires significant increases in air and land forces.

The most immediate threat, however, is that of economic war between America and the Common Market. It is essential that Europeans should do everything possible to make it politically and economically easy for the President of the United States to maintain the present strength of American forces in Europe, for, in the words of the German Defence White Paper for 1972: "The West European nations are not capable of taking the place—politically, mili-

tarily, or psychologically—of the American commitment in Europe."

The danger is not of World War IV and the nuclear holocaust but of the West continuing to be manoeuvred out of positions of influence and strategic importance for the maintenance of Western interests. A process which will in the end lead to Russia encroaching on vital Western interests, at which point we are all too likely, from habit and from inadequate military capability, to surrender rather than face the risks of World War IV.

More happily, it should be remembered that Russia acts realistically and in her national interest, which, above all, is to avoid a shooting war with the United States; that she is cautious; and that, if she sets no limit to the expansion of her power and influence, neither

does she set herself a timetable.

Finally, Russia is responsive to firmness emanating from military strength, a position which Nato is capable of maintaining without undue sacrifice.

Safety lies in the developing dialogue between the two super-Powers, a dialogue which could help to prevent miscalculation, coupled with improvements in Western solidarity and the balance of ready forces. It lies also in the development by the West of a skill equal to that of Russia in applying the appropriate mix of political, economic and psychological action, backed by adequate, readily-available conventional forces.

Above all we must avoid losing World War III by thinking too much in terms of World War IV.

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## Happier families

JONATHAN STEEL

THE free movement of people and ideas between Eastern and Western Europe has always been the most emotive issue in East-West relations. It is no surprise that it looks like being the touchiest subject at the forthcoming talks in Helsinki on the agenda for the European Security Conference. Western hawks argue that if there is no change in the general position here the conference will be a waste of time. Eastern hawks see the issue as a "Trojan horse" being used as a device for "disrupting" the conference.

The issue was first proposed for the Conference by the NATO countries in December last year, and although it has never been formally rejected by the Soviet Union and its allies, it is clear that they do not like it. A battle royal now looks like shaping up in Helsinki over the issue with one side trying to get it on the agenda and the other side trying to transform it into "cultural cooperation."

In the process it is almost inevitable that some of the facts will be overlooked. One of the most interesting developments in recent years in Eastern Europe is, indeed, the way more and more Western information and publications have been able to circulate there.

Newspaper journalists tend to concentrate on newspapers, and

soon discover that Western ones are unavailable at news-stands in every Eastern European capital.

But the broadcast word is as powerful, and in virtually every country a vast amount of Western broadcasting gets through unhampered. Nowadays Eastern jamming is selective rather than total, and Eastern Europeans who want Western news soon learn which wavelengths are least affected. Television is much more expensive to jam, and in most of the German Democratic Republic, and in the Western and Southern parts of Czechoslovakia, Austria, and West Germany, television can easily be seen. In the GDR it years ago ceased to be an offence for individuals to listen to Western stations.

As for modern Western literature this is now regularly translated. Except in Czechoslovakia where conditions are clearly sterner, few serious authors are taboo. Newspapers are in a different category, but here again the picture is less grim than it used to be. How many people for example know that in almost every Polish city there is an institution called "The Club of the International Press and Book"? This rather pretentious title masks a foreign-languages reading-room, which is open to anyone and where all the major Western newspapers are available. At the end of the day the file copy can be bought, and taken home. These "clubs" which are always full, pre-date the Giersek reforms and have been going for a decade.

Poland is unique in this. But in the other countries, Western newspapers have a much higher

circulation. In institutions, in publishing houses, in local newspaper offices, and in foreign language departments than they ever used to. Although the majority of their readers here will be politically "safe" a determined intellectual who wants to see a foreign paper can usually find one.

The result is that many Eastern Europeans are justified in saying that they know more about life in the West than most West Europeans know about their life. This is a point on which liberals and conservatives agree, and it often arouses some annoyance. One reason of course

is a kind of "linguistic asymmetry" in Europe. Even if there were no political division in Europe the fact is that more Poles will always learn French, and Hungarians English than Frenchmen and Englishmen will learn Polish or Hungarian. The cultural attraction will always be stronger from West to East than vice versa.

The point will no doubt be used politically at the Security Conference, if a recent article by Hungary's first deputy Foreign Minister, Mr F. Pujfa, is any guide. Writing in the September issue of *Társadalmi Szemle*, he argued that "the Socialist countries give much greater scope to real Western intellectual values than do the capitalist countries to Socialist intellectual values." He then itemised the number of French, British, and American books and films recently published and shown in Hungary compared with Hungarian ones in the West.

"The intellectual life of the Socialist countries is scarcely discussed in Western countries. ... If the authorities in Socialist

countries help to disseminate real Western cultural values, the governments of Western countries should render the same help to Socialist cultural values. If equality is lacking western proposals about the 'free' exchange of cultural values and ideas can only be considered misleading phraseology."

The argument has many omissions, not least the point that if a wider range of views could be expressed in the Socialist countries, Western publishers might find more books worth translating. But the argument cannot be totally dismissed.

When it comes to the "free movement of peoples" the present position for Eastern Europeans is also much better than it was. Passports for travel to the West are getting a little easier to obtain (again, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and package holidays are now developing fast. East German has always been the exception and it is still the only country from which ordinary tourists cannot visit the West. But elderly people with relations in West Germany, or other people who want to travel for special family reasons, like funerals or weddings, can now travel more freely as a result of the Berlin agreement and the recent transport treaty between the two Germanys.

Almost a million East Germans have visited West Germany so far this year, while in five times more than last year. It also means that more East Germans are now travelling West than any other Eastern European people. Although they are not tourists as such, the development is certainly one in the eye for the West. ... of East German



as a country whose people never travel.

The development certainly means that in East Berlin some hard thought is now being given to the way the Government should meet the intense pressure from its people who will want to travel as genuine tourists once the main treaty in Bonn is completed. When East Germany is finally recognised in the West, the government will not be able

to argue that Western obstinacy over visas is an obstruction. Nor will an alleged shortage of hard currency be convincing since East Germans know they are richer than other Eastern Europeans who can get money to travel.

The signs are that East Germany has hit on a subtle argument here. It is simply this. The East German mark will have to be recognised as equivalent to the Western mark instead of being worth only a

fifth. It is a clever line since it turns Bonn's own argument that East and West Germany are part of one nation round. If you are prepared to exchange our marks at a rate of one to one, the East Germans will say, then we can think of letting more tourists out to visit the Federal Republic. As an additional argument East Berlin is also likely to insist on a change in Bonn's citizenship laws, rather on the

analogy of Israel's Law of Return, these say that any East German who wants to settle in the West can become a West German citizen at once. What ever compromises the two German States make in the issue, the drive for more foreign travel from East to West is bound to grow. The development of consumer societies in Eastern Europe will certainly increase it, regardless of anything the Security Conference may or may not decide.

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# Is communism in its twilight?

By Paul Wohl

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

**A** MOOD OF GOETTERDAEMMERUNG — THE twilight of the gods — seems to have set in among Communist leaders. Publicly they still carry on about communism's historically preordained victory. Marxist-Leninism continues to be held up as the only scientific theory which enables its followers to correctly analyze historical developments and predict their outcome.

In other words, outwardly communism has lost none of its cockiness.

Privately, however, Soviet and East European Communists know better. Talking with them off the record one elicits embarrassed smiles when one recalls the ebullient Nikita S. Khrushchev's prediction of 1961: "We shall bury you."

In fact, Communists now have second thoughts about how their system can survive "peaceful coexistence between states of a different social order" — that same peaceful coexistence which has so long been a major plank in their propaganda.

A few weeks ago, after an ideological joust lasting into the early morning hours, a Russian Marxist-Leninist of pre-World War II vintage admitted to this writer his doubts as to whether Lenin actually had meant peaceful coexistence as a quasi-permanent state of affairs.

Yet this is what Soviet Communists today claim it to be — in every field except ideology. But most Communists nowadays keep ideology in the closet and in everyday life seek to coexist comfortably and even profitably with capitalism.

"Sometimes I wished I were a capitalist," sighed Boris, a Soviet student whose father is a well-paid and influential member of the Moscow writers union. That was not so long ago, and he was half in earnest. But these are forbidden thoughts, and Boris, even in America, looked cautiously over his shoulder.

## Quite a few feel uneasy

Soviet and East European Communists have become increasingly exposed to capitalist ways. Quite a few of them feel uneasy about it.

Communist propagandists now warn that coexistence may lead — horrible dictum — to "a propagation of

individualism as a superior social idea" and to "the establishment of a (capitalist) vanguard and of (capitalist) ideological bridgeheads within the party."

The words are lifted from an article by Col. Julian Sokol entitled "Peaceful Coexistence and Ideological Subversion," which was published in the May issue of *Wojsko Ludowe* (People's Army), a limited-circulation journal of the main political board of the Polish armed forces.

The Polish intelligence officer's warnings were echoed on Aug. 18 in Russia's armed-forces daily, *Red Star*, by Lt. Gen. A. Shevchenko, a Soviet political officer.

General Shevchenko entitled his article: "An Insider's Weapon — Psychological Warfare in the Plans of Imperialism."

Colonel Sokol went more deeply into the matter. Writing in a restricted monthly, he could express himself in more detail and with greater frankness than the Soviet general.

"The tendency of relaxation of international tensions and peaceful coexistence . . . is accompanied by events which, in their final stage, are propitious to capitalism," Colonel Sokol wrote.

The West, according to the colonel, has five advantages over communism in the present confrontation of the two systems:

— "Capitalism is somewhat more advanced in the scientific and technological revolution. In some fields of technology it has managed to obtain a passing, but effective, superiority.

— "The scientific and technological revolution (a term which plays an important role in Communist propaganda) has involved the socialist (meaning Communist-ruled) states in complications which capitalism does not have to face.

— "The advantage gained by capitalism in the scientific-technological revolution tends to reduce . . . tensions." This strengthens democracy and bolsters

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protagonists of democracy in Communist-ruled countries.

—"Because of these advantages, capitalism for the time being is able to extend . . . aid to developing countries on a much larger scale than in the past."

—"Relaxation of tensions (between capitalism and communism) has not been accompanied by unity within the international Communist movement. This forces the Marxist core of the revolutionary camp (meaning the Soviets and their associates) to fight on two fronts: against capitalism and against the Chinese heretics, politically as well as ideologically."

Never before has a responsible Communist writer so clearly credited capitalism with being technically more progressive and politically more united than communism.

### Some problems outlined

Colonel Sokol then lists some of the problems which Communists have to face as a result of easier relations between the two systems.

"Psychologically, increased relaxation brings with it a new gentler style in international affairs especially in East-West relations. Spectacular diplomatic overtures, characterized by readiness to negotiate and sign agreements, will come to the fore."

The colonel, writing before President Nixon's visit to Moscow, seems to have anticipated both the relaxed atmosphere which prevailed then in Moscow and the agreements signed there.

"A foreign policy adapted to the strategy of peaceful coexistence demands a greater use of compromise and of political bargaining with concessions made by both sides."

"Such an atmosphere," the colonel warned, "may tend to make us lower our guard at home (especially in ideological work) and further illusions about a permanent and all-inclusive understanding between the two systems and about the disappearance of social and political differences between them; it may lead to 'soft' attitudes, weaken social vigilance in the face of imperialism, and be accompanied by the temptation to extend compromise from politics to ideology."

Under these circumstances "one must expect increased psychological pressure by Western centers of ideological subversion." The pressure will be aimed at "groups which are in a position to influence our public opinion," in other words, "at intellectuals, writers, artists, and students." General Shevchenko used almost the same words.

"All this may have a negative influence on the dynamism of our propaganda," Colonel Sokol continued. Public opinion in Communist-ruled countries will interpret "concessions extracted by us from the West as an expression of goodwill on the part of the capitalist states and an indication of their peaceful intentions."

As political conflicts are becoming less evident, "people and ideas will begin to move more easily between the two systems." This is what the European security conference may bring about. The Eastern countries oppose the principle of such freedom of movement, but their opposition is not unanimous.

Colonel Sokol went so far as to claim that communism is "objectively interested in an open-door policy. It provides us with good testimony and constitutes an important psychological asset in our campaign for further relaxation."

One wonders, of course, whether the Communists themselves really believe in their own slogan of peaceful coexistence. One wonders whether the Communists themselves

are in favor of continuing a campaign for peaceful coexistence. As a dutiful official, he probably could not do otherwise. But he offered a consolation: "Broader mutual contacts will give us an opportunity for exercising an ideological influence on the West."

The colonel does not appear to be very optimistic about the effect of this influence. His main concerns are the political and ideological dangers to which communism is exposed.

One of these dangers is tourism. "The trend toward relaxation of tensions will increase travel abroad to visit family members or friends," and a movement of Western tourists in the opposite direction.

"One can regulate this tourist exchange," wrote the colonel, "but cannot eliminate it. Travel abroad has its psychological reefs. A tourist from a socialist country, by the very nature of his visit abroad, lays himself open to the frequently attractive aspects of capitalism."

The colonel did not mention the impression which the relative wealth and ease of visiting Western relatives usually makes on their families under communism.

"Another means by which Western ideology and propaganda enter Communist-ruled countries is the wider appearance of Western goods and closer acquaintance with Western technology. In many instances they will be better than our own and thus help to spread the belief in the superiority of capitalism."

One also should not "underestimate the possibilities offered to mass communications media through such technological innovations as satellites in radio and television. Although we must regulate through international law these new techniques in order to ensure that they are not exploited for ideological aggression, it is easy to guess that the West will not give up without a struggle this chance to wage psychological warfare."

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko's Aug. 8 note to United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to that effect must have been the object of consultations with the East Europeans. How otherwise could Colonel Sokol have anticipated the Soviet demarche?

"An atmosphere of relaxed tension gives imperialism a greater freedom of maneuver, especially in the economic field"; it facilitates efforts to bring about "the disintegration of the socialist system and offers better possibilities for propagating the Yugoslav economic model and the introduction of workers' councils, thus stimulating (inside the socialist commonwealth) trends toward (anti-Communist) social democracy."

After listing the many dangers which threaten communism's political and ideological hold over the people, the colonel added that "there also are disadvantages for capitalism: Relaxation of tensions threatens the West with ideological erosion."

"The question is this: Who — we or the West — will be better able to face these problems and take advantage of them?"

A propaganda contest is inevitable. "Administrative barriers will protect us less against the infiltration of hostile (anti-Communist) propaganda" than . . . "open ideological struggle."

"We cannot and should not give up administrative barriers altogether; they play a useful role, but they are not decisive."

However one looks at it, communism's slogan of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West has turned out to be a two-edged sword.

One wonders whether the Communists themselves really believe in their own slogan of peaceful coexistence.

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gives them a better chance to carry their ideology to the West. Ruling out another major depression with massive unemployment and galloping inflation, communism will need a lot of house cleaning and a thorough refurbishing before its ideology has a chance of being accepted in

capitalist countries.

In the meanwhile high-caliber Communist propaganda technicians seem to believe that capitalism has a fair chance of winning the propaganda contest.

NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich  
19 November 1972

CPYRGHT

EUROPEAN CONFERENCE PROGRAM

Front page editorial  
by editor-in-chief

Next Wednesday in Helsinki the curtain goes up on a play, on whose production the Soviet Union, together with at least a part of its following, has been working now for a good many years, but whose plot still remains quite uncertain. The name of the play is The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

On the stage just now, only a Prologue, The Meeting of the Ambassadors in the Parlor, will be played. This is supposed to prepare the really important negotiations -- but it is already noticeable that ideas as to what this preparatory work is to consist of, differ increasingly. The Russians, and others, want to limit this preparatory discussion to at most the indispensable minimum, say a definition of the nature of the real conference, which is expected to take place next summer, and of its agenda. The Americans, and others, would like to test now in this preliminary phase the prospects for the main event; that is they want to induce preliminary decisions of a substantive nature, so that it will become clear now whether the big show, which means so much to Moscow, is going to produce any results at all, and what kind. Sober observers are of the opinion that the more substantively and the more seriously the preparations are carried out, the more unlikely the Great Conference will take place, given the antitheses and conflicts among the participants. For many, consequently, this is one more reason why the much cited phrase, "thorough preparation," is not to be taken all that seriously.

What is this affair all about, for whose inception representatives from not less than 32 European states are assembling, from Moscow to San Marino, and in addition, the U.S.A. and Canada? Big, vague catchwords arouse far-reaching expectations. In Pravda one can read about a "new system of interstate relations" which is to be discussed along with "good neighbor policy," "diminution of tension," "renunciation of the use of force." The catalogue of slogans is about the same in Western countries, but further enriched by the addition of "disarmament," although skeptical voices there do not escape attention.

The facade painted by publicity still cannot conceal what it is all about. The "All-European" Conference is a product of Soviet policy, and it is propaganda. Its meaning has shifted emphasis repeatedly during the long period of its incubation. For example, for awhile it was important above all else to help the DDR to achieve international recognition and thus formalize and perpetuate the existence of two separate German states. But this has in the meantime been accomplished by another procedure, with the assistance of the Federal Republic of Germany itself.

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Transcending the Eastern treaties with Bonn is the need of Moscow to reinsure by international agreements its European sphere of hegemony, and to seal it off from unfavorable Western influences. This need has become more urgent as a result of the growing insecurity at the Asiatic, Chinese rear of the Soviet Empire. There still remains, within the framework of such a security policy, and as its offensive component, the wish and the intent of Moscow, to extend the influence of the Soviet Union out through ramparts and advance posts of its West European power position, in order to acquire openings for co-determination and rights of supervision. This adds up to an effort to get a foot in the door of the European and Atlantic Communities, and by applying leverage from both ends, to loosen the ties between Europe and America. Add to this also a Soviet yearning to acquire access to western economic capacity, either European or American, either both together or by playing one off against the other, to assist its own cramped and suffering economic development.

In this situation then there are neither the beginnings of a loosening of totalitarian Soviet overlordship in East Europe (quite the contrary), nor the beginnings of East-West open relationships and bridge building (quite the contrary), nor beginnings of a reduction in military striking power. These goals are rather Western concerns, or to be more explicit, the concerns of some of the Western partners who have more or less clear conceptions and firm intentions, and hope to achieve these goals by a process of mutual give and take. In these circles, the idea of a "European Conference" to serve Soviet interests in a one-sided way has long met with rejection. It first began to look attractive, when NATO, under pressure from the growing American trend towards troop reduction in Europe, began to sense the possibility of an agreement on Mutual Balanced Force Reduction. The "Security Conference" then did duty as bait for the Berlin Agreement. And people are now beginning, here and there, to nurse the hope that the Conference will afford possibilities of obtaining a minimum freedom of movement for human beings as well as ideas over and through the Iron Curtain.

Does the Conference have a chance of becoming a place of exchange for reciprocal concessions, for a "do ut des", from which will result an improvement in European relations? Does the Conference have a chance of producing a real reduction in tension? Will the Conference illuminate the desolate wilderness of totalitarian rule with the light of hope? This would be something more than was obtained by German skill at making treaties which only serve to confirm Soviet positions and aspirations. It all depends on the degree of decisiveness and energy with which insistence on performance in this sense is demanded. And not the least, it depends on the attitude and disposition with which the partners for the exchange go about their business.

Without doubt, given its difficult world political and economic situation, the Soviet Union attributes the greatest importance to what it is striving to accomplish with this conference. Will it, therefore, pay for what it wants with substantial concessions? The Soviet Union has drawn back from consideration of "troop reduction" as a counter in the exchange. Her readiness to discuss this subject, proclaimed after long procrastination, indicates only her desire to obtain the "great" conference and remove obstacles which still lie in its path. By no manner of means does it indicate that Moscow reciprocates western ideas

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about a "balanced" reduction in military forces. As for the "presumptuousness" of concessions of greater freedom of information and greater freedom of movement, her propaganda is being fired in salvos from all outlets in denunciation of this as "intervention in internal affairs." For many a politician in East Europe, a leading idea or hidden motivation with reference to the conference is the thought of loosening the bonds of compulsory community formulated in the Brezhnev Doctrine. But Moscow itself will do everything in its power to nip such temptations in the bud.

By no manner of means does the West enter into this round of negotiations in full unity. It is not only that France does not want to have anything to do with discussions about troop reduction, a position totally at variance with that of the other partners; or that within NATO there is dispute about what is to be demanded of Moscow under the caption "freer movement," even expressed in more neutral tones, a dispute about the degree of emphasis with which this is to be asked of Moscow.

Still other quite different mortgages burden and limit the negotiating power of the Atlantic partnership. American-Soviet Bilateralism, that is to say, the reciprocal preference for exclusive private talks between the two super-powers, concerning which no one knows how far things have gone nor at whose expense, has produced new suspicion and distrust among the allies ever since the joint Moscow communique of Nixon and Brezhnev about the "Twelve Commands" of coexistence. The allies not only feel that they have been passed over, they also feel that to some extent they have been disregarded.

Similar threatening tendencies are being registered by Bonn. Namely the tendency to consult with their contractual partners in the East just as they do with their allies in the West; thus attempting once again to take the German role of intermediary between West and East, a task requiring the stature and talents of a Bismarck, but also a task which today hardly is likely to contribute to the strength of the Western Alliance.

Europe, taken collectively, insofar as it is a matter of politics, particularly East-West politics, and not just a question of foreign trade, has not yet found one voice or one speaker. It is disorganized into many individual tongues and individual tactical schemes, and so has remained a field for maneuver and for out-maneuvering, at the disposal of the others. The western states are perhaps of one mind today in their keen interest in trade with the East. However, the bargaining position of the Western states is hardly strengthened by their desire for trade with the East, because in the East they face a united power bloc which shows no sign of dissolution and conflict of interests, as does the West, and in the East such tendencies certainly cannot be expressed.

Given these conditions, one can hardly close one's eyes to the problems and risks inherent in this great gathering coming up. It could bring about a displacement in the balance of power which would give the Soviet Union a more permanent and stronger influence in West Europe. All the different nations on this continent would then be drawn more relentlessly in the wake of its strongest power. This conference could produce fictions which would be represented to the public as solid achievements: non-aggression pacts, border guarantees, disarmament measures, mutual cooperation agreements, all of which would only suggest a stable condition of peace, but which would not guarantee this peace

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in any effective fashion, that is, by a manifestation of strength sufficient to deter war through fear of consequences. It would be a conference that proclaimed detente and normalization, but would do nothing essential to remedy the sad situation of a divided Europe, certainly would do nothing to make the realm of totalitarian rule more bearable. These are not the foregone consequences of this conference, but rather the dangers of a possible miscarriage in its development. It will require several and, above all, well-coordinated efforts in order to avoid these dangers.

CPYRGHT

## Konferenzthema Europa

Am nächsten Mittwoch geht in *Helsinki* der Vorhang über einem Stück hoch, an dessen Inszenierung die Sowjetunion mit einem Teil ihrer Gefolgschaft seit vielen Jahren gearbeitet hat, dessen Handlung aber noch ganz ungewiß ist. Das Stück heißt «Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa» (KSZE).

Gespielt wird vorläufig nur der Prolog in der Form eines *Botschaftersalons*. Er soll die eigentliche Haupthandlung vorbereiten — wobei jedoch bereits die Vorstellungen von dieser Vorbereitungsarbeit auseinandergehen. Die Russen und andere wollen sie auf das Notwendigste, etwa auf die Bestimmung des Charakters der eigentlichen, für nächsten Sommer vorgesehenen Konferenz und ihrer Traktandenliste beschränken; die Amerikaner und andere möchten in dieser Vorphase bereits die Chancen der Hauptveranstaltung testen, also Vorentscheidungen in der *Substanz* herbeiführen, damit klar werde, ob die große Schau, an der Moskau so viel liegt, überhaupt Resultate produzieren könne, und welche. Nüchterne Beobachter meinen, je seriöser und substantieller die Vorbereitung geführt werde, desto unwahrscheinlicher werde angesichts der Gegensätze im Teilnehmerkreis die Hauptkonferenz. Für manche ein Grund mehr, es mit der vielzitierten «gründlichen Vorbereitung» nicht zu genau zu nehmen.

Was soll das Unternehmen, zu dessen Einleitung die Vertreter von nicht weniger als 32 europäischen Staaten, von Moskau bis San Marino, und zusätzlich der USA und Kanadas zusammenkommen? Große und vage Worte wecken *weitreichende Erwartungen*. «Ein neues System der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen» stehe nebst «Gewaltverzicht», «Entspannung», «guter Nachbarschaft» zur Diskussion und in Aussicht, kann man in der «*Prawda*» lesen. In westlichen Ländern lautet der Wortkatalog ähnlich, bereichert noch um «Abrüstung» — wenn auch die skeptischen Stimmen dort nicht zu überhören sind.

Die Fassadenmalerei der Publizität vermag nicht zu verdecken, worum es geht. Die «all-europäische» Konferenz ist ein Projekt der sowjetischen Politik und Propaganda. In seiner Bedeutung hat es während der langen Inkubationsfrist wiederholt Akzentverschiebungen erfahren. So zielte es eine Zeitlang vor allem darauf, der DDR auf diesem Wege zu internationaler Anerkennung und schließlich zur staatlichkeit Deutschlands zu besiegeln. Das

ist inzwischen auf andere Weise, unter Mitwirkung der Bundesrepublik selber, erreicht worden.

Es bleibt über die Ostverträge Bonns hinaus das Bedürfnis Moskaus, seinen europäischen Herrschaftsbereich durch internationale Vereinbarungen abzusichern und von ungünstigen westlichen Einflüssen abzusiegeln, ein Bedürfnis, das mit der wachsenden Unsicherheit im asiatischen, chinesischen Rücken des Sowjetimperiums dringlicher geworden ist. Es bleibt, im Rahmen solcher Sicherungspolitik und als ihre offensive Komponente, der Wunsch und der Wille Moskaus, den Einfluß der Sowjetunion auf ihrem westeuropäischen *Glacis* auszuweiten und ihr dort Mitbestimmungsmöglichkeiten und Aufsichtsrechte zu verschaffen, also in irgendeiner Form in der westeuropäischen und atlantischen Gemeinschaft Fuß zu fassen und den europäisch-amerikanischen Zusammenhang durch Hebelwirkungen an beiden Enden zu lockern. Und es kommt dazu das sowjetische Verlangen, westliche Wirtschaftskapazitäten, europäische oder amerikanische oder beider im Zusammen- oder im Gegeneinander-spiel, für die eigene notleidende Entwicklung einzuspannen.

In dieser Anlage stecken also, für sich genommen, weder Ansätze zu einer Lockerung der totalitären sowjetischen Herrschaft in Osteuropa — im Gegenteil —, noch zu westöstlichen Brückenschlägen und Öffnungen — im Gegenteil —, noch zu militärischem Abbau. Das sind vielmehr Ziele, die im Westen, das heißt bei einzelnen seiner Partner, mehr oder minder entschieden ins Auge gefaßt werden und denen man sich über einen Ausgleich von Leistungen und Gegenleistungen anzunähern hofft. Die Idee der «europäischen Konferenz» ist dort, als einseitig sowjetischen Interessen dienend, lange Zeit auf Ablehnung gestoßen. Attraktiv wurde sie erst, als die NATO, unter dem wachsenden Druck amerikanischer Tendenzen zum Truppenabbau in Europa, darin die Möglichkeit einer Vereinbarung über «gegenseitige ausgewogene Kräfteverhältnisse» (MBFR) zu wittern begann. Die «Sicherheitskonferenz» tat sodann ihre Dienste als Köder für das *Berlinabkommen*. Und man verspricht sich, stellenweise, von ihr nun auch Ansatzmöglichkeiten, um ein Minimum an «Freizügigkeit»

über den Eisernen Vorhang hinweg herauszuholen.

Hat die Konferenz eine Chance, zum Tauschkontor für wechselseitige Konzessionen zu werden — für ein *«do ut des»*, aus dem nicht nur, wie aus deutschen Vertragskünsten, eine Bestätigung der sowjetischen Positionen und Ansprüche, sondern eine tatsächliche *Verbesserung der europäischen Verhältnisse*, eine wirkliche Entspannung, eine Aufhellung der trostlosen Oede totaler Herrschaft resultiert? Es kommt darauf an, mit welcher Entschiedenheit und welchem Nachdruck Leistungen in diesem Sinne verlangt werden. Es kommt also nicht zuletzt auf die *Verfassung* an, in der die Tauschpartner zu ihrem Geschäft antreten.

Die Sowjetunion legt zweifellos in ihrer globalpolitisch und wirtschaftlich problematischen Situation großen Wert auf das, was sie mit dieser Konferenz erreichen will. Wird sie deshalb mit substantiellen Zugeständnissen dafür bezahlen? Dem Tauschobjekt «Truppenabbau» gegenüber hat sie sich bisher zurückhaltend gezeigt. Ihre erst nach langem Zögern angekündigte Bereitschaft, überhaupt darüber zu reden, verrät nicht mehr als ihr Interesse, die «große» Konferenz zu bekommen und die noch davorliegenden Hindernisse zu beseitigen. Keinesfalls deutet sie schon an, daß Moskau den westlichen Vorstellungen einer *«ausgewogenen»* Reduktion der militärischen Kräfte entgegenkommt. Und gegen die «Zumutung» von Zugeständnissen freier Information oder freier Bewegung schießt ihre Propaganda aus allen Rohren und denunziert sie als «Eingemischung in innere Verhältnisse». Eine Lockerung der östlichen Zwangsgemeinschaft im Zeichen der *Breschnew-Doktrin* ist ohne Zweifel der leitende Gedanke oder Hintergedanke manches osteuropäischen Politikers im Hinblick auf die Konferenz; Moskau selber aber wird alles daran setzen, derartige Versuchungen im Keime zu ersticken.

Der Westen seinerseits tritt in die Verhandlungsrunde keineswegs als geschlossene Einheit ein. Nicht nur, daß Frankreich im Unterschied zu den anderen Partnern von Truppenabbaugesprächen nichts wissen will und daß in der NATO umstritten ist, was unter dem Titel «freiere Bewegung» oder, neutraler, «Austausch» mit welchem Nachdruck von Moskau gefordert werden soll.

Es lasten noch ganz andere Hypothesen auf der Handlungsfähigkeit der atlantischen Partnerschaft. Der *amerikanisch-sowjetische Bilateralismus*, das heißt die beiderseitige Neigung zum Exklusivgespräch zwischen den

Supermächten, von dem niemand weiß, wie weit und auf wessen Kosten es geht, hat seit der gemeinsamen Moskauer Erklärung *Nixons* und *Breschnews* über die «zwölf Gebote» der Koexistenz neues Mißtrauen unter den Alliierten erzeugt, die sich dort nicht nur völlig übergangen, sondern zum Teil «verkauft» fühlten.

Aus Bonn werden ähnlich ominöse Tendenzen registriert. So die, sich mit den neuen «Vertragspartnern» im Osten ebenso abzustimmen wie mit den Verbündeten im Westen, also wieder eine *deutsche Mittelrolle* zwischen West und Ost anzustreben, die zu bewältigen einer schon das Format Bismarcks haben müßte, die aber heute kaum zur Stärkung der Allianz beitragen dürfte.

Europa insgesamt hat, soweit es um Politik und besonders West-Ost-Politik und nicht nur um Außenhandel geht, bisher weder eine Stimme noch einen Sprecher gefunden, sondern ist in Einzelzüglein mit Sondertaktiken aufgelöst und also ein Manövriere- und Auseinandermanövrierefeld — für die andern — geblieben. Einig sind sich die westlichen Staaten vielleicht heute in ihrem eifrigen Interesse am Osthandel; das wird ihre *«bargaining power»* gegenüber einem geschlossenen Machtblock, in dem sich keine der westlichen Auflösungserscheinungen und Interessengegensätze zeigen beziehungsweise manifestieren können, kaum verbessern.

Unter diesen Umständen wird man die Augen nicht vor der Problematik verschließen können, die in dieser Großveranstaltung steckt. Sie könnte *Gewichtsverschiebungen* bewirken, die der Sowjetunion einen nachhaltiger bestimmenden Einfluß in Westeuropa verschaffen und den bunten Konvoi der Nationen dieses Kontinents vermehrt in den Sog seiner stärksten Macht bringen könnte. Und sie könnte *Fiktionen* erzeugen, die man in der Öffentlichkeit dann für solide Resultate hält: Nichtangriffspakte, Grenzgarantien, Abrüstungsmaßnahmen, Kooperationsabkommen, die einen stabilen Frieden lediglich suggerieren, aber ihn nicht mehr in wirksamer Weise, nämlich durch *kriegsabschreckende Stärke*, sichern würden; die eine Entspannung und Normalisierung lediglich deklarieren, aber am traurigen Zustand des geteilten Europa nichts Wesentliches ändern würden — nichts, was den Raum der totalitären Herrschaft wohnlicher machen könnte. Das sind nicht die bereits vorhersehbaren Ergebnisse dieser Konferenz, sondern die Gefahren ihrer möglichen Fehlentwicklung. Es würde einige und vor allem koordinierte Anstrengungen brauchen, um sie zu vermeiden.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
12 November 1972

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## Letters to the Editor

To the Editor:

It is impossible for me to reconcile your editorial stand on Vietnam with the reality I perceived on a recent visit to that beleaguered country. I found a lively, vital and relatively open society that has made impressive strides in education, medical care, land reform, etc., against what seem insuperable obstacles.

It is mystifying how easy it seems to abandon these people to the proven murderous ministrations of the North Vietnamese. This is despite the willingness of a pacific people to die to defend their country against an ancient enemy.

Perhaps the key to an easy conscience in this case is the substitution of mind-numbing slogans for a disturbing reality. Thus, a complex society struggling for survival is equated with the "Hieu regime," and description of the ruthless,

aggressive North Vietnam Army, with 500 tanks, 150 MIG's, SAM's, etc., as a "tiny band of peasant guerrillas."

How do such simplistic concepts become an acceptable characterization of a complex society of seventeen

million people fighting a centuries-old battle against aggression from the north? I suspect that, in part, the news coverage, focusing on a few aspects of South Vietnam to the exclusion of all else, has permitted a brutalized rhetoric to substitute for reasoned knowledge.

I went to South Vietnam as a private citizen, representing only myself, to learn as much as possible in a brief visit about higher education, medical training and the society in general. For background information, I had, of course, the benefit of the efforts of some 400 reporters covering a country the size of Florida.

I might as well have gone to the moon for all the information our media carry on these subjects. I found, surprisingly, massive educational efforts that have resulted in almost universal literacy, a university system struggling to achieve high standards, a national agricultural center and an engineering center more attuned to pragmatic social needs, it seemed to me, than our own counterpart institutions.

I was particularly impressed by the medical education, which applies the

rigorous standards of our best western schools. The new university growing up at Thuduc represents a sacrifice of national resources remarkable in so beleaguered a country.

All of what I saw was made possible by energetic and dedicated Vietnamese concerned for their people's future and welfare. How tragic to know that, by all indications from previous North Vietnamese occupations, they will most probably be murdered should a policy of abandonment ever be implemented.

South Vietnam can be freely entered by the news media and by private citizens. In contrast, North Vietnam is accessible only to politically reliable visitors. As a consequence, as great an institution as The Times concludes that there is little worth supporting in the open society, and, by implication, the closed one should be permitted to carry out its aggression.

There is a lesson in this that will surely not be lost on future leaders who debate the virtues of free access by the press.

SHELDON PENMAN  
Professor of Biology, M.I.T.  
Cambridge, Mass., Oct. 28, 1972

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THE TUPAMAROS: A MYTH DEMOLISHED

Can a democracy, especially one in the throes of social unrest brought on by a lengthy economic depression, survive the attempts of well organized Marxist revolutionaries to impose their views through political terror and violence?

This question, which has caused increasing concern in recent years, is partially answered by the determination of the people and government of Uruguay to eliminate the Cuban-inspired and supported elitist Marxist insurgency that wracked their country for almost five years.

Less than a year ago, the Tupamaros had a worldwide reputation as "masters of urban guerrilla warfare" and generally were conceded to be "technically and operationally" the most effective purveyors of revolutionary violence outside the Far East. Their exploits and operational methods were chronicled, carefully studied and imitated by militant revolutionaries throughout the world.

In mid-1971 some responsible Western observers even credited the Tupamaros with "running what is virtually a parallel government in Montevideo," the capital of Uruguay. Others saw the government of Uruguay as being "virtually terrorized into impotence" by the Tupamaros. In its issue of 15 May 1971 the Economist of London pessimistically predicted that the Tupamaros "are about to show that a new model of revolutionary warfare -- the war of the urban guerrilla -- can lead to the conquest of the state."

Yet, today, the Tupamaros have been routed. Their intricate clandestine infrastructure, painstakingly built up over a period of years, is all but destroyed and their well compartmented "columns" and "revolutionary cells" shattered. Most of the Tupamaro activists, including the top leadership, are either in prison or dead; the few still at large are in total disarray.

The defeat of the Tupamaros will be an especially bitter pill for Fidel Castro and his Havana-based exponents of violent revolution. Just as the death of Che Guevara symbolized the failure and marked the decline of the rural guerrilla movement in Latin America, so may the demise of the Tupamaros do the same for urban guerrilla movements with which Castro has aspired to torment almost every country in Latin America and many others throughout the Third World.

Uruguay, a small country nestled between the two giants of Latin America, Brazil and Argentina, has often been called the "Switzerland of the Americas." It was the scene of the first social revolution of the 20th century, peacefully carried out during the two terms of President Jose Batlle, 1903-1907 and 1911-1915. Among the Batlle reforms were an 8-hour work day, a minimum wage, unemployment benefits, old age pensions and paid holidays. He also legalized divorce, abolished capital punishment, instituted a system of free university education and nationalized public utilities, large banks and key industries such as meat packing and oil. With additional reforms over the years Uruguay became one of the world leaders of progressive social development.

Uruguay has a population of slightly less than 3,000,000, almost all of European origin. About 80 percent of Uruguay's population is urban and 1,250,000 live in Montevideo.

Until the advent of the Tupamaros Montevideo was a city in which the fine arts flourished and Uruguay was singled out as the best example of Latin American enlightenment. Its people were among the best educated in the world.

#### URUGUAY'S ECONOMY -- THE ROOT OF ITS PROBLEMS

In 1950, with a thriving economy based primarily on the export of beef and wool and with an unusually large and affluent middle class, Uruguayans enjoyed the highest standard of living in Latin America. The Uruguayan environment attracted many tourists and foreign business firms, further contributing to the nation's wealth. The government was so well off that it continued to expand its already large civil service to administer its elaborate and costly social welfare programs. In such a bright economic atmosphere little thought was given to expanding the country's economic base as a hedge against the future.

By the mid-1950's, however, world demand and prices of beef and wool began a sharp and steady decline. With a corresponding drop in production of these key items, unemployment increased at a rapid pace. In a futile attempt to alleviate the situation the Uruguayan government absorbed numbers of the unemployed into its already abundantly staffed civil service. Between 1953 and 1960 a 400 percent increase in the cost of living overtaxed the government's ability to meet the rising needs of social welfare.

The 1960's began with increasingly louder labor demands for higher wages while the large percentage of the population that subsisted on once-generous government handouts, found their numbers increasing and the real value of their subsidies dropping. Frustration grew among the large numbers of the capital city's intellectuals as it became more apparent that the nation's economic problems were not caused by temporary market fluctuations but represented serious faults

requiring radical and stringent corrective measures in the basic national economy. An increasing number, with a theoretical rather than a practical knowledge of socialism, began advocating a wide variety of radical Marxist solutions to the nation's ills.

#### THE RISE OF THE TUPAMAROS

It was in this atmosphere of economic depression and social unrest that the Tupamaros were spawned. Although the genesis of the organization is obscure, it is generally conceded that Raul Sendic Antonaccio was its founder. Sendic attended law school but dropped out before receiving his degree. He was already a hardened professional revolutionary with international ties when he first received public attention in 1960 as the principal labor organizer for the Socialist Party of Uruguay (PSU) among sugar plantation workers in the north of Uruguay. At this time Sendic, already 35 years old, was a member of the PSU executive committee and legal adviser to a Communist-Party-dominated labor organization.

In 1961 Sendic visited Cuba for an on-the-spot study of the revolutionary techniques of Castro and Che Guevara. Although Sendic would eventually become an innovator of revolutionary tactics on his own, the basic strategy that he and the Tupamaros would follow stemmed directly from the Cuban example.

In Uruguay, Sendic set up his bases of operations in the northernmost part of the country where, with two other Cuban-trained and seasoned revolutionaries, he set about to organize the Artigas Sugar Workers Union (UTAA). One of his cohorts was Rodriguez Beletti, then in his mid-30's, who had made several trips to Moscow and Havana as Chief of Propaganda of the Uruguayan Communist Youth League before he joined Sendic.

Under the trio's leadership a small action group of the UTAA occupied the offices of a large sugar company and organized the sugar workers in "the March of the Hairy Ones" to Montevideo on May Day of 1962, shouting the slogan "For land and with Sendic." The march succeeded in gaining reforms for the sugar workers, although it failed to spark an immediate nation-wide guerrilla movement, which was Sendic's objective. Nevertheless, Regis Debray, the Havana-based French intellectual who chronicled many of Castro's revolutionary pursuits, gives credit to Sendic and his nucleus of hard-core revolutionaries, who organized the UTAA in 1962, as "the half dozen militant 'eccentrics' who were to give birth to the Tupamaros."

During the early days of the Tupamaros, Sendic and his group received more than inspiration and guidance from Havana. A former Cuban intelligence officer who defected in 1965 has reported that during the first half of the 1960's, the Cuban Intelligence

Center (DGI) in the Cuban Embassy in Montevideo supplied funds, training in the techniques of guerrilla warfare and logistical support to the Sendic militants. Although Sendic gratefully accepted this aid, from the very beginning he was careful to preserve for his group a public image as an independent, self-sufficient, nationalistically-oriented revolutionary movement.

First public mention of the Sendic group as the "Tupamaros" came in the latter part of 1964 and coincided with their first known actions in an urban setting. The group distributed leaflets bearing the title, "Tupamaros," at the university in Montevideo in an attempt to publicize the group among students and intellectuals for future efforts at recruitment. Shortly thereafter, the group attacked the offices of the American-owned Moore-MacCormack Lines in Montevideo and printed its new name, "Tupamaros," on some leaflets and scribbled on the walls. The name and a distinctive five-pointed red star adopted as the group's emblem, got more publicity in 1965 when the group bombed the Bayer chemical plant in Montevideo.

The name, "Tupamaro," had romantic nationalistic connotations for Uruguayans since it was used by General Jose Artigas for the gauchos he led against the British in Uruguay's war of independence in the 19th century. It originated with a Peruvian Indian named Tupac Amaru, who was executed in the 18th century for leading a revolt against Spanish rule and had become a symbol against foreign repression for Uruguayans and many other Latin Americans.

By January 1966 the foundation of the organization was sufficiently firm, enough publicity had been generated, and enough ties with the international Marxist world had been made for the Tupamaros to hold their first national convention. The group formally assumed the title Movimiento Liberacion Nacional/Tupamaros (National Liberation Movement/Tupamaros), with the initials MLN.

By the time the convention was held Sendic and his lieutenants had decided that the Sierra Maestra of the MLN/Tupamaros would be the modern buildings, boulevards and side streets of Montevideo. Rural guerrilla movements, patterned after the Cuban example, had failed in the early 1960's in Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia. The Tupamaros would change the doctrine of Castro and Guevara to meet the needs of the times and to conform to conditions in Uruguay -- to become the prototype for a new revolutionary warfare -- that of the urban guerrilla.

Compartmentation was the golden rule in securing the organization. The basic structure was the cell which was composed of two to ten individuals. The cells, carefully compartmented, made up "columns" which were also compartmented. Each column had its own leadership unit, services, infrastructure, contacts and action groups. Strict discipline was maintained by a secret executive committee, known to be headed by Sendic and to include only his

hard-core comrades, who carefully controlled the operations of the organization.

The inner organization of activists, or combatants, was protected by surrounding "layers" of aspirants, sympathizers, collaborators, friends and momentary allies, including the Comite de Apoyo a los Tupamaros (Tupamaros Support Committee) (CAT) which secretly carried out such tasks as propaganda, recruiting, financial activities and occasional operational support.

The MLN never issued any manifestos or made public ideological pronouncements. Ideology of the movement paralleled its organizational structure: Only the executive committee considered itself as an element of the "Marxist-Leninist world revolution." It was this small group of Sendic and his Havana-trained aides who secretly maintained ties with centers of world revolution in Havana and Moscow.

This executive core was surrounded by a larger group of tested revolutionaries who came to the Tupamaros from the ranks of the Communist, Socialist and other Marxist-Maoist parties, in many cases without severing their respective party ties. Although this group was not privy to the executive center's objectives, it viewed the movement as a means to establish a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship of the proletariat.

Surrounding the executive and revolutionary groups were the activists, supporters and sympathizers who made up the majority of MLN personnel. While some were Marxists of sorts, none was made aware of the ultimate objectives of the movement. They were accepted by the organization on the basis of their ability and willingness to perform some useful function. The center made little effort to influence their political or ideological views. It was this variegated but carefully compartmented ideological composition of the Tupamaros that probably accounted for its greatest strength. The conglomerate of assorted political and ideological views on the broad outer rim projected the desired popular image.

#### TUPAMAROS IN ACTION

In several of the Tupamaros' early operations foreign businesses, especially American-owned firms, were attacked on the pretext of protesting the war in Vietnam. While the public and most of the MLN membership could accept this as a worthwhile political objective, the executive committee was well aware that these operations would increase unemployment and deprive the nation of vitally needed foreign investments, thereby adding to the burdens of the Uruguayan government and the growing economic plight of the people.

In one of its earliest operations, the Sendic group hijacked a delivery van loaded with meat products and distributed their loot as food packages in the poorest area of Montevideo. In prominent

press accounts of the incident they were labelled the "hunger commandos," and since then almost every article concerning the Tupamaros has retold the story.

They also invaded radio stations where they played taped messages over the air before retreating, and on occasion occupied movie houses to show their own slides or deliver lectures to the audiences before the arrival of security forces. Favorite political targets of the organization were imperialism, corruption in government, (and later the government of Uruguay itself), the police and security forces, the oligarchy (although Uruguay is unique in Latin America in that it has no established oligarchy) and the "bourgeois" establishment.

The group carried out a number of bank robberies, escaping with funds that totaled close to half-a-million dollars over the course of several years. Such actions provided the executive committee with a ready explanation for its source of funds, although a careful analysis of the expenses of the group would in all likelihood reveal that income from operations provided only a small fraction of the organization's funds.

Until 1969 the Tupamaros concentrated their main energies on actions and operations designed to popularize the struggle and sell their national revolutionary line to the people. Violence was shunned for the most part; emphasis was on building their prestige and attracting recruits. Although the first Tupamaro was killed in a fight with police after an abortive attempt to steal a car in December 1966, the total casualty figures for the three-year period, from mid-1966 to mid-1969, were two guerrillas and two policemen killed.

The MLN's choice of targets, its avoidance of undue violence and its unbroken string of successes during this period, combined with the free press of Montevideo, which thrived on romance and sensationalism, made the Tupamaros a household word throughout Uruguay. Numerous magazine and newspaper articles touted its members as modern Robin Hoods, and a local public opinion poll of early 1969 showed that 40 percent of the people surveyed believed that the Tupamaros were a group of well-intentioned, nationalistic revolutionaries.

A generally ineffective government experienced a major crisis with the death of the President in late 1967 and the coming to power of the Vice-President, Jorge Pacheco Areco. As President, Pacheco moved to control imminent economic collapse by stringent methods, including a wage and price freeze and devaluation of the currency. In 1968 he initiated the first vigorous government efforts to suppress the rising tide of Tupamaro harrassment. To Pacheco's discredit, he did not have a clear mandate from the electorate and, in instituting emergency security measures that suspended certain constitutional provisions regarding civil rights, he



bypassed the legislature. Pacheco's efforts, although needed, were ill conceived and poorly publicized. They resulted in a public image of increased government repression and a marked increase in sympathy for the Tupamaros' cause.

Certain basic trends on the South American continent and throughout the world also benefited the Tupamaros during the latter half of the 1960's. These included: a sharp rise in nationalism throughout Latin America, focusing in large measure on anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism; a rapid increase in urbanization that caused unmanageable social and economic problems for city governments; and a remarkable surge of political awareness and subsequent unrest and violence among traditionally acquiescent social elements, including youth, women and racial and ethnic minorities.

Viewing the Tupamaros as a nationalist movement of the new left, many young men and women were attracted to it, and they formed the overwhelming majority of new recruits during the period of the late 1960's. Most were from upper middle-class or relatively well-to-do and influential families. Although many were politically immature, they were attracted by the glamour and romance associated with the Tupamaros: the secrecy and mystique, firearms, fast cars and motorcycles, karate, code names and disguises. By mid-1971, the MLN had an estimated 5,000 supporters and sympathizers and about 3,000 activists.

#### THE FALL OF THE TUPAMAROS

The beginning of the end for the Tupamaros was in 1969 when the executive committee decided to make greater use of terror and violence in its political action operations. (Their first actual kidnapping was in August 1968, when they abducted Ulises Pereyra Reverbel, Director of the State Electric Power and Telephone Company. Their image was not damaged, however, because he was released after five days and reported he had been well treated.) But a year later they undertook a series of kidnappings that turned public opinion against them. In September 1969 they abducted a prominent newspaper publisher and held him for over two months until they were paid a large ransom. Because of the ordeal suffered by the publisher's family, which was believed to have precipitated his elderly father's fatal heart attack, and the bad publicity that followed, the incident was regarded more as a common crime than as another act of nationalist-inspired derring-do. Several foreign officials were subsequently abducted, among them the Brazilian consul in Montevideo, a U.S. agronomist and the British ambassador. But the case that probably cost the Tupamaros the greatest loss of popular support was the 1970 kidnapping and brutal murder of AID advisor Dan Mitrione.

Violence of this kind, which gave the Tupamaros spectacular international notoriety, gave rise to the false impression that MLN had developed into a para-military force strong and effective

enough to challenge the Uruguayan security forces for control of the government. Apparently, even the MLN leaders believed their own publicity and were deceived into over-estimating their own strength, for there was a succession of increasingly violent operations, followed by the notorious September 1971 jailbreak, when 106 Tupamaros escaped, among them Sendic himself.

The Tupamaros then halted their terrorist activity in order to support the leftist Broad Front coalition which, in the style of Chile's Popular Unity front, was trying to elect their candidate as president in November elections. Unlike the Allende-led coalition in Chile, however, the Broad Front candidate was roundly defeated, having received only 18 percent of the popular vote.

Sendic apparently decided then, and began to plan for an all-out, direct confrontation with the Uruguayan military, which culminated in the shocking, mass assassinations in April of this year. The running gun battles and the resulting slaughter, as the terrorists fought it out with military and police forces, spurred Congressional legislation to eliminate the Tupamaros. The armed forces were given authority to hold suspects indefinitely, to search without warrant, and military courts were given the power to hand down sentences of up to thirty years for those convicted of terrorist action.

At present over 3,000 Tupamaros have been tried or are under arrest. The consensus among the Uruguayans and foreign observers in Montevideo is that the Tupamaros, once a model for revolutionaries throughout Latin America, have been devastated and the myth of Tupamaro invincibility demolished. It will obviously be a long time before they can again mount a major operation. In contrast to earlier public opinion, a poll taken in July 1972 showed that 59 percent of those questioned supported military and police efforts, and only 4 percent believed the Tupamaros were in true quest for social justice.

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## The crumbling columns of a model guerrilla group

Can the urban guerrilla be defeated? The experience of Uruguay strongly suggests that he can. Over a period of about four years, the Tupamaros had virtually terrorized the state into impotence: today, after ruthless security operations since mid-April, the gang has been broken, perhaps irrevocably.

In their heyday, the Tupamaros robbed banks, kidnapped ministers and diplomats, operating apparently at will and escaping if captured. They held the British ambassador, now Sir Geoffrey Jackson, for eight months in a "people's prison". By any standards, they were the most successful—indeed, the prototypes—of the new breed of urban guerrillas, and as such an inspiration to the IRA Provisionals, the Palestinian gangs and other practitioners of the art of paralysing civilized life. Unless their fortunes unexpectedly revive, their defeat must count as the most successful anti-terrorist action in recent memory, and comparable with the messier and more protracted British campaign in Malaya.

It is worth looking, first at the facts of the present situation; then at the reasons for the dramatic changes in Uruguay. Styling itself after an Inca folk hero, Tupac Amaru, the National Liberation Movement (MNL) owed its successes, at least in part, to superb organization. A five-man executive gave the orders, and a seven-man secretariat did the administration; the rank and file were grouped in "columns", each more than 100-strong. At all three levels, the movement has suffered crippling losses. The founder of the MLN, Raúl Sendic Antonaccio, was captured on September 1 after a gunfight with the security forces in which he was wounded. Three other members of the executive are also out of action: Julio Marenales Sáenz, wounded and arrested on July 26; Alberto Candán Graíales, killed on April

14; and Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro, arrested—also on April 14.

Of the seven-member secretariat, only two are at large: Carmen de Rosencoff and Jorge Rissi Picardo. Rosencoff may still be in Uruguay, but Rissi has fled to Chile, where President Allende's leftist government offers open hospitality, at times perhaps to the President's embarrassment, to revolutionaries from all over Latin America. Of the other members of the secretariat, one is dead and four are under arrest.

Rissi was a member of the MLN International Affairs Secretariat; so was Andrés Flex Cultelli Chiribao, and he too has taken refuge in Chile. The depletion of the leadership goes down to the column commanders. Jorge Pedro Zabalza, who commanded Column 23, was arrested on June 15; and Leonel Martínez Platero, in command of Column 7, was killed in June. Other hard-core Tupamaros now out of action include:

José-Alberto Mujica Cordano, arrested on August 16; Pedro Dubra Díaz, arrested in May; and Jesse Arlette Macchi Torres, wounded and arrested in June. Only one MLN leader of any importance appears to be still actively in the fight: Raúl Bidegáin Greissing. The arrests continue, but the police and army are running out of important people, and most of those seized lately have been small fry, including members of the Committee in Support of the Tupamaros and of the Training Action Groups.

Further down the hierarchy, the columns have been almost entirely dismantled. Virtually nothing is left of Columns 21 to 27. Ninety-four members of Column 24, operating in Paysandu, have been detained. Column 26, operating in Colonia, is officially "liquidated"; more than 100 members of Column 27, which covered Florida,

Durazno and Paso de los Toros, are out of action. The Montevideo columns are shattered. Of the 192 Tupamaros who had escaped in mass jailbreaks, 159 have been rearrested.

With the arrests have come huge hauls of weapons. Nearly all the rifles and hand guns stolen from the Naval Training Centre in May, 1970, have been recovered. So have nearly all the weapons imported from friendly countries and organizations. Some of the arms stolen from private collectors are still, however, in MLN hands.

The question—of interest to countries, such as the United Kingdom, faced with similar armed challenges—is, how did it happen? It is worth recalling, in view of the popular association of Latin America with strong men and palace revolutions, that Uruguay is both a democracy and a welfare state, although it had fallen on hard times through the partial loss of wool and meat export markets.

The turning point may have come in November 1971, when general elections were held in the face of terrorist attempts to prevent them. The new President, Juan-María Bordaberry, who had described the Tupamaros as "criminals", did not take office until the beginning of March. A lull followed, but in mid-April a new wave of terrorism began with the kidnapping and murder of officials and members of the security forces.

In the revulsion of popular feeling that occurred, Congress, by a large majority, gave the President power to proclaim a "state of internal war", involving the suspension of civil liberties and trial by military courts of offences against the state. A State Security Law took effect on July 12; the suspension of civil liberties had been extended for 90 days on June 30; and on its expiry on September 29, was further extended for 60 days.

CPYRGHT

Tough interrogation methods brought rapid results, and a breakthrough came in April when one of the arrested leaders decided to give full cooperation with the authorities.

But tougher police methods alone would not have brought success: the overwhelming factor was the feeling of revulsion against the Tupamaros, which is reflected both in Congress and in public opinion polls. The MLN's overt political arm, the 26th of March Movement, is virtually defunct and its leaders

have fled or been arrested. But their Christian Democrat friends within the Frente Amplio (Broad Front) in Congress have turned against the terrorists. The other left-wing parties — the Communists and Socialists—are scarcely troubling to hide their joy at the MLN's discomfiture, from which they hope to profit.

In the polls, 59 per cent of those questioned in July thought the armed forces were doing a good job; and only 4 per cent felt the Tupamaros were motivated by a search for social jus-

tice. In May, only 33 per cent had given the armed forces high marks; and a year ago 52 per cent considered the Tupamaros well intentioned.

It remains to be seen whether the Tupamaros are crushed beyond all hope. The economic and social ills under which they flourished remain unsolved; and the suspension of liberties will not be enforced indefinitely. Only time will show whether the restoration of democracy will give new life to its enemies.

READER'S DIGEST  
November 1972

CPYRGHT

BY DAVID REED

## How a fanatic guerrilla movement, once a model for revolutionaries the world over, has been all but defeated by South America's smallest democracy

THE ASSASSINS had drawn up a list and, when they set out early that morning, the victims were as good as dead. At 7, the killers closed in from a moving car and shot down two men. At 9:05, they gunned down another man as he was walking to a bus stop. At 9:40, they took up window positions inside a church, watching a house across the street. They waited patiently for 50 minutes before the man they wanted came out of the house. The killers took aim and fired.

That morning, last April 14, shocked the little South American republic of Uruguay as has nothing else in recent times. The killers were members of the fanatically leftist Tupamaro guerrilla movement, and the victims were associated with the government, armed forces and police. The Tupamaros, who had been skirmishing with the authorities for nearly three years, had opened a

final, showdown push to replace Uruguay's democratic government with a Castro-style dictatorship.

It was a confrontation that would loom large for all of South America. Little Uruguay (slightly larger than Missouri, population three million) is sandwiched between the two giants of the continent, Argentina and Brazil. Guerrilla war was already going on in Argentina, and an urban terrorist movement that had been suppressed in Brazil could easily be re-ignited if the Tupamaros were to triumph. The Tupamaros had the support of Cuba's Castro as well as of Chile's Marxist president, Salvador Allende, who, like leftists elsewhere, saw Uruguay as a focal point for promoting successful revolutions throughout South America.

**Deadly Sophisticates.** The Tupamaros were formidable opponents, the most sophisticated of the world's

guerrilla movements, and they had already all but brought the Uruguayan government to its knees. By every trick imaginable, they had sought to discredit the government. They assassinated policemen. They kidnapped nearly 20 foreign diplomats and prominent Uruguayans, and for a long time outwitted all government efforts to rescue the victims. They set off bombs, robbed banks, burned down business firms and boldly held up radio stations to broadcast propaganda messages. For psychological effect, most killings and kidnappings were carried out on Fridays, a day of the week that the public came to dread.

The guerrillas intimidated so many of the nation's police and judges that the police often looked the other way when the Tupamaros struck, and judges were afraid to hand down stiff sentences. After one shoot-out between Tupamaros and police, a terrified policeman telephoned a man whom he knew to be a Tupamaro sympathizer and said

that he had withheld his fire. "Come and count my bullets," he quavered. CPYRCHT guerrilla movement operated in, literally, such an underground fashion. The Tupamaros honeycombed Montevideo with underground hideouts and tunnels, usually reachable only by moving secret panels in walls and furniture of houses above. In some subterranean chambers, they set up hospitals for their wounded, complete with operating tables and, in at least one case, a stolen X-ray machine. In other tomb-like caverns, they maintained "people's jails," where they held their hapless kidnap victims for months. Montevideo's sewer system became their network of highways. Most hideouts were connected by tunnels to the sewers and, if the police closed in on a hideout, the Tupamaros had only to wade to safety through the filth.

**Monetary Malaise.** The Uruguayan government was singularly unprepared for a showdown. Unlike many South American countries, Uruguay was and remains a democracy. For years, the country prospered from exports of meat, wool and hides; the wealth was shared, and there were few very rich people, few very poor. Early in the 1900s, Uruguay began a program of social reforms—workmen's compensation, unemployment insurance, retirement pensions, the eight-hour day. Free education up to the university level produced a population of highly educated people.

But this halcyon era came to an end in the early 1950s, when meat prices fell and synthetic fibers began to give wool tough competition. Instead of tightening its belt and cutting back on its expensive welfare system, Uruguay's politicians continued to shower benefits on the voters. Today an Uruguayan can retire at about age 50 on a full salary. A woman who has worked for ten years can retire, with a lifetime pension, on the birth of a child. Uruguay's work force of one million must support 400,000 others on lifetime pensions. To aggravate the eco-

nomie malaise, the cost of living has been soaring since the 1950s, and many men have had to take on a second or even a third job. And all the while the national university has churned out more and more graduates—frustrated young people without career prospects who have become increasingly radicalized.

**Urban Underground.** It was against this background that the Tupamaros appeared.\* The movement was founded by Raúl Sendic, a leftist agitator and one-time law student. Beginning in 1962, Sendic gathered embittered young radicals around him. They were men and women in their late teens or 20s, almost all from upper-middle-class homes and very well educated. They spoke vaguely of creating a "socialist" society, but never spelled out details. Their main aim was simply to destroy existing institutions.

The Tupamaro movement developed a new wrinkle from the outset: instead of beginning in the countryside, as the old pros, Mao Tse-tung and Fidel Castro, had done, Sendic launched his guerrilla war in the streets of Montevideo (population 1.5 million). With indefatigable energy, he and his followers began renting houses in quiet residential neighborhoods all over the city, under which they excavated *berretines*, or hideouts, carrying earth away secretly at night. The Tupamaros operated above ground as well, behind what seemed to be perfectly respectable business firms. They opened three furniture shops, where they made furniture with sliding panels to conceal secret passages. A tailor shop stitched up bogus police and army uniforms, and a photo shop produced false identifications. They had their own auto-painting and body garages, where stolen cars were disguised. Obtaining supplies was never a problem: if they needed something—like the estimated \$100,000 per month nec-

\*They took their name from Tupac Amaru, one of the last of the Inca royal dynasty, who was put to death after he led an unsuccessful uprising against the Spaniards in Peru during the 18th century.

essary to finance their operations—they simply took it at gunpoint.

The Tupamaros enjoyed considerable popularity in the early years. People howled with laughter every time the guerrillas made a fool of some pompous official or another. But their sympathy quickly evaporated when, in mid-1969, the Tupamaros began assassinating policemen—and others.

On July 31, 1970, an American official named Dan Mitrione got into a police car in front of his house to be driven to the American Embassy. Mitrione, who worked for the U.S. Agency for International Development and was a former police chief of Richmond, Ind., had been assigned to help train the Uruguayan police. Mitrione's car had traveled only a block and a half when it was rammed by a truck.

Instantly, the Mitrione car was surrounded by Tupamaros. They beat Mitrione on the head, shot him in the chest, took him away in a car, and threatened to kill him unless the government released 150 "political prisoners"—Tupamaros awaiting trial for robbery and other crimes. President Jorge Pacheco Areco refused, and Mitrione's body was later found in a stolen car. He had been shot in the head.

Not long after the kidnapping of Mitrione, the Tupamaros also kidnapped an elderly American agricultural expert, Dr. Claude L. Fly, who had been serving as an adviser to the Uruguayan government.\* Then, as British Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson was being driven to work, a station wagon rammed his vehicle and he, too, was spirited away. Kidnapings of prominent Uruguayans followed with dismaying regularity.

A living entombment awaited the victims. Taken to underground *berretines*, they were put in wire cages six feet long and four feet wide, and kept there month after month, never knowing if their lives

\*See "Claude Fly's Seven-Month Nightmare," *The Reader's Digest*, September '71.

would end with a bullet in the head. (Dr. Fly suffered a heart attack after nearly seven months in his prison tomb, and the Tupamaros grudgingly let him go. Ambassador Jackson's ordeal lasted eight months; then he, too, was released.)

**Record Jailbreak.** Despite all the difficulties, the police began to make considerable headway against the Tupamaros. They scored one big success when they raided an apartment and arrested two Tupamaros. Instead of taking them to jail, the police remained in the flat. At each knock on the door, they pulled in the newcomers and handcuffed them. Soon the police had nine top Tupamaros, including Raúl Sendic.

Then, during the early hours of September 6, 1971, the recent police victories went up in smoke. The evening before, four Tupamaros had invaded a private home across the street from Punta Carretas Prison, and had put the family under guard in a bedroom. The guerrillas then tore up the floor. At 2 a.m., the family heard many voices—and realized that men were coming up through the hole in the floor! Working for two months under the noses of indulgent guards, the Tupamaros had dug a 120-foot tunnel from the prison. As each prisoner emerged, he was given clothes, a pistol, ammunition and money. Precisely 106 Tupamaros fled, including Sendic.

**Turn of the Tide.** In late 1971, however, the guerrillas suffered a major defeat—at the hands of the entire nation. President Pacheco's

term was coming to an end, and a presidential election was set for November 28. The leftists organized a so-called Broad Front, which included the communist party, to contest the presidency. Some leftists reckoned that in view of Uruguay's economic malaise, they had a strong chance of coming to power by the ballot box; only a year before, the Marxist Allende had done just that in Chile. The Tupamaros backed the Front and, to avoid alienating the voters, called off terrorist operations during the campaign.

On election day, however, more than 90 percent of the voters went to the polls and turned the Front down cold. It received only 18.3 percent of the popular vote as a relatively conservative rancher, Juan Bordaberry, was elected president. Sendic and his lieutenants now reckoned that the time had come for all-out warfare on the Uruguayan army itself, which numbered only 14,000 men and hadn't seen combat in 68 years. The assassinations that so shocked Uruguay last April 14 were the result. All that day, beleaguered troops and police fought gun battles with the Tupamaros in the streets.

As it turned out, Sendic could not have made a more poorly judged move. The open battle jolted Congress into declaring a state of internal war, the first in Uruguay's history. The army, which had taken charge of operations, was given the power to hold suspects indefinitely. A ban on searching homes without a warrant was suspended. Working

with the police, the army rounded up known Tupamaros. The public, which had distrusted the police because of Tupamaro intimidation and infiltration, flooded military headquarters with information. Congress, in turn, enacted new laws under which military courts could mete out sentences of up to 30 years for terrorist offenses. The Tupamaros had sought to provoke a military takeover of the government so as to polarize the country and give them an opportunity to ally themselves with moderate, democratic forces. Instead, they only provoked the army into destroying them.

More than 1000 Tupamaros, perhaps one third of the active membership, are at this writing under arrest. Although Sendic, seriously wounded and captured by the army on September 1, has been securely tucked away in military custody, along with almost all of his top lieutenants, there are still enough Tupamaros at large to stage an assassination or some other headline-catching crime. Even so, the consensus among Uruguayans and foreign diplomats is that the Tupamaro movement, once taken as a model by revolutionaries the world over, has been crippled and, in all likelihood, destroyed. The myth of Tupamaro invincibility has been demolished. Uruguay has shown the world that, with determination, democracy can triumph over those who would take advantage of its freedoms to destroy it.

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December 1972

MISSION OF THE UNIVERSITY IN LATIN AMERICA

The Conference on the Mission of the University in Latin America, which opened 18 September in Bogota, and then continued with four days of discussions at the resort center of Sochagota, served to highlight longstanding problems of the universities in Latin America. More important, its participants, who represented a broad range of political viewpoints, reached agreement on a number of issues and solutions related to the current situation in the universities, their role in society and national development, the priority of their problems and the need for reform.

The conference was sponsored by the Colombian Institute for the Promotion of Higher Education and the International Institute for Educational Studies. In addition to the regular participants, numbering some sixty university rectors, administrators, professors and student leaders from twelve nations, there were observers from several regional and international organizations, including UNESCO, the Office of Ibero-American Education and the Andres Bello Convention (the Andean regional group).

Major resolutions dealt with the concept of university autonomy, student participation in university management and the problem of campus violence. On university autonomy, the conference resolution stated that as a cultural and scientific institution, the university is autonomous, "with all the rights, functions and responsibilities that this entails." It maintained that while autonomy is natural and appropriate to the university, it is "relative and not absolute," and its limits are determined by its own nature. It said further that the exercise of such autonomy should not imply either its isolation or the existence of unjustifiable privileges; that autonomy belongs to the university, but the university belongs to society. The resolution emphasized that mutual respect and tolerance constitute the essential pre-requisites for the development of all university activities, and the university must be "political but non-partisan," inculcating the student with ideas and teaching without bias.

Student participation in governing the universities was described as a "legitimate right of those who compose the university community," but the forms and implementation of it were left to each individual institution according to local problems and conditions. The conference condemned campus violence as a means contrary to the very nature of the institution which must not be resorted to under any circumstances.



The responsibility of teachers toward students and the academic community was also considered as well as their role in society at large. The conference dealt with the problems of teacher training and stressed the need for better compensation to ensure that professors give their full time and attention to their academic duties. The participants likewise agreed that much could be done to improve the administration of universities and to raise the standards and status of university administrators.

The university system is largely a result of the reform movement, aimed at democratization of the university, that began in 1918 in Cordoba, Argentina, from which it subsequently spread throughout most of Latin America. The system of higher education that developed from the Cordoba reform has generally failed to meet the needs of Latin American society since academic standards are low, administration is too decentralized and ineffective, there is a continuing lack of trained personnel and funds to meet the needs of the growing student body and a sense of academic community is non-existent. It has been openly admitted by Latin American educators that a number of the universities offer a low level of education and operate with low budgets, resulting in inadequate laboratories, technical equipment and teaching resources. In many cases the majority of faculty members are professional people who volunteer as part-time instructors.

The Cordoba movement also represented a type of nationalistic urge to escape European influence and develop specifically Latin American universities. This, combined with increasing social tensions over the years, has encouraged a tradition of revolt against established authority and has led students to consider themselves as the vanguard of reform.

In Latin America the problem of dissident university students, and the accompanying problem of campus violence, are old ones, whether the students actually belong to minority extremist groups dedicated to fomenting discontent and disorders or belong to the majority of politically conscious, rebellious youth who are vulnerable to and stimulated by the continuing stream of leftist propaganda which typically flows through the Latin American university community.

The principle of university autonomy is directly related since in practice it facilitates and protects the infiltration into the university system of extremist elements who are interested only in diverting it to their own ends and against the best interests of the university and larger national interests. Autonomy has been a firmly established, time-honored principle in Latin American universities, and was originally conceived to protect the universities from unwarranted political interference in such matters as curriculum, staffing and teaching. It has meant that virtually all prerogatives in university academic and

administrative matters are reserved to a governing council, made up of student, faculty and graduate representatives. This body has the authority to hire and fire staff members, including the rector, establish curriculum, disburse funds and control university grounds.

These factors, together with the role of the university as a melting pot for the formation of political ideas have led students to consider it as a privileged sanctuary with virtually extra-territorial status. The result has been that political agitators have taken advantage of the safehaven afforded by the university's autonomy to exploit the highly vocal and susceptible student sector, often under the direct guidance of adult political parties. Ultra-leftists have thus been able to pose as champions of nationalistic solutions to problems of overriding interest to the student body, and have repeatedly succeeded in drawing support to their cause on such issues. The overall result has been that the universities have become politicized to an inordinate degree, and academic standards have been so lowered that Latin America's needs for well-educated university graduates are not met. Yet the principle of autonomy has prevented governments from taking the necessary steps to depoliticize them and turn them toward their true educational purpose.

There have been several instances in recent years, however, when governments have not hesitated to limit the extent of university autonomy, and to end student-inspired violence. They have taken the position that autonomy is not the same as extra-territoriality nor does it exempt a school and its students from enforcement of the law. In the case of the Mexican student riots in 1968, it was generally agreed that while the government's basic stand on this issue was justified, it over-reacted and used extraordinarily harsh and repressive measures against the students. On the other hand, when the Venezuelan government took action in late 1966 to clean out the terrorists using the Central University of Venezuela as a bastion and sanctuary against the law, it received overwhelming public approval.

LA REPUBLICA, Bogota  
26 September 1972

CPYRGHT

## La autonomía: derecho relativo de universidades

La autonomía universitaria no debe mantenerse como un derecho absoluto sino relativo, para buscar una efectiva integración de los estudiantes profesionales con las necesidades sociales de cada país.

La anterior es una de las conclusiones del encuentro sobre la misión de las universidades en América Latina, que deliberó en Sochagota, con participación de once países.

El documento final del certamen fue dado a conocer ayer en conferencia con periodistas por el presidente del encuentro, doctor Edgar Millares Reyes, y el director del Icfes Pablo Oliveros Marmolejo.

Los asistentes al evento deliberaron en tres comisiones: la universidad y la comunidad universitaria, ubicación ideológica de la universidad y la universidad y la sociedad.

En cuanto a la "Ubicación ideológica de la universidad", señaló el encuentro que las instituciones de educación profesional tienen como misión principal contribuir a formar auténticos hombres, a quienes ha de capacitar mediante una sólida cosmovisión, a fin de que adquieran las aptitudes necesarias para poder actuar de acuerdo con las exigencias de la realidad histórica de cada país.

Los representantes sostuvieron que una de las principales tareas de la universidad, como órgano de saber riguroso y profundo, es la de dilucidar científicamente los mecanismos

ideológico-políticos que confluyen en la integración del sub-continente, como condición ineludible para preservar los valores nacionales y solucionar los angustiosos problemas de las grandes mayorías marginadas.

Respecto al "nacionalismo popular", la mayoría de delegados anotaron que supone un proyecto de civilización como empresa común, capaz de animar un fuerte desarrollo independiente, el cual ha de ser a su vez generador, tanto de una justa redistribución del ingreso y la riqueza, como reformas estructurales tendientes a lograr una sociedad más justa y humana.

Expresaron que las universidades deben estar animadas por el propósito de incrementar un intercambio inmediato de profesores y alumnos, promover encuentro, con el objeto de concretar lineamientos de acción conjunta.

Analizaron los asistentes al encuentro, la conveniencia de que las universidades apoyen la creación de una "universidad latinoamericana de post-graduados", encargada de formar una conciencia para "una reunificación".

También conceptualizaron los delegados que las universidades del continente deben fomentar la creación de un fondo latinoamericano de becas integrales.

Igualmente afirmaron y defendieron la autonomía universitaria como condición

esencial de la vida académica y de su misión de búsqueda de la verdad en la ciencia y la investigación.

Estimaron que el comportamiento y la responsabilidad de los docentes universitarios en América Latina se encuentran afectados por factores que atañen a la situación histórico-social que vive el mundo y por problemas que se dan en el ámbito interno de la institución.

Entre los factores histórico-sociales citaron: la insuficiencia de recursos en los países latinoamericanos, el distanciamiento entre las generaciones y el incremento de la población estudiantil.

Constataron que los problemas internos universitarios se refieren a la politización partidista de la universidad, a la discriminación político-ideológica en el nombramiento de profesores y a presiones políticas que atentan contra la libertad de cátedra.

### VIOLENCIA

Rechazaron todo conato de violencia como sistema de trabajo universitario.

"Es sabido -anotaron- que muchas veces los medios violentos comportan manifestaciones de fanatismo o son una manera fácil de no enfrentarse racionalmente a los problemas. Además, la violencia engendra violencia en la vida social, situación que repercute en la universidad".

CPYRGHT

## A RELATIVE RIGHT OF THE UNIVERSITIES

University autonomy must not be held to be an absolute right but, rather, a relative one [if we are] to seek the effective integration of the professional students and the social needs of each country.

The foregoing is one of the conclusions of the Meeting on the Mission of the Universities in Latin America which met, with 11 countries participating, in Sochagotá.

The final document of the event was released yesterday at a press conference held by the chairman of the Meeting, Dr. Edgar MILLARES Reyes, and ICFES Director, Pablo OLIVEROS Marmolejo.

The participants in the event conducted their deliberations in three committees [whose subjects were]:

"The University and the University", "The Ideological Stance of the University," and "The University and Society."

CPV RIGOR  
With regard to the "Ideological Stance of the University," the Meeting pointed out that the principal mission of the professional education institutions is to contribute to the training of genuine men, whom they must train through a sound cosmos-vision so that they may acquire the necessary capabilities to be able to act in accordance with the exigencies of historical reality of each country.

The representatives stated that one of the principal tasks of the university, as an organism for rigorous and profound [searching for] knowledge, is to scientifically elucidate the politico-ideological mechanisms that will lead to the integration of the sub-continent [sic], an essential condition for the preservation of national values and for solving the agonizing problems of the vast deprived masses.

As for "popular nationalism," the majority of the delegates noted that this presupposes a civilization planned as a joint enterprise; one capable of stimulating a strong [and] independent development which, in turn, must be the generating force of a just redistribution of income and riches and structural reforms aimed at achieving a more just and humane society.

They stated that the universities must become excited about the prospect of a immediate exchange of professors and students; [must] encourage meetings whose aim is to lay out specific plans for joint actions.

The participants in the Meeting analyzed the advisability of the universities backing the creation of a "Latin American university for postgraduate students," whose mission would be to create an awareness for "an [eventual] reunification."

The delegates also conceived the idea that the universities of the Hemisphere must encourage the establishment of a Latin American fund for complete scholarships.

They also affirmed and defended university autonomy as an essential condition for the academic life and [the university's] mission of seeking truth in science and research.

They also felt that the behavior and responsibility of the university instructors in Latin America is affected by factors deriving from the socio-historical situation in the world, and by problems arising within the institutions themselves.

Among these socio-historical factors, they mentioned:  
- the shortage of resources in the Latin American countries, the generation gap, and the increase in the student population.

They stated that the internal university problems refer to the partisan politicalization in the university, to the politico-ideological discrimination in the appointment of professors, and political pressures that hinder academic freedom.

#### VIOLENCE.

They rejected any form of violence as method suitable to the university's work.

"It is known," they stated, "that violent measures often entail manifestations of fanaticism, or are an easy way of avoiding facing up to problems rationally. Furthermore, violence breeds violence in social life, a situation that rebounds to the detriment of the university."

EL TIEMPO, Bogota  
26 September 1972

## "La violencia es negativa" para la U. latinoamericana

El Primer Encuentro Latinoamericano sobre la Misión de la Universidad en América Latina precisó que "el camino de la violencia, siendo negativo, no puede ser expresión universitaria".

Durante una rueda de prensa, en la cual estuvieron presentes el doctor Jaroslav V. Zich, director general del Instituto Internacional de Estudios sobre la Educación, IIEE, el doctor Pablo Oliveros, director del ICFES, y el doctor Edgar Millares-Reyes, se dieron a conocer las conclusiones de este encuentro, cuya meta inmediata es lograr el funcionamiento de una Universidad Latinoamericana para postgraduados.

En cuanto hace a la violencia, los directores del encuentro indicaron que "esa expresión tan común en varios países latinoamericanos merece el estudio de sus causas y la remoción de las mismas".

"Según nosotros, dijo Millares-Reyes, ejecutivo del IIEE para Latinoamérica, la autonomía de la universidad, pero no es absoluta sino relativa y sus límites están determinados

por su propia naturaleza".

"Hay arbitrariedades en el seno de las universidades que limitan su propia autonomía, por ejemplo, cuando se presentan pugnas y enfrentamientos extrauniversitarios; pero también hay limitaciones que surgen de fuera de la universidad, tan peligrosas como las primeras".

Millares-Reyes concretó: "La autonomía es de la universidad, pero la universidad se debe a la sociedad".

Sobre este aspecto, el encuentro, en el cual estuvieron presentes autoridades, profesores y estudiantes de 14 países del Hemisferio, considera que "la universidad debe cumplir con respecto a la sociedad las siguientes responsabilidades: una cultural, que consiste en conservar, acrecentar y transmitir la cultura al máximo nivel en forma escolarizada y también en forma no escolarizada; una responsabilidad política, que consiste en enjuiciar científicamente la realidad nacional con nuevos modelos; una responsabilidad social, que consiste en contribuir al

desarrollo dando unidad a todos los sectores de la vida nacional".

"La universidad debe estar integrada no solo dentro del sistema unitario de la educación, sino también dentro del sistema general de la sociedad, vinculándose concretamente con los sistemas científico, tecnológico y cultural del país".

Los representantes del IIEE y del ICFES indicaron que "la universidad de por sí es elitista, porque a sus dependencias o programas solo ingresa el mínimo de las mismas comunidades. Así lo demuestran las estadísticas de la universidad de los países industrializados como de los en vía de desarrollo".

#### La crítica

Agregaron que "la crítica es el elemento esencial dentro de la universidad. No debe ser por tanto militante; si lo fuera, dejaría de ser universidad y se convertiría en excluyente. En cambio la crítica es valiosa si se la hace desde el ángulo de la realidad, que tiene en cuenta todos los elementos que componen la sociedad, respetando las dis-

tintas ideologías existentes en ella. Una universidad no debe estar aislada, por el contrario, debe estar orientada hacia la problemática nacional. Para el encuentro debe responder a ella con fórmulas científicas".

El encuentro, que deliberó entre el 18 y el 22 de septiembre en Paipa, Boyacá, también se pronunció sobre la universidad como una unidad emocional.

Los representantes de IIEE e ICFES, auspiciadores del certamen, pusieron de presente que "hubo equilibrio entre los participantes por sobre diferencias intelectuales o ideológicas". Y "cuando las intolerables diferencias hacen su escenario de la universidad, aparecen las dificultades para ella"; por eso "decimos que la universidad es una institución que tiene que mantener su unidad de espíritu y nutrirse de ideas, y no hay por qué temerlas", pero "también debe haber hidalguía, altura de espíritu y decorazón para sembrar las virtudes en beneficio de las instituciones y de la humanidad".

"VIOLENCE IS NEGATIVE" FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY  
Educational Meeting:

The "First Latin American Meeting on the Mission of the University in Latin America" pointed out that, "the method of violence being negative, it cannot be a university expression."

At a press conference given by Dr. Jaroslav V. ZICH, Director General of the International Institute for Studies on Education (Instituto Internacional de Estudios Sobre la Educación, IIEE); Dr. Pablo OLIVEROS, Director of the ICFES; and Dr. Edgar MILLARES Reyes, there were announced the conclusions of this meeting whose immediate goal is to establish a Latin American University for postgraduate students.

As for violence, the directors of the meeting indicated that "this expression, so common in many Latin American countries, requires a study of its causes and the overcoming thereof."

Amongst us, said MILLARES Reyes, the IIEE executive, "autonomy is synonymous with the university; but it is a relative, not an absolute, thing and its limits are determined by its very nature.

"There are arbitrary attitudes within the universities themselves which limit their own autonomy -- for example, when extra-university clashes and confrontations crop up; but there are also limitations that come from without the university, and which are as dangerous as the first type."

MILLARES Reyes made it clear that, "The autonomy belongs to the university, but the university belongs to the society."

On this aspect, the meeting, which was attended by [university] authorities, professors and students from 14 countries of the Hemisphere, feels that, "the university must meet the following obligations to society: a cultural one, which consists of preserving, increasing and transmitting culture to the maximum extent in both a scholarly and non-scholarly [sic - popular] form; a political responsibility, which consists of scientifically assessing the national realities and creatively contributing new ideas; a social responsibility, which consists of contributing to [national] development by unifying all sectors of the national life.

"The university must be integrated not only into a unitary educational system, but also into the general system of the society, specifically binding together

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the scientific, technological and cultural systems of the nation."

The IIEE and ICFES representatives indicated that, "The university per se is elitist because only the minimum number from the [various] communities enter its dependencies or programs. This is shown by the statistics from both the industrialized countries and the developing ones."

#### CRITICISM.

They added that, "Criticism is the essential element within the university. But it must not, therefore, be militant; if it were, it would cease to be a university and become exclusive. On the other hand, criticism is valuable if it is levied from the scientific standpoint, taking into account all the elements that make up the society [and] respecting the ideological differences extant therein. A university must not be isolated; on the contrary, its must be oriented toward [solving] national problems. Therefore, this meeting must respond with scientific formulae."

The meeting, which was held in Paipa, Boyacá, from 18-22 September, also discussed the university as an emotional entity.

The IIEE and ICFES representatives, the sponsors of the event, noted that, "there was a balance among the participants in terms of intellectual and ideological differences." and that, "when intolerable differences crop up in the university, then the latter is in trouble;" and, therefore, "we say that the university is an institution that must maintain its unity of spirit and nourish itself on ideas and not fear them;" but,, "there must also be [a spirit of] gentlemanliness, nobility of spirit and rectitude of the heart in order to sow virtue to the benefit of the institutions and of Mankind."

EL SIGLO, Bogota  
26 September 1972

*Negativo el Camino de la  
Violencia en Universidad*

### Dicen conclusiones de encuentro de educación superior

El camino de la violencia es negativo para solucionar los conflictos de la Universidad en América Latina; el Estado debe estar de acuerdo con la Universidad para su programación educacional superior; la educación superior pertenece a las élites en todo el mundo; en muchos países no hay diferencia entre la educación superior y la educación básica; la educación superior requiere un inter-

cambio de profesores a escala latinoamericana; se propone por la fundación de una universidad para capacitación de profesores y se deben revisar los planes "sobre educación superior en el continente".

Tales son en parte las conclusiones del Encuentro Latinoamericano sobre Misión de la Universidad en América Latina, que terminó sus deliberaciones en Sochagotá, Boyacá, el pasado fin de semana.

El evento fue auspiciado por el Instituto Internacional de Estudios sobre la Educación con sede en Bruselas, Bélgica, y el ICFES y fue instalado por el ministro de Educación, Juan Jacobo Muñoz. Participaron delegados y observadores de Argentina, Brasil, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Panamá, Perú, Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala y Ecuador.

El temario comprendió tres puntos esenciales: Ubicación ideológica de la Universidad, la Universidad y la Comunidad y la Universidad, la Sociedad y el Estado. (Ver la página 9)

El encuentro Latinoamericano sobre la misión de la Universidad en América Latina realizado en Sochagotá del 18 al 22 del presente mes, adoptó importantes conclusiones en un documento final dado a conocer hoy por sus organizadores.

Edgar Millares Reyes, Director del Departamento del Instituto Internacional de Estudios sobre la Educación Superior para la América Latina y Pablo Olivares, Director del Instituto Colombiano de Fomento para la Educación Superior, presidieron una rueda de prensa e informaron sobre los resultados de la importante reunión en Sochagotá.

El evento fue instalado la semana anterior por el Ministro de Educación Juan Jacobo Muñoz, y deliberó en Sochagotá Boyacá con la presidencia del viceministro del ramo Guiller-

mo Alberto González y Edgar Millares Reyes, Director para América Latina del IIEE con sede en Bruselas Bélgica.

#### VIOLENCIA

Entre las conclusiones adoptadas por el Encuentro figura la que se refiere a los estados violentos dentro de las Universidades. "El camino de la violencia, —dice el documento— siendo negativo no puede ser expresión universitaria. Esta expresión tan común en varios países Latinoamericanos merece el estudio de sus causas y la remoción de las mismas. Según nosotros, la autonomía es connatural a la Universidad pero no es absoluta sino relativa y sus límites están determinados por su propia naturaleza. Hay arbitrariedades en el seno de las Universidades... pero también hay limitaciones que surgen fuera de la universidad tan peligrosas como las primeras. La autonomía es de la Universidad pero la Universalidad se debe a la sociedad".

#### RESPONSABILIDAD

Se consideró durante el Encuentro que la Universidad debe cumplir entre otras estas responsabilidades: cultural, que consiste en conservar, acrecentar y transmitir la cultura; social que consiste en contribuir al desarrollo dando unidad a todos los sectores; responsabilidad política para enjuiciar críticamente la realidad nacional y contribuir creativamente con nuevos modelos.

Se enfocó igualmente la reforma de la educación en América Latina en el campo superior; sobre el tema disertó Raúl Ailard Neumann de la Universidad Católica de Valparaíso.

En materia académica se expresó el consenso de que "deben revisarse los planes y programas de estudio e informar sobre dicha revisión con la conservación Latinoamericana, con contenidos propios, con acentuado conocimiento del pasado, marcando una proyección para el porvenir de nuestra realidad cultural continental".

Finalmente el documento señala que "una de las principales tareas de la Universidad como órgano del saber riguroso y profundo es la de dilucidar científicamente los mecanismos ideológicos políticos que confluyen en la integración del Continente Latinoamericano, como condición ineludible para preservar los valores nacionales y solucionar los angustiosos problemas de las grandes mayorías marginales...". "La Universidad debe hacerse cargo, sostuvo la mayoría de los delegados, de la tarea de constituir la futura realidad Latinoamericana basada en el esfuerzo propio de nuestros pueblos".

### VIOLENCE A NEGATIVE FACTOR IN THE UNIVERSITY

Violence is a negative factor in [attempts to] solve the conflicts in the university in Latin America; the state must agree with the university in planning its higher education is the property of the elite throughout the world; in many countries, there is no difference between private and state education; there is always a "brain drain" in some countries; an exchange of professors throughout Latin America is needed; there will be proposed the establishment of a university for the training of professors, and there must be a revision of the plans for "higher education in the Hemisphere."

These are some of the conclusions of the Latin American Meeting on the Mission of the University in Latin America [ELMUAL] that concluded its deliberations in Sochagotá, Boyacá, this past weekend.

The event was sponsored by the International Institute for Studies on Education [IIEE], with headquarters in Brussels, Belgium; and the ICFES, and was opened by

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therein delegates and observers from Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Panamá, Perú, Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala and Ecuador.

The agenda covered three basic points:- Ideological Stance of the University; The University and the Community; and The University, the Society and the State.

#### CONCLUSIONS OF THE EDUCATIONAL MEETING IN SOCHAGOTA.

The Latin American Meeting on the Mission of the University in Latin America [ELMUAL], held in Sochagota on 18-22 [September], adopted some important conclusions, published in a final document that was released yesterday by its organizers.

Edgar MILLARES Reyes, Director of the Latin American Department of the International Institute for Studies on Higher Education [IIEE]; and Pablo OLIVEROS, Director of the Colombian Institute for the Encouragement of Higher Education (Instituto Colombiano de Fomento para la Educación Superior, ICFES), presided at a press conference on the results of this important meeting in Sochagotá.

The event was opened the preceding week by Education Minister Juan Jacobo MUÑOZ, and conducted its deliberations in Sochagotá, Boyacá, under the chairmanship of the Vice Minister [of Education], Guillermo Alberto GONZALEZ, and Edgar MILLARES Reyes, Latin American Director for the IIEE, which is headquartered in Brussels, Belgium.

#### VIOLENCE.

Among the conclusions reached by the Meeting, was one dealing with the outbreaks of violence in the universities. "Violence," says the document, being negative, cannot be a university expression. This phenomenon, so common in many Latin American countries, deserves to have its causes studied and corrected. In our view, autonomy is concomittant with [the concept of] the university; but it is not an absolute thing, but, rather, a relative one and its limitations are determined by its very nature. There is arbitrariness within the universities....but there are also limitations which derive from without the university, but the university is the property of the society."

#### RESPONSIBILITY.

It was decided during the Meeting that the university must meet, among others, these responsibilities: - a cultural one, which consists of preserving, increasing and transmitting culture; a social one, which consists of contributing to the development [of the nation] by providing for the needs of the people, and a political responsibility to scientifically assess the national realities and to creatively contribute new ideas.

[The Meeting] also focused its attentions on the reform of higher education in Latin America, a subject that was discussed by Raúl ALLARD Neumann of the Universidad Católica of Valparaíso, [Chile].

In the field of academics, a consensus was expressed to the effect that, "the study plans and programs should be reviewed and a report given on this review, based on an overall view of Latin America, in appropriate context, with stress on knowledge of [our] past, to lay out a plan for the future of our Hemispheric cultural realities."

Finally, the document points out that "one of the principal tasks of the university, as an organism devoted to a profound and rigorous [search for] knowledge, is to scientifically elucidate the politico-ideological mechanisms that will lead to the integration of the Latin American area as an essential condition for the preservation of national values and for solving the agonizing problems of the vast, deprived masses...."; [and continues by saying that] "The university must take over, in the view of the majority of the delegates, the task of establishing the future Latin American reality, based on the efforts of the peoples themselves."

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ISLAM IN AFRICA: A DETERRENT TO COMMUNISM

Islam, an intimate part of the daily lives of an estimated 50 million Africans south of the Sahara and an equal number in North Africa, is a force that influences one in every three Africans and which the Soviets are attempting to harness to further their foreign policy objectives. Despite Soviet efforts, Islam serves to deter the impact of communism in Africa because of (a) contradictions between theistic Islamism and atheistic communism and (b) inconsistencies between Soviet claims made to foreign audiences about religious tolerance and Soviet domestic practices of Muslim repression.

Development of Islam in Africa

Islam has proved to be a potent and resilient force in the North African states of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco where Muslims have constituted an overwhelming majority for more than a thousand years. Additionally, Islam has had an ever increasing influence on sub-Saharan Africa, particularly via West Africa, and is considered by many Africans as an indigenous religion preached by and for Africans -- without the colonialist and racist stigma often attached to other proselytizing religions. The flexibility offered by the Islamic religious structure (long established animist beliefs and rituals are incorporated and often reinforced by Islam; many indigenous social customs -- such as polygamy which is widespread in Africa -- are accepted by Islam) also make it attractive to the Africans. Initially, the new convert is not bound to all the obligations (prayers, fasts, almsgiving) that are required of Muslims. The prospective convert is asked to make one promise, that is, to have his children study the Koran and they will then fulfill the obligations of the believers. Gains are not rapid but are undeniable; for every convert to Christianity, there are an estimated 10 converts to Islam. Whole villages and tribes in both West and East Africa have converted to the Muslim religion within a period of a few months. In fact, every African country has its Muslim dispersion. In Cape Town and the Cape Peninsula area alone, there are more than 30 mosques.

Although African foreign policy is in the hands of a few leaders whose primary concern is with domestic issues, the impact of religion in general and Islam in particular serves to reduce the acceptance of communism in Africa on an increasing scale. "Muslim law (Sharia), the foundation of Islamic society, has, like the religion itself, undergone much adaptation and modification in Africa. Yet it gives African Muslim society a cohesiveness, culture and ideological orientation that transcends ethnic or

tribal affiliation...Thus, once converted, the African has acquired membership in a community as well as a religious system."\*

The basic incompatibility between Marxist-Leninist dogma and Islam is becoming increasingly clear to the leaders of the 500 million-strong Muslim world despite persistent Kremlin efforts to mask its longstanding policy of militant atheism. Libya's authoritative daily Ar-Ra'id of 7 September 1972, in an article warning against an invasion of communist ideology -- "A New Imperialist Invasion" -- denounces Moscow for "sowing the principles of communism...(and)...attempting to penetrate the Islamic idea...(We have)...ascertained the extent of the ugliness of the plots...being concocted against...destiny, religion and aspirations...(We are)...now facing a new, stronger imperialism... The imperialist methods have changed and have assumed an ideological aspect...(We)...should firmly oppose this new invasion to protect the heavenly mission..."

#### Suppression of Islam in the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union will attempt to pose as the model of inter-ethnic relations and harmony on the eve of its 50th anniversary celebration scheduled for 30 December 1972. (The USSR was established in 1922, five years after the communists seized power in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.) Special Soviet propaganda themes will be directed toward its 30 million Muslims in the four Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics of Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan as living testimony to the communality of Soviet-Islamic interests.

The Chief Mufti of the 30 million Soviet Muslims is Sheik Zin-ud-din Babakhanov who travels widely and champions the Soviet cause wherever he goes. Known as the "Red Mufti," Babakhanov speaks Russian, Persian, and Arabic. He was educated at a Tashkent religious school and the "University of Workers from the Orient" in Moscow. He attended the leading academic institution in the Muslim World of Al Azhan University in Cairo. Any Muslim students from the Soviet Union allowed to go to Cairo for advanced study can be assumed to have, at least, the blessings of the Soviet internal security services. The Red Mufti's speeches invariably claim that Soviet Muslims have complete freedom "to carry out their religious duties faithfully."

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\*Tareq Y. Ismael, "Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa", Current History, March 1969.

In actuality, Marxist-Leninist dogma looks upon traditional religions as spiritual intoxicants and specifically upon Islam as a reactionary, feudal doctrine. Atheistic campaigns against any resurgence of religion continue. For example, an article in the March 1972 World Marxist Review entitled "Lenin's Philosophical Testament" restated Lenin's views about the "irreconcilability" of Marxist philosophy with "all varieties of idealism and religious obscurantism." In September 1972 a Pravda editorial on "Atheist Education" exhorted Party Organizations to devote more attention to the "causes of the vitality of religious prejudices among certain strata of the population."

Most of the usual anti-religious arguments are not enough to satisfy the atheists in their attempts to curb the growth of Islam within the Soviet Union. Satirical poems, cartoons, mass meetings -- every means communist propaganda can devise -- are used to denigrate and ridicule Islam in a systematic way. A Tashkent newspaper, "Kommunist Uzbekistani" recently praised atheistic plays being staged at Uzbek theaters for being directed against "harmful religious vestiges, superstitions and prejudices, and the religious holidays of Islam" and for exposing the "sanctimony, greed, hypocrisy and depravity of the reactionary Muslim priesthood." In addition, Soviet authorities continue their policy of seeking pretexts for closing down mosques of which more than 90% have been abandoned since the 1917 Revolution.

Within the Soviet Union, Islam is condemned as a "primitive religion...a chaotic mixture of Christian, Jewish and pagan doctrines...founded by a member of the feudal trading classes of Mecca with the object of providing a religious pretext for the plundering expeditions organized by the Arab aristocracy." Islam is classed as a "most reactionary religion" that has "impeded all reform and has retarded the evolution of Turkestan" by advocating "unconditional submission...to fate and to...oppressors." -- The Koran is downgraded as a catalogue that codifies "injustice and inequality" and "sanctifies the submission of woman." The Sharia is presented as "a collection of laws among the most unjust which the world has ever seen."

In addition to attacking the fundamental Islamic concept of belief in a supernatural and restricting the number of Moslem religious officials and functioning Mosques, the Soviets strike at the five basic pillars of faith incumbent upon all followers of Mohammed: Zakat, obligatory almsgiving, is forbidden; hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca which every believer has to perform once in his lifetime, has been rendered practically impossible; pilgrimages by individuals are forbidden although every year 20 or 30 Muslims are selected by Spiritual Directorates and permitted to make the pilgrimage. Fasting, during the month of Ramadan has never been officially prohibited, but government campaigns attack fasting as "a barbarous, degrading and reactionary custom which prevents workers from taking an active part in building socialism." The extent to which the faithful observe salat -- a private

prayer that should be observed five times daily -- and shahada -- a profession of belief in one God and in Mohammed, are unknown. The latter two observances, of course, elude the control of authorities.

#### Soviet Islam for the Outside World

Moscow's official line for consumption abroad, especially by Afro-Asian Muslims is typified in a lecture given by Dmitri Ponomarev, Candidate of Historical Sciences, and broadcast over Radio Moscow on 27 March 1972. In his lecture entitled "Against Imperialist Attempts to exploit religion for reactionary purposes," Ponomarev said in part that "Muslims in many Afro-Asian countries where Islam is regarded as the official religion of the State, have actively participated -- and still do -- in the just struggle against colonialists for political independence..." He said that "logically, progressive revolutionary parties, including Marxist-Leninist parties call for alliance with believers in the common struggle for just objectives...Communists are sure that the believers will become...an active force in the struggle against imperialism and for profound social changes...Reaction and imperialism fear the unity of action of Communists and all progressive forces as well as millions of Muslims."

It is ironic that Ponomarev so singles out the "imperialists." As one observer has said: "In 1920 nearly all Muslims were living under direct or indirect government by the French, British, Dutch and Russians. Today only the Russians maintain their colonial empire. Apart from the 30 million or so Muslims in the USSR, Muslims everywhere are politically independent of Europe except in the Balkan countries..." The past 50 years have seen little progress for Soviet Muslims compared with those in the rest of the world.

Comments published in November 1968 in Jeune Afrique in an article by Munir Hafez are still applicable: "They lose no opportunity to repeat it. Sometimes, even they prove it: the Soviets are the great allies of the Muslims. One solitary condition: that they do not live in the Soviet Union itself...."

# Where Muhammad beats Karl Marx

SOMALIA'S success in mediating between Uganda and Tanzania has helped to improve this impoverished country's image in black Africa.

The country, on the very northeast edge of the African continent, is trying to create a new identity for itself and is seeking closer ties with East and Central Africa.

The process is shuffling, erratic, often bizarre. The old elements have not disappeared. For Africa, the people are uniquely homogeneous—there is one language, one religion and one ethnic group—yet almost a third of the Somalis live outside their country's frontiers and there is still no written form of the Somali language.

The old divisions, between the former British north and the Italian south, though diminishing, still exist. Paradoxes abound. The Somalis, virtually all Muslim, continue to feel the two-way tug of 'Arab' and 'Black' Africa.

The country aspires to be a modern state, yet 90 per cent of its

from JOHN de ST JORRE: Mogadishu, 7 Oct

population is nomadic. Situated on the Indian Ocean and commanding the entrance to the Red Sea, Somalia is at once strategic, yet remote. And its people, though marvellously friendly as individuals, remain neurotically xenophobic in the mass.

A new batch of paradoxes has been spawned since the overthrow of civilian rule in October 1969, by the Army under General Muhammad Siad Barre, now the President of Somalia. In the past three years, the Government has moved steadily to the Left, and the legendary 'Land of Punt,' where Egypt's Pharaohs once obtained myrrh and frankincense, is now the land of 'Scientific Socialism.'

Islam walks uneasily hand-in-hand with marxism. There is plenty of ideology but no party hierarchy, and everyone from the President to waiters and taxi-drivers is addressed as 'Comrade.'

President Barre doesn't hold all the power. The country is ruled by

a 24-man Supreme Revolutionary Council composed of soldiers and a few policemen. But as the most senior officer in the Army—there are no jumped-up NCO's of the Amin or Bokassa type in Somalia—and a sincere patriot who is personally uncorrupt, Barre enjoys a wide measure of popularity.

But inevitably there is a price. After the coup and the assassination of President Barre's predecessor, Somalia, like several other African military governments, styled itself a 'democratic' republic. The country, however, is further from democracy than it used to be.

Two attempted coups have been vigorously crushed (the ring-leaders of the last one were publicly executed recently), and a inefficient security service, trained by the East Germans and the Russians, keeps potential opponents in line.

President Barre has promised an eventual return to civilian rule, but the prospect seems remote.

On the surface Somalia may pre-

sent the image of an Islamic-Marxist State but, underneath, it is the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, not Karl Marx, that hold sway. Forcible lies the most likely threat to the Government if it pushes 'Scientific Socialism' too hard, for although the Somalis have never been fanatical Muslims their faith still means a lot to them.

Somalia, the Government says, is pledged to 'positive neutrality,' yet it is well under the shadow, though not the tutelage, of the Soviet Bloc.

The Russians train and equip the Army, are building up the Air Force and enjoy crucial port facilities for their Indian Ocean and Red Sea fleets. While the East Germans are training the security police, the West Germans, ironically, are instructing the ordinary branches of the force.

The Chinese restrict themselves to well-chosen technical aid projects. They have already started work on the most important scheme of all—the £40 million trunk road that will link Mogadishu and Hargeisa in the north with the first all-weather road.

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Sep 72 p 1 L

CPYRGHT

[Editorial: "Atheist Education"]

[Text] The formation of a scientific, Marxist-Leninist world outlook among the broadest masses of the working people is the core of our party's entire ideological-educational work. Such education, the 24th CPSU Congress emphasized, is inseparably linked with decisively surmounting the survivals of the past in people's consciousness and behavior and all that is outlined and which contradicts the morality and views of a socialist society. Among the most tenacious survivals of the past are religious prejudices.

The full eradication of religious prejudices requires a further upsurge of the spiritual culture and educational level of all strata of the population and much patient educational work among the masses. Many party, soviet, trade union, and other public organizations have accumulated valuable experience of such work. Increasingly fruitful use is being made of various forms of oral propaganda of scientific atheism—from lectures and discussions to question-and-answer evenings. In cities and rayon centers the network of houses and offices of atheism is growing, and exhibitions of atheistic literature are organized in public libraries. In Belorussia, for example, about a 1,000 schools for the elementary knowledge of nature and society have been set up for believers. The people's universities of atheism, the network of which has almost doubled in recent times, play a large role in the formation of a scientific world outlook.

At the same time, the scale and level of scientific-atheistic propaganda by no means everywhere meets the party's requirements. The work is developing slowly in the Kurgan, north Kazakhstan, and some other oblasts. Here and there no genuine concern is displayed for regular lectures on antireligious themes. In individual rayons of Uzbekistan, for instance, the number of lectures not only did not increase last year, but even dropped. The workers in a number of cultural-educational establishments stand aside from the struggle against religious prejudices.

Of course, the main thing in atheistic education is not the number of measures but their influence and effectiveness. There is little use in lectures if they are of a general, abstract nature and do not take account of the concrete conditions of life. During in people's consciousness under the influence of scientific and social progress or the

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Propaganda of scientific



atheism does not allow cliches and primitivism, and the slightest theoretical and factual errors, which still mar some lectures and discussions, are especially inadmissible here. The criticism of religious survivals is sometimes limited to the debunking of individual forms of religious ceremony or the unmasking of the activity of sectarian preachers and believing fanatics.

It is necessary to reveal the true reactionary essence of these survivals, which are organically alien and hostile to the conscious builders of a new society. To insure the increased efficacy of atheistic education, party organizations are called on to devote more attention to scientific analysis of the degree and causes of the vitality of religious prejudices among certain strata of the population.

Under present-day conditions it is very important to reveal the interconnection between religion and nationalist vestiges. It is known that in a number of cases churches and sects pretend to the role of the guardians of national values. We still encounter attempts to represent religiosity as a feature of national originality and nonobservance of religious festivals as being little short of apostasy from the "behests of the fathers." Such attempts are supported and fanned in every possible way from outside by bourgeois propaganda aimed at reanimating religious and nationalist prejudices. All means of ideological struggle must be utilized for the decisive rebuff of the intrigues of the bourgeois ideologists, who are striving to distort the sense of the process of mutual enrichment of the Soviet peoples' spiritual culture and to portray religion as an essential attribute in the development of their social and cultural life. At present, in the days of the preparation for the 50th anniversary of the USSR's formation, such a struggle acquires particular significance.

It is obligatory that party organizations take pains to insure that our scientific-atheistic propaganda is not only systematic and of a mass nature but also militant and on the offensive. This depends a great deal on the involvement of the general public, the production collectives, and all conscious workers in the ranks of active fighters against the survivals of the past. And above all, every communist must be a militant atheist. It is impossible to be reconciled with instances of individual party and Komsomol members themselves performing religious ceremonies, as has happened in some rayons of the Kemerovo, Orel, and Nikolayev oblasts.

The training of propagandists in scientific atheism is of paramount significance in improving the forms and methods of atheistic education. We have done and are doing much in this respect. In the Moscow, Leningrad, Lipetsk, and Gorkiy oblasts and the Tatar ASSR facilities and departments of atheist lecturers have been set up in evening universities of Marxism-Leninism; in the Ukraine, Moldavia, and Lithuania permanently operating seminars for such lecturers have become widespread. But, as a whole, the training of propagandist cadres for the antireligious front needs further expansion and considerable improvement. An important role here belongs to the All-Union "Znaniye" Society, which has great potential for enlisting scientists, specialists, writers, and artistic figures in this cause.

The formation of a scientific world outlook and the overcoming of religious prejudices is one of the combat tasks of all ideological workers and the mass information and propaganda organs. However, in the press, especially the youth press, the requisite elucidation of questions of atheistic education for the younger generation is still not always found. Material published in newspapers and magazines on these themes are sometimes of a superficial nature. Television is insufficiently used for atheistic education. Our press, television, and radio are called upon to be the able propagandists of the ideas of atheism.

Educating the working people in the spirit of scientific communism and resolutely overcoming religious survivals means raising even higher the activeness of the masses in building a new society and in struggling for the triumph of communist ideals.

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 12 Sep 72 p 1 M  
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[Editorial: "Atheistic Education"]

[Text] At the current stage of developed construction of communist society in our country ideological work among the workers assumes a special importance. The second year of the ninth 5-year plan is passing and the glorious jubilee, the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, is approaching, and the plans outlined by the 24th CPSU Congress are putting on flesh. Correct organization of mass ideological education work, mobilizing the multi-million strong army of workers of industry, agriculture, and Soviet intelligentsia for the fulfillment of the decisions of the party and government--is the fighting task of the party, Komsomol and trade union organizations, and of the local soviets of workers' deputies.

One of the important aspects of ideological work is, as is known, antireligious propaganda and atheistic education of the broad masses of the working people. Vladimir Ilich Lenin pointed out: "Marxism is mercilessly hostile to religion." The bases of all atheistic propaganda are made up of the premises brought forth by the classics of Marxism-Leninism.

Much has been done recently in our republic in the field of atheistic education of the population.

Considerable work has been done to train qualified atheist propaganda cadres. The best workers, representatives of the creative intelligentsia, has been drawn to atheistic work. An important positive role was played by the seminar of lecturing groups of the oblast and rayon party committees held by the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party. The "Znaniye" Society has played an active role. Thus, only last year and during the first 6 months of this year this society read 9,795 lectures on atheistic themes to a total of about 350,000 listeners.

An important role in the mass antireligious propaganda belongs to the people's universities. At present six faculties of three such universities are carrying on work in this direction. Local press organs, clubs and libraries pay particular attention to the atheistic education of the population. Atheistic corners and question and answer evenings are being organized; gorkoms and raykoms are holding lecture days. Atheistic education of the growing generation is more intensive.

Where antireligious propaganda is well organized and where the party committees and party committees and primary party and Komsomol organizations, and local organs of power approach this important aspect of ideological work with due attention, measures adopted for atheistic education of the masses bring the desired results.

Unfortunately, the state of this work in a number of rayons of the republic leaves much to be desired.

Today we have to speak of definite activation of the servants of cults and various religious sects in the Gagry and Gadauta rayons of Abkha ASSR, in Khelvachaurskiy and Kedskiy rayons of Adzhar ASSR, and in Akhaltsikhe and Akhmedskiy rayons.

Here we still find cases of such religious rituals as christenings, wakes, weddings in church, and so on. The servants of these cults are trying to increase the number of the faithful, attracting into the religious communities and sects people who are morally and spiritually unstable or those who do not quite understand the true aims of the churchmen and religious fanatics. This meets with success where atheistic education of the population is at a low level and left to itself.

Publication of materials on atheistic subjects in the local (rayon and city) papers has a sporadic character. There are few articles posing sharp, topical problems of organizing atheistic work among the masses. Statements by former priests and those who have come to realize their errors are seldom published.

Party committees and primary party organizations, local soviets of a number of rayons do not pay enough attention to conducting antireligious propaganda where the people live. Lectures on atheistic themes often have a superficial, shallow character.

At the same time we must not fail to consider that the churchmen and religious fanatics have sharpened devices to attract representatives of numerous circles of the population among the faithful, striving to modernize religion, and to bring their dogmas in line with the present day.

Work on atheistic education of the masses must be based on strictly scientific foundation and must be conducted single-mindedly and constantly. It must be carried out on the principle of differentiation of the audiences, taking into account the varied psychological and social factors, level of education, and so on.

In no instance can the difficult process of the profound and gradual influence upon world outlook in the feelings of the believers be replaced by stark administrative measures which are still in effect in some places. Finally, it is necessary to counterpose to the ideology of the religious fanatics the full value of spiritual food capable of satisfying the aesthetic and natural hunger of man. It is the question here of correct organization of leisure and better work of the libraries, rural clubs, and so on.

Atheistic education of the population is an urgent task of the party committees, the local organs of power, and of the Komsomol organizations of the republic. Only by creating a united front of struggle against religious prejudices, the survivals of the past in the consciousness of the people, can we insure full success in this important and complex sphere of ideological work among the masses.

Proctor, "Islam and International Relations", 1965. pp. 192-193.

#### RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES \*

	Population Total <sup>a</sup>	Catholics	Protestants	Muslims	Animists
Algeria†	10,896,940	942,322	15,650	9,780,232	<sup>c</sup>
Angola	4,500,000	1,539,000	559,000	<sup>c</sup>	2,114,000
Basutoland	641,674	273,542	213,000	<sup>c</sup>	136,000
Bechuanaland	304,097	6,230	37,404	<sup>c</sup>	260,463
Burundi	2,495,000	1,600,000	100,000	20,000	775,000
Cameroon	3,873,548	776,972	<sup>b</sup>	605,379 <sup>d</sup>	<sup>b</sup>
Central African Republic	1,180,000	128,000	128,000	50,000	830,000
Chad	2,652,000	75,615	78,000	1,400,000	1,062,385
Congo (Brazzaville)	803,745	257,866	134,650	4,540	382,000
Congo (Léopoldville)	13,990,162	4,873,925	1,058,072	116,372	7,300,314
Dahomey	1,756,000	238,148	17,600	123,000	1,341,000
Egypt	26,000,000	42,000 RC	200,000	24,000,000	<sup>c</sup>
		1,500,000 Copts			
Ethiopia (+ Eritrea)	17,000,000	124,000	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>
Gabon	417,000	185,260	<sup>c</sup>	202,445	<sup>c</sup>
Gambia	280,500	4,451	3,500	214,000	58,000
Ghana	6,690,730	562,912	686,000	687,000	4,658,133
Guinea	2,727,000	25,110	1,000	1,700,000	1,000,000
Guinea, Portuguese	550,000	15,000	<sup>c</sup>	165,000	320,000
Guinea, Spanish	240,000	192,731	<sup>c</sup>	950	65,000
Ivory Coast	3,240,000	235,836	69,574	678,455	2,193,237
Kenya	6,668,417	766,792	370,000	580,000	3,773,000
Liberia	1,500,000	12,804	60,000	250,000	1,176,000
Libya	1,172,000	41,285	3,500	1,124,000	<sup>c</sup>
Malagasy Republic	5,186,331	1,085,741	859,159	252,205	2,953,922
Mali	3,745,875	18,607	1,962	2,331,150	1,383,399

\* Source: *Ready Information About Africa* (Mission Information Center, St. Edward's College, London, 1962).

† Figures for Algerian Catholics and Protestants are in error due to large-scale exodus of Europeans since 1962.

\* Differences between the population total and the sum of the categories are frequently accounted for by "Circumstances" not yet in the Catholic Church. Among other unlisted categories are Jews, Greek Orthodox, and Hindus.

	Population Total *	Catholics	Protestants	Muslims	Animists
Mauritania	730,000	2,678	e	721,000	e
Morocco	10,560,000	420,844	7,000	9,900,000	e
Mozambique	6,310,000	476,700	100,000	612,000	4,663,500
Niger	2,600,000	10,600	579	1,800,000	727,547
Nigeria	34,443,000	1,750,000	1,030,000	15,090,000	15,870,000
Northern Rhodesia	2,394,900	486,114	30,092	837	1,872,199
Nyasaland	2,800,000	444,734	500,000	209,000	1,582,000
Rwanda	2,572,773	654,813	138,939	13,413	1,499,125
Senegal	2,260,000	143,225	900	1,633,500	474,428
Sierra Leone	2,300,000	18,545	70,000	800,000	1,400,000
Somalia	2,500,000	3,880	e	2,200,000	e
Somaliland (Fr.)	75,024	4,280	120	70,000	e
South Africa	14,673,000	850,230	9,379,000	102,600	3,667,000
South West Africa	593,000	62,399	104,000	e	423,000
Southern Rhodesia	3,111,700	279,462	114,947	1,596	2,154,732
Spanish Sahara	24,550	4,860	e	19,600	e
Sudan	11,615,000	259,971	20,000	8,000,000	3,000,000
Swaziland	264,300	20,068	56,795	e	204,205
Tanganyika	9,994,000	1,547,149	739,000	2,033,000	4,918,451
Togo	1,116,000	205,226	42,557	57,807	780,000
Tunisia	3,965,000	100,000	e	3,840,000	e
Uganda	6,536,616	1,701,348	719,028	65,366	3,979,032
Upper Volta	3,884,000	131,343	9,274	995,500	2,698,000
Zanzibar	299,111	2,080	e	296,000	e

# AR-RA'ID WARNS AGAINST INVASION OF COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

Tripoli AR-RA'ID in Arabic 7 Sep 72 p 8 M

["With the People" column: A New Imperialist Invasion]

[Text] The event is not as simple as some people believe but rather a very complicated one. It is a question of a nation whose security is being threatened by a new imperialist invasion. This invasion takes the idea as its weapon and ideology as its gunpowder and bombs. These are more effective weapons in colonizing and suppressing peoples, rendering them a tool for achieving imperialist plans and objectives.

Moscow--The banner bearer of communism and cultivator of communist ideology in third world states--is naturally interested in the unity of the Syrian Communist Party [SCP] so that it can continue on its course of penetrating the Arab peoples in an attempt to raise doubts about their destiny and existence.

Communism has attempted to penetrate into the policy of destiny and among the ranks of leaders to achieve its suspicious aims and divide Arab ranks. Russian Communism has also attempted to destroy the Arab man in fraternal Sudan, to raise doubts about its heavenly belief and to overthrow the revolutionary regime in that country. Communism has attempted all this, but it has failed. It is now trying to invade the Arab peoples in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon within the framework of an alarming plan that includes all the Arab states. The plan is to sow the principles of communism and deepen its concept among Moslem Arab youths in the present critical phase in the history of the Arab nation.

The SCP collapsed after its alarming motives were unmasked. Leaders of the communist ideology in Egypt also collapsed when their ugly faces were unmasked. They sought to overthrow the Nasirite regime and consequently to destroy the Arab struggle in its most critical and most difficult phase.

All communist parties attempting to penetrate the Islamic idea will also collapse on the soil of the Arab nation. The Arab man has ascertained the extent of the ugliness of the plots which were being concocted against his destiny, religion and aspirations

The Arab nation, which has confronted various forms of European and U.S. imperialism and through its struggle has attained its independence, is now facing a new, stronger imperialism. To confront this imperialism, the Arab nation should achieve a united revolutionary cohesion capable of checking the imperialist danger and of finally expelling it from the Arab world.

The imperialist methods have changed and have assumed an ideological aspect. The revolutionary Arab governments should firmly oppose this new invasion to protect the heavenly mission and the Arab man's freedom in his land.


Islam in Africa, edited by James Kritzech and William H. Lewis, 1969.

### INTRODUCTION 3



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CPYRGHT



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CPYRGHT

## NEW WORRY FOR KREMLIN

At a time of summit diplomacy—  
Inside Russia itself people are learning that  
Marxist dogma is no substitute for religion.  
Upshot: Freedom of worship is becoming a key  
point of dissent in an atheist-ruled nation.

**B**YOND THEIR diplomatic results, President Nixon's talks with Russia's rulers are bringing to world attention the fact that God, in the Soviet Union, is far from dead.

Interest in religion, and a desire for religious freedom, are on the rise in this officially atheist nation. Growing is a loosely knit "fraternity of dissent" embracing not only Jewish, Christian and Moslem believers but also intellectuals, youths and professional people.

For Soviet rulers, it means growing worries at home and trouble abroad in their drive for "respectability."

This situation has been developing over the last five or six years, but events directly connected with President Nixon's visit have brought it into the foreground.

- On May 9, in Moscow, 15 Baptist evangelicals invaded the U.S. Embassy seeking America's help in getting the Kremlin to relax its antireligious policy. By coincidence or not, President Nixon scheduled a visit to the First Baptist Church in Moscow for worship services on May 28.

- On May 18, in the Lithuanian city of Kaunas, Roman Catholic and nationalist demonstrators fought a pitched battle with Soviet police to dramatize their discontent on the eve of President Nixon's arrival.

- On May 19, in Washington, D. C., five Jewish militants staged a White House sit-in on behalf of Soviet Jews now in U.S.S.R. prisons and labor camps.

- On May 21, in Moscow and several other Russian cities police arrested nine Jews who had planned to present a petition to the President stating their case for religious and cultural freedom, and the right of unrestricted emigration to Israel.

**Struggle for freedom.** Close observers of this religious ferment note that the openly active dissidents probably come to no more than a few hundred thousand persons out of Russia's 225 million.

Noted, too, is the apparent fact that this broadening dissent is aimed not at the overthrow of state capitalism and many other aspects of Communism, but at the restoration of "human rights" as promised in the Soviet Constitution.

While relatively few in number and limited in aims, however, the religious dissidents are beginning to get results.

This is notably true of Russia's nearly 3 million Jewish citizens, for whom life

has become increasingly miserable since the Kremlin began to support the Arab nations and denounce Israel.

In 1970, at the celebrated Leningrad trial, 13 Jews were accused of attempting to steal an aircraft and fly to Israel. Two were convicted and sentenced to long prison terms.

That event set off Jewish protests and demonstrations within the Soviet Union, and an avalanche of condemnation abroad. As a result, the Government commuted the death sentences and—in an unprecedented step—began to let Jews leave for Israel in substantial numbers, a flow that still goes on.

That success appears to be encouraging other religious and cultural groups to step up their dissent.

Recently Moslems of the Crimean Tatar community of Central Asia sought out Jewish leaders in Moscow for advice on how to get back to their homeland, where they had been rounded up and deported during World War II for alleged pro-Nazi sympathies. Now Tatars are pressing the Kremlin for repatriation—if not to the Crimea, then to neighboring Turkey.

A Soviet physicist and member of the Committee for Human Rights, V. N. Chalidze, last year rebuked the head of the Russian Orthodox Church for supporting Soviet authorities in denying a church to believers in the town of Naroch-Fominsk.

Not only in Lithuania but in the Ukraine, Georgia and other areas, religious believers are making common cause with ethnic and nationalist groups against "Russification" of local languages, institutions and culture.

Circulating among churchmen, intellectuals and other dissenters is a "Chronicle of Current Events," which lists all known arrests and trials of those punished for expressing their beliefs. Also listed are petitions presented to Government officials on behalf of "human rights."

Says the Rev. Michael Bourdeaux, a leading British specialist on religion in the Communist nations:

"Religion is the one area where the dissidents strike a chord with the ordinary people. When intellectuals are arrested, they don't get much popular support. It's quite different for those arrested on religious grounds—they attract a surprising degree of support from all sides, even from those not religiously inclined."

Often this "fraternity of dissent" has its roots in prison and labor camps where, as one Orthodox layman puts it, inmates "slept side by side in prison bunks, gulped the same prison soup out of the same rusty bowls."

**Youth movement.** Older believers are getting reinforcement from young people to an extent not seen before.

These youths, observers find, are skeptical of Communist ideology to a surprising degree. More than previous generations, they have grown up with at least some freedoms and material pleasures—including access to news and culture from the West.

Today, young intellectuals are openly exploring moral and ethical questions. Even young Communists express an astonishing degree of tolerance for religion.

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A Russian Western diplomat with long experience in Russia: "There's a growing intellectual revolt in the Soviet Union against conformism. Young Russians look at religion as an alternative ideology—the only one permitted under the Soviet Constitution."

Whatever the cause, the religious upsurge is coming into the open to an extent not dreamed of a few years ago.

Jewish youths, newly conscious of their religious heritage, sing and dance outside synagogues. A recent survey in the industrial city of Gorki disclosed that among Christians 60 per cent of newborn infants still are being baptized—and that in 50 per cent of such households Christmas also was celebrated. A Communist report on peasant collectives conceded that 47 per cent of farm homes still display religious objects.

Even more convincing evidence comes from an atheist manual published in 1970.

This document admitted that only about 40 per cent of youngsters leaving school can be classified as "convinced atheists." Recommended were renewed efforts to root out religious beliefs among the young.

**Continuing oppression.** In 55 years since the October Revolution, religious persecution in Russia has fluctuated but never ceased.

It eased off briefly in the 1920s and again during World War II. Contrarily, religious believers—especially Jews—suffered heavily in the Stalinist "purges" of the 1930s. In the early 1960s another wave of repression closed down thousands of churches, synagogues and mosques.

The Soviet Constitution, in addition to separating church and state, gave the Government free rein in propagandizing on behalf of atheism. It forbade religious instruction for anyone under the age of 18 and placed severe limits on freedom of religious activities.

Approved denominations are permitted religious services in their places of worship but they cannot propagandize on the outside.

The Government maintains absolute control over religious publishing, manufacture of religious objects and establishment of new congregations.

Communist authorities must be supplied with lists of church members; and retain veto rights over composition of a congregation's executive body.

Permission to form a congregation may be denied without a reason's being given.

Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses and some offshoots of the Russian Orthodox Church are outlawed in their entirety. Jews and Roman Catholics are denied the right to form nationwide or regional bodies.

Other faiths were earmarked for extinction by state-decreed merger.

Protestant evangelicals were ordered to merge in 1944, and Pentecostals were added to the list in 1945. Roman Catholics in the Ukraine were ordered to merge with the Russian Orthodox Church in 1946.

Such measures, over the years, have taken their toll of organized religion in the Soviet Union.

**The worshippers.** Some Western experts put Soviet believers of all faiths at no more than 15 to 20 per cent of the population. This would include, they say, perhaps 30 million Orthodox, 3 million Roman Catholics, 1 to 2 million Baptists, Lutherans and other Protestants, 1 million practicing Jews, 5 to 10 million Moslems and somewhat fewer than 100,000 Buddhists.

Some outward traces of religion remain on the Russian landscape, including major cathedrals richly adorned with Byzantine mosaics.

But Moscow, which in 1917 had more than 600 churches for 1 million people, today has perhaps 50 active churches

Former churches have become museums, "drying out"

Jews, in 1917, had 3,000 synagogues in the Soviet Union—compared with 50 at present. Islam, in 1917, boasted of 12,000 mosques in Turkestan alone. Today, fewer than 1,000 remain in use nationwide.

In recent years, Western visitors find that religious persecution has eased somewhat—but not much.

Known believers still risk loss of jobs or promotion. Their children sometimes are refused admission to secondary schools or higher education. In some cases, youngsters actually are taken away from their church-going parents on one pretext or another.

Last year, a Church of England newspaper published a letter from 35 Baptist evangelicals which stated that in the last months of 1970, almost 400 persons spent 15 days each in prison for participating in illegal prayer meetings.

In Lithuania last November, two Roman Catholic priests were sentenced to a year each in prison on charges of giving religious instruction to children.

The last Jewish seminary closed down several years ago. With the death last year of Moscow's Rabbi Yehuda Leib Levin, only two ordained rabbis are known to be functioning in the European part of the Soviet Union—where a majority of Russia's Jews reside.

**Rise of dissent.** Today, as religious unrest grows, churchmen are finding themselves dividing into collaborationists and rebels. But it is dissent that appears to be getting the upper hand. Says the Rev. Blahoslav S. Hrubý, of New York City, himself once a Presbyterian minister in Czechoslovakia and now editor of the periodical, "Religion in Communist Dominated Areas":

"Somehow, official pressures and persecution seem to intensify spirit and faith. And now there is a seeming growth in the mood of dissent in the Soviet Union."

This unrest—and the divisions it is creating among churchmen—turn up even within the Russian Orthodox Church.

Stripped of the power it enjoyed as the state church of "Holy Russia" in czarist times, this Church still is seen by its critics as an ally of the Kremlin.

Patriarch Pimen and other high churchmen conform to Government policy without demur. Daily they are driven in black limousines to their offices, or to their *dachas*—country homes—which contain magnificent works of art and other luxuries available to few Russians.

More importantly, these churchmen have become a major instrument of Soviet policy abroad.

The Orthodox Church belongs to the World Council of Churches, and cultivates contacts with the National Council of Churches in the United States.

With official sanction, Russian prelates are free to attend religious gatherings abroad where they extol religious freedom in the Soviet Union and denounce U. S. "atrocities."

Now some Orthodox clergymen and laity are beginning to question this arrangement between church and state.

A few months ago, in an "open letter" to Patriarch Pimen, the Nobel Prize-winning novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn—an Orthodox layman—caustically stated:

"A church dictatorially directed by atheists is a spectacle that has not been seen for 2,000 years."

Another spokesman for dissenters, Anatoly E. Levitan, a schoolteacher and lay theologian, has described the Orthodox Church as "seriously ill" because of its subjugation to state policy.

Orthodox dissenters as well as other religionists are going to prison for their views.

In 1965, an Orthodox archbishop was removed from his duties for criticizing Communist intrusions into church decision-making—and two priests in Moscow who made similar complaints were dismissed from the priesthood.

But the fastest-growing church in the Soviet Union is the officially authorized Baptist denomination, too, which is widely regarded as the fastest-growing in the Soviet Union.



Over all, about 5,000 Baptist churches are reported to be registered officially. But many Baptist groups exist illegally and evangelize in defiance of state restrictions.

These Baptists, known as "The Initiators," have formed their own Council of Churches as well as the Council of Relatives of Convicted Members of Evangelical-Baptist Churches. Both agencies fire off letters and petitions not only to Soviet leaders but to the United Nations and foreign churchmen to protest the continuing imprisonment of their followers.

The established Baptist leadership itself follows a careful policy of obeying state restrictions but avoiding close collaboration with authorities.

Foreigners usually are startled by the size of Baptist congregations and their age ranges—not only in Moscow's well-publicized First Baptist Church, where President and Mrs. Nixon scheduled their Sunday morning visit, but in the countryside, too.

A Western visitor to several Baptist congregations noted:

"Altogether the congregations appeared to be pretty fair cross sections of Soviet society—with sprinklings of doctors, lawyers, teachers, professors, engineers and so on. I saw more young people than I would have in many American churches.

"No more than a very, very few of them could be called 'anti-Communist' but certainly most were against the way in which the Soviet Constitution was being violated in respect to their religious practice.

"The young seemed as fanatical as their elders—perhaps more so. They knew their Bibles."

**Catholic situation.** Unrest among Roman Catholics is especially feared by Communist authorities not only because they see Catholics as instruments of a "foreign power"—the Vatican—but because Catholicism is strong in such centers of nationalism as Lithuania and the Ukraine.

Last January, 17,000 Roman Catholics in Lithuania addressed a letter to Communist Party boss Leonid Brezhnev and to United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim complaining about harassment of their Church. Both in Lithuania and Latvia, *samizdat* or clandestine publications circulate persistently among an estimated 2.5 million Catholics.

Resistance in the Ukraine centers on the Eastern Rite or "Uniate" branch of Roman Catholicism which continues to function underground despite its state-decreed merger with the Orthodox Church in 1946.

The underground "Chronicle of Current Events" in 1969 reported that "The Eastern Rite Church . . . has become more active in recent years, and the number of its priests detained and beaten up by the police has grown."

Islam, concentrated largely in the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union, is engaged in a dual revival—both religious and nationalist in nature.

Arabic and several local languages are making a comeback as Soviet rulers ease up on their attempt to "Russify" Central Asian languages. Among nearly

all educated Moslems, "Arabic" has become a rallying cry.

Little is known of Islamic worship since the antireligious drive of the early 1960s. Soviet articles, however, refer often to "wandering mullahs"—presumably unregistered preachers—and one article mentioned a town where only seven mullahs were registered but "many more preached."

**Harassment of Jews.** As in the times of czarist pogroms, Jews are coming under especially heavy pressure.

Just how many of Russia's Jews practice their ancestral faith is not known. What does seem certain is that most are targets of repression tending to drive them into rediscovering their culture and religious heritage.

Anti-Semitism, although disavowed officially, remains an important force in Russian life and Government.

Under Communism, for instance, Jews are held to be a nationality—though unlike others, they have no homeland of their own in the Soviet Union where they may practice their own culture. They are denied the right to teach Hebrew, the scriptures or Jewish history to the young—at the same time they are set apart and discriminated against. A former orientalist scholar who is now in Israel, Mikhail Zand, observed recently:

"[Soviet leaders'] discrimination is at once forced assimilation of Jews—and restriction from becoming assimilated. So they show us that those of us who sincerely wish to be assimilated will never become equal citizens. . . . They will forever be oppressed, forever restricted, forever remain second-class citizens."

The Six-Day War in 1967 and Israel's stunning triumph over its Arab enemies brought Soviet Jews a measure of respect from some Russians, notably intellectuals, and a new sense of pride in their culture. But it also brought intensifying Government attacks on them as "aliens" and—echoing anti-Semitism of the past—as members of "the Jewish world government."

The large majority of Soviet Jews are described as wishing to remain in Russia if they can do so in peace and freedom. But in the last quarter of 1971, more than 13,000 Jews emigrated, or about 4,000 a month. An estimated 75,000 have applied for passports, and estimates of those wishing to leave run anywhere from 100,000 to a half million.

**Problem for the Kremlin.** As many Western scholars and diplomats see it, traditional religion will continue to be

a growing worry for a nation no longer able to remain unresponsive to pressures at home and abroad and no longer able to instill many Russians with Communist ideology as a substitute for religion.

More importantly, "human rights" has become the basis of a broadly gauged movement attracting churchmen, intellectuals and other elements of Soviet life and reaching into the masses. More and more Russians, churchgoers or not, are moving toward the viewpoint expressed by novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn in his letter to Patriarch Pimen:

"In the end, the true and profound destiny of our country depends on whether the right of power will become firmly embedded in the national consciousness, or whether . . . the power of right will again shine forth."

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# Kremlin leaders worried: Religion just won't go away

By Paul Wohl  
Written for  
The Christian Science Monitor

More and more churches and mosques are being closed in Russia, but religion still keeps the Communists worrying.

The party line has long been that religion is the consolation of the uneducated. But lo and behold, as Soviet education has increased, so has the interest in religion.

The party is seriously disturbed.

Pravda on Oct. 22 carried a five-column article about the best methods of fighting religion in industrial Bashkiria, an autonomous Tatar territory southeast of Moscow. In the past 10 years, the article boasted, 23 churches and 15 mosques have closed their doors.

Yet Pravda complained that even some party officials, for whom militant atheism is a must, observe religious practices.

What makes this trend so dangerous, according to Pravda's editorial, is its link with nationalist tendencies. The Russians themselves brought up this angle several years ago by interpreting the Orthodox crosses around the necks of many bathing youngsters as an expression of pride in their national heritage. The crosses, supposedly, had no religious significance.

The Soviet Union's non-Russian nationalities, eager to assert their national identity, occasionally also turn to old religious customs, which goes smack against Communist efforts to whittle down national differences.

Even more disturbing from a Communist point of view is the stubborn survival of religion in the armed forces.

On Oct. 22, a front-page editorial of Red Star, the armed forces' daily, complained about "survivals of the past in the consciousness and practice" of Army personnel.

On Aug. 22, the same journal carried a long

article according to which a "Baptist sect" had been able to win over wives of officers and enlisted men.

In another case, crosses made of aluminum were found strewn on the floor of the barracks of a military unit whose commander was a staunch Communist.

In February of this year, the same journal carried an article naming several soldiers — apparently Byelorussians — who had refused to carry arms or take the military oath. These conscientious objectors belonged to the so-called Initiativniki, or unregistered evangelical Baptists, who in contrast to their registered correligionaries, oppose many institutions of the Soviet state.

When political officers ultimately persuaded the recruits to take the oath and to carry arms, the soldiers' parents arrived, or members of their sect, and very soon the young men again became conscientious objectors.

The author commented in a conciliatory vein: "Communists must understand that the religiousness of a man is not a fault but a misfortune, and that the duty of a Communist is to help him find the (atheist) truth."

But the author admitted that there were still quite a few slips in atheist propaganda.

It would be a mistake to conclude that religion has become a decisive influence among young Soviets or that party and Army discipline are threatened. Yet the fact remains that the press still feels compelled to disclose the existence of religion not only among the people at large, but also among party members and the military.

## Long prison terms

Especially in Byelorussia, the Ukraine, in Kazakhstan, Transcaucasia and Siberia, local newspapers frequently report the activity of unregistered Baptists, Pentecostals, and Seventh-day Adventists and the sentencing of their leaders to long prison terms.

The survival of religion usually is attributed to stubborn backwardness in outlying areas, to the many religious broadcasts of the West, and to the propaganda of Western religionists who enter the country as tourists.

Another factor, acknowledged by the Soviets themselves, is the monotony of Communist indoctrination. Repelled by the shallowness of Marxist-Leninist propaganda, young people frequently seek solace in mysticism and oriental religions.

Just as in the West, Zen Buddhism seems to have made inroads among the young.

December 1972

FORTHCOMING EVENTS

December 10-17

Worldwide  
USSR

Human Rights Week, commemorating the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly 10 December 1948. In 1970 a "non-political creative association" devoted to developing the practice of human rights in the USSR was formed by Andrei Sakharov, with two physicist colleagues, Valeri Chalidze and Andrei Tverdokhlebov who said their organization would be guided by principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Sakharov made public in June 1972 his previously unpublicized memorandum of March 1972 to Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev calling for a Soviet Bill of Rights. The unofficial Human Rights Committee has been accused by the KGB of contributing to "anti-Soviet propaganda."

December 13-18

France

20th French Communist Party Congress. The French communists face thorny problems at this congress. Their joint action program with the Socialist party for the 1973 elections was severely strained by political trials in Czechoslovakia. The socialists have accused the communists of equivocation on the issue. The Czechoslovak trials have become an important issue in French politics relating to the electorally

		sensitive question of whether the French communists in power with the socialists could be trusted to adhere to democratic principles.
December 18-21	Belgium	International Symposium on 50th Anniversary of USSR to be held in Brussels under the sponsorship of the International Committee for Human Rights in the USSR. Participants will discuss generally the human rights situation today in the USSR and particularly how human rights are violated by the harsh Soviet enforced labor camp system.
December 20	USSR	Fifty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Soviet security police -- KGB.
December 21	USSR	Stalin's birthday, 1879. Died 5 March 1953.
December 26	China	Mao Tse-tung's 79th birthday. Western newsmen have recently reported that Mao favors a collective leadership for the future.
December 30	USSR	50th Anniversary of the Soviet Union. The Ukraine, Byelorussia, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were forcibly annexed to the Russian Republic in one federation politically controlled by the all-union Communist Party. The 50th Anniversary year has been marked by unrest in national minority areas, particularly in the Central Asian and Baltic Republics.

January 26-31	Finland	Interparliamentary Union Conference on European Security and Cooperation.
January 16	Czechoslovakia	In 1969 Jan Palach burned himself to death in downtown Prague to protest the Soviet occupation of his country.

~~FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

December 1972

SHORT SUBJECTS

STIRRINGS OF NATIONALISM IN SOVIET ASIA

The growth of national self-assertion among the USSR's Islamic population is a phenomenon that is increasingly intriguing observers of the Soviet scene. Following Stalin's death the Soviet Moslems have succeeded in securing for themselves a considerable amount of educational and cultural freedom. In many Islamic areas, for example, the current circulation of indigenous publications is outstripping that of Russian-language publications. The causes of and prognostication for this increasing growth of a sense of nationhood in the Moslem republics of the USSR are thoughtfully examined in the attached reprint of an article by James Critchlow who has been a student of Soviet affairs for 20 years and is currently specializing on problems of the Soviet Moslems.

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MEXICO FACES HIJACKING PROBLEM

The possibility of a change in attitude by Mexico toward extradition of hijackers may presage a breakthrough in international legal efforts to halt mounting air piracy throughout the world, and could have a positive influence on other governments which have shown a similar reluctance to enter negotiations for this purpose. Until a Mexican airliner was hijacked to Cuba in early November, Mexico had stood fast on the principle that individual states have the right to grant political asylum, and therefore Mexico would not be a party to any international agreements that do not clearly state this right.

In the case of the recent Mexican hijacking, however, the Foreign Secretariat of Mexico issued a statement that it would seek extradition of the hijackers from Cuba. (The group includes five men accused of robbery and assault in Monterrey, who had been released from jail at the hijackers' demand.) In its statement the Foreign Secretariat pointed out that such crimes are among those covered by the 1925 treaty of extradition with Cuba. Whether or not the hijackers, who call themselves members of the "League of Armed Communists," have actual revolutionary backgrounds, they were apparently well-organized and evidently some kind of guerrilla-type planning had preceded their action, since the hijacking was carried out the day after the five group members were arrested.

Foreign Secretary Emilio Rabasa himself declared that "these acts of barbarity ought to receive immediate condemnation and rebuke; that common criminals who put life and security in danger merit the most severe condemnation and rigorous application of the law; and that the Foreign Secretariat, with the Secretariat of the Interior and the Attorney General, will continue to work to obtain extradition." Interior Secretary Mario Moya Palencia told the press that countries which protect hijackers are responsible for plane hijackings, and added, "we fervently wish that on presenting this request for extradition, we will obtain a response conforming to law...and that an international legal order be the instrument to avoid this type of action, which is beneficial to no country or human being."

The Cuban government has returned the ransom money to Mexico, and there have been indications that Castro's welcome to hijackers is wearing thin as the criminals and psychopaths continue to stream into Cuba. Most likely the recent overture of the Cuban government to the United States, indicating it was "ready to take such steps which might lead to the adoption of a broad agreement" to solve the hijacking problem, will ultimately have a bearing on the Mexican case. But for the present,\* if Castro refuses the Mexican request for extradition of their hijackers, there could be considerable impetus within the Mexican government in favor of international conventions on air security.

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\*Cuba's official position on hijackings, as outlined in an Havana Radio broadcast of 15 November, is included among the attachments.

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SOVIETS IN ASIA: Proceedings of Symposium Sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University, 19-20 May 1972; Cremona Foundation, Mechanicsville, Maryland, \$2.95.

SIGNS OF EMERGING NATIONALISM IN THE MOSLEM SOVIET REPUBLICS  
by James Critchlow

There is evidence that in Central Asia and other areas of the Soviet Union the Moslems<sup>1</sup> - at least the larger nationalities among them - are experiencing a new tide of self-assertiveness and particularism. The 1970 All-Union census listed more than 30 million Soviet citizens who belong to traditionally Moslem ethnic groups. The Moslem peoples, flanked on one side by their kinsmen in Sinkiang and on the other by the Islamic nations of the Middle East, seem to be deriving unprecedented advantage from a strategic position athwart two regions in which vital Soviet interests are at stake. In some cases it has appeared that their loyalty is being purchased at the price of the Moscow leadership's acquiescence, grudging on occasion, in the strengthening of national institutions and the burgeoning of new national elites.

The climate of recent years has fostered emergence of a distinct personality for the Moslem republics and their elites. An undoubted concomitant has been the creation of a new variant of Soviet communism more attractive for export to the Afro-Asian world than the Europe-oriented, Russian based Marxism-Leninism of tradition. Yet to the extent that the trend has developed its own *élan*, Soviet Moslem communism shows signs of being no longer a tame adjunct of Soviet strategy; in it are the seeds of a new ideological challenge and incipient threat to the "democratic centralism" on which all Soviet administration is based.

This challenge has found ever more direct expression in the writing of Soviet Moslem authors. It was implicit, for example, in recently published verse by an Uzbek poet, in which he alluded to the ancient glories of Samarkand and Bukhara and traced their influence on the present content of Central Asian communism. This was his concluding stanza:

*My cradle was the territory of Great Asia,  
The cradle that rocked Ulughbek and Avicenna,  
The light in whose eyes has spanned a thousand  
years.  
This is the world that led the caravan of history,  
This Samarkand, this Bukhara - these two  
universes.  
This is the cradle of Communism in the bosom of  
the East!*

The Moslems are the country's fastest growing population group, the major contributor to the trend of differential birth-rates that is making the Russians a minority in their own country. Census data show that the average Uzbek family has five members compared to 3.6 for the average Russian one.

The Moslem community, now accounting for more than one Soviet citizen in eight, is fairly compactly distributed. Its heartland consists of six of the USSR's 15 union republics, located along the southern marches of the country from the Azerbaidzhan SSR in the West to the five Central Asian republics across the Caspian: the Uzbek, Kazakh,<sup>3</sup> Tadzhik, Turkmen and Kirghiz SSR's. To the North and West of these lie two other major Moslem political units which are separated from the rest by a narrow isthmus of the Russian SFSR: the Tatar and Bashkir Autonomous SSR's. With the exception of the Iranian Tadzhiks, all of these major nationalities share a common Turkic ethnic and linguistic character in addition to their past Islamic ties. Other, less numerous Moslem peoples occupy autonomous SSR's and oblasts in Central Asia, the Caucasus and on the territory of the Russian SFSR.<sup>4</sup>

Both Soviet and Western writers have referred to the persistence of Islamic customs among believers and non-believers.<sup>5</sup> For example, pig-breeding in the Moslem republics is at a

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CPYRIGHT level compared with the rest of the country.<sup>6</sup> A recent resident of Tashkent reports that a high Uzbek official of his acquaintance, a member of the Communist Party, surreptitiously had his infant son circumcised without the knowledge of his Russian wife, who objected violently.<sup>7</sup> Marriages between Moslem men and non-Moslem women, sanctioned by tradition, are not uncommon, but the marriage of Moslem women to non-Moslems, a matter of taboo, is apparently still rare in the extreme.<sup>8</sup>

The 1970 census revealed that the Moslem peoples were still among the least susceptible to linguistic assimilation. Of those resident in their own union republics, the percentage who had kept the mother tongue of their nationality continued in all cases to be higher than 98. In fact, there was a general increase in this percentage compared with the 1959 census.

### *Sovietization and Russification*

Much of the Moslem territory lay in the theater of combat between Reds and Whites in the Civil War years; the loyalty of its population was eagerly sought by the Bolsheviks who promised full national autonomy and equality to those who supported the Soviet cause. Moslem nationalists were accepted for Party membership with little regard to their ideological stripe.

Following consolidation of Soviet rule, the rights of the Moslem peoples were increasingly subordinated to the interests of central authority, and there were successive purges of the Moslem intelligentsias, including many Communist leaders, the victims usually being branded as "bourgeois nationalists." Repressive measures included gerrymandering of the boundaries of the national areas.

The Stalinist terror of the late 1930's afflicted the Moslem peoples with a special virulence, essentially decapitating them of native leadership. Accompanying it was a deliberate policy of Russification and ruthless trammeling of national privileges. Of the promises of the earlier Soviet period, little remained but the vestige of indigenous institutions now wholly subject to Moscow's hegemony.

In the rewriting of history which marked the Stalinist epoch, the Moslem national past received contemptuous treatment. Progressive elements like the *jadid* reformers who had

fought for their peoples' rights against tsarist oppression were relegated to opprobrium with such epithets as "Turkish agents," and the Russian tsarist conquest was now viewed as a "positive" one which had enabled the Moslems to cast off the thralldom of feudal beys and obscurantist mullahs. What emerged was a condescending and degrading image of primitive peoples being helped out of misery by a superior Russian "elder brother."

The post-Stalin collective leadership made concessions to the Moslems and other non-Russian minorities, especially in the domain of linguistic policy and historiography, easing some of the graver abuses of Stalin's day. The period of Khrushchev's "one-man" rule was marked by ambiguity: his policies were frankly assimilationist, avowing the eventual "merging" of all peoples into a single Soviet nationality, yet the relatively liberal political atmosphere left room for maneuvering without fear of the harsh repressions associated with Stalin. If the new Communist Party program adopted in Moscow in 1961 proclaimed that "the boundaries between the union republics are increasingly losing their former significance,"<sup>9</sup> the grass-roots social trend was at the same time leading toward the reinforcement of national identity. The Russian "elder brother" remained a nominal presence, but his younger siblings were on the rise.

### *De-Russification: The Tide Turns*

The amorphous condition of Soviet politics which followed immediately after Khrushchev's ouster was comparatively favorable to the non-Russian nationalities. Talk of the future "merging" of nationalities all but disappeared from official pronouncements. Typical of the lack of resolution on national questions was a conference held in Volgograd in November 1968 to discuss the future complexion of Soviet society; it was adjourned after the participants, representatives of a variety of nationalities, including Russians, conceded "the lack of solution of a number of problems."<sup>10</sup> It should be noted that the Party's tolerance did not apply to nationalists who challenged its policies too bluntly and openly, as shown by a series of arrests in the Ukraine.

The evolution of Soviet Moslem society in

CPYRGHT

### *Thou Uzbekistan*

I wished to speak about happiness,  
To sing a joyous ode,  
To think of tomorrow and today,  
To hold a fabulous feast;  
In my eyes thou appearst,  
Thou at last art the one, the eternal object of yearning,  
Thou Uzbekistan.  
Child of toil art thou, sound of heart,  
And thy enviers are distraught and downcast,  
with every year;  
At every step art thou paradise, an Eden, a garden,  
Thy nights unending myriads of candelabra,  
Thou art despot to enemy, solace to friend,  
Danger afar, art thou a bower of calm,  
Thou Uzbekistan.

Thy hand holds the key to treasures of riches,  
In thy garden and desert a happy year's song,  
Left and right thy gold and thy silk;  
How many the peoples enrapt in thy path,  
Thou art fruit and wine and water and cake,  
Thou art twin rivers of love.  
Thou Uzbekistan.  
Thou art thy own machine-builder, thy own livestock-breeder,  
Thy own scholar, thy own cultural worker.  
Thou art volunteer soldier, noble guide,  
A storehouse of cotton priceless, without peer,  
Thy soul Lenin's child forever,  
Thou Uzbekistan.

CPYRGHT

*Source:* Mirtemir (pseudonym of Mirtemir Tursanov), "Ozbekistansan" (Thou Uzbekistan), *Sovet Ozbekistani*, January 1, 1970, page 1. This poem was run over a message of greetings from Moscow which appeared on the same page.

the 1960's, and especially after Khrushchev's removal in 1964, was characterized by a current of de-Russification in such areas as language, cadres, and history. Russian vocabulary has been to some extent expunged from the national languages, reversing an earlier trend, and preferential treatment is now being given to the use of those languages for communications; the proportion of Russian cadres in local institutions, even the sacrosanct Party *apparatus*, has been reduced.

Especially telling is the work of native historians, who have re-emphasized the ancient roots of their communities and their cultural debt to traditional Islamic, especially Arabic and Persian influence, while downgrading the Russian contribution. Moslem writers are hinting that a new, Eastern form of Communism has been brought into being in Soviet Central Asia. In much of this literature, the individual Soviet republic seems to have supplanted the USSR as the primary object of patriotic loyalty. A poem, "Thou Uzbekistan," which appeared on the front page of an Uzbek newspaper for January 1, 1970, was featured more prominently than New Year's greetings from party and state organs in Moscow which were carried on the same page (see Box 1).

The concept of the Russian "elder brother" leading Soviet Asians out of primitive obscurity is today recalled only rarely in local media. Acknowledgement of Russian assistance now usually specifies material, not spiritual contributions. Above all, the statement of the 1961 Party Program that "the boundaries between the union republics are increasingly losing their former significance" has lost its own significance. The present trend is in the opposite direction.

De-Russification has become overt and official, implemented through such devices as conferences held in the Moslem republics to discuss "speech culture." Commenting on one such conference organized in 1969 in Uzbekistan, an Uzbek writer revealed that its purpose was to rectify linguistic injustices of an earlier period, when numerous native words were purged from the Uzbek language in favor of Russian ones (see Table 1). Noting the substantial measure of de-Russification which had already taken place prior to the conference, the author, possibly with tongue in cheek, advanced in justification that the Russians themselves have purified their language through elimination of such foreign borrowings as

Table 1. The De-Russification of Uzbek.

CPYRGHT

	Uzbek Word	Russian Word	English Equivalent
Group "A"	khiyaban	prospekt	avenue
	jāvan	shkaf	cabinet
	buyurtmā	zakaz	order (as for books)
	buyurtmāchi	zakazchik	order (for goods)
Group "B"	zārbdar	udarnik	customer
	namzad	kandidat	shock-worker
	qamus	entsiklopediia	candidate
	darilfunun	universitet	encyclopedia
	jārrah	khirurg	university
	jārrahlik	khirurgiia	surgeon
Group "C"	tababāt (tibbiyat)	meditsina	surgery
	katib	sekretar'	medicine
			secretary
Group "C"	muāllif	avtor	author
	an'ana	traditsiia	tradition
	inqilab	revoliutsiia	revolution
	inqilabchi	revoliutsioner	revolutionary
	mafkura	ideologiia	ideology
	dāha	genii	genius

## Explanation:

Group A. "Forgotten" Uzbek words restored to usage instead of Russian equivalents once a standard part of Uzbek vocabulary.

Group B. Uzbek words once relegated to "obsolescence" but now revived for use together with Russian words as "literary synonyms."

Group C. Uzbek words eliminated from the dictionary during "a certain" period when "the culture of speech suffered considerable damage" and now rehabilitated - used interchangeably with Russian equivalents.

Source: A. Osman, "Ozbek ādābii tilining bā'zi masālari" (Certain Problems of the Uzbek Literary Language), *Sovet Ozbekistani*, May 24, 1969, p. 3.

Not all Moslem writers are satisfied with progress achieved so far in resisting Russification; a Tatar poet complained in print of continuing efforts to have his language replace traditional geographical names derived from Arabic with their Russian equivalents, e.g. Russian *Kair* for *Qahira* (Cairo) and *Indiia* for *Hindstan*.<sup>12</sup>

Purification of the national languages has been accompanied by an extension of their use for communications at the expense of Russian. A comparative study of selected periodicals in Moslem areas showed that in recent years those in the national languages exceeded their Russian counterparts in circulation growth-rates,<sup>13</sup> reversing an earlier assimilation trend (see Tables 2 and 3). By 1970, the Uzbek, Kazakh, Azerbaidzhan, Kirgiz, Tadzhik and Turkmen SSR's alone were publishing 132 journals and 477 newspapers in their own local languages with combined circulations of 6.6 and 7.5 million respectively.<sup>14</sup>

Table 2. Comparison of Average Monthly Circulation Figures for Literary Journals: Azeri Language (Azerbaidzhan) and Russian Language (*Literaturnyi Azerbaidzhan*), 1960 - 1968.<sup>a</sup>

Year	Language	
	Azeri	Russian
1960	6,670	3,125
1963	9,000	3,200
1964	14,500	3,400
1965	18,000	3,100
1966	19,400	4,000 (6 mo.)
1967	22,800	3,400
1968 (10 mo.)	29,000	2,500

<sup>a</sup> Available years only. Azeri journal has 200 pages; Russian, 150 pages.

Source: Michael Neuwirt, "Paper Allocation Rivalry and National Pressures in the USSR," *Radio Liberty Research Paper*, New York, 1969, p. 1.

### The New Moslem Elite

Probably of more profound and enduring significance to the political future of the Moslem republics is the attrition of European cadres in key Party and government organs. Things have changed remarkably since an earlier study noted that "in the Uzbek Central Committee Secretariat during the 1940's, Russians and other European party secretaries and department heads constituted three-fourths of the total, and no change in this proportion was apparent in the 1950's."<sup>15</sup> By 1966 (Seventeenth Uzbek Party Congress) the number of Russians and other Europeans in these posts was not three-fourths but approximately one-fourth of the total,<sup>16</sup> and has remained

Table 3. Comparison of Average Daily Figures for Newspapers: Uzbek Language (Soviet Uzbekistani) and Russian Language (Pravda Vostoka), 1956 - 1965.<sup>a</sup>

Years	Languages	
	Uzbek	Russian
1956	170,000	140,000
1957	175,000	140,000
1961	271,000	146,000
1962	279,000	146,000
1963	305,000	155,000
1964	400,000	160,000
1965	382,400	161,000

<sup>a</sup> Available years only. Both papers issued six times weekly.

Source: Michael Neuwirt, *op. cit.*

fairly constant since. Between 1958 and 1966, the number of Europeans in the Uzbek Central Committee had dropped from 31 per cent to less than 20 per cent, and has persisted at that level. A similar trend was evident in other Moslem republics; even in Kazakhstan, where European immigration has placed the Moslems in the minority, the latter make up about half of the Central Committee.<sup>17</sup> Such important Central Committee departments as administrative organs, propaganda and agitation, culture and education are now commonly directed by Asian cadres (except in Kazakhstan). The European foothold has been largely reduced to the traditional pro-consul's post of second secretary, the party organs departments of Central Committees, the republican committees of state security, and local military commands.<sup>18</sup>

This is a far cry from the situation in Khrushchev's latter period (1962-1964) when constitution of a Central Asian Bureau (now defunct) of the Central Committee of the CPSU moved a Western observer to comment: "The new bureau, standing between Moscow and the authorities of the union republics and visibly controlled by Russians, cannot possibly fail to diminish the already meager powers left in the hands of the Moslem Communist officials."<sup>19</sup>

The steady increase in the native graduates of higher education, bolstered by the Moslem's demographic advantage, adds to pressures for *korenizatsiia* (assignment of native cadres to key posts). Between 1962/63 and 1968/69, the number of Moslems enrolled in higher education doubled, compared to a

corresponding increase of only about 50 percent for Russian students; the number enrolled today is nearly half a million.<sup>20</sup> At the present rate, Moslems could catch up with Russians in per capita student population within the next few years. Another index of the vigor with which Moslem elites are growing is the increase in number of scientific workers: from 17,000 to 48,000 for the principal Moslem nationalities between 1960 and 1969, well above the equivalent growth-rate for Russians.<sup>21</sup> An American scholar who spent five months at Tashkent University in 1969 reported a sense of injustice among Russians and other Slavs at the privileges of the Uzbeks:

*Though the Uzbeks and other Turks feel sure of their social and legal equality, some Slavs feel that they are discriminated against by the Uzbeks. Because the Uzbeks are in the majority, and many of the high civil posts are held by Uzbeks, there is a tendency for Uzbeks to be preferred for positions over other peoples. A Russian school teacher told me that she resented the fact the Uzbeks seemed to get better jobs . . .*<sup>22</sup>

The new elites presumably owe their status to Sovietization which has given them modern professional training and an economic and social structure in which to use it. At the same time, they suffer from a paradox of Soviet society: the system encourages minority education but restricts the occupational mobility of the Moslem graduates toward the center. They are victims of discrimination with respect to admission to the All-Union political-administrative apparatus which is the real seat of power and position. Members of the Soviet Moslem elite have a vested interest in the system, but to the extent that it blocks their advancement at the republican level they must push to improve the position of their Republic.

### *Resurrection of the Pre-Revolutionary Past*

It is in the republican educational and cultural establishments that Moslem power has already come into its own. Modern Soviet communications facilities are being used, as never before, for mass glorification of pre-Russian and pre-communist roots. With the national languages providing a convenient means of esoteric communication, the rallying cry is *miras* - traditional heritage - a word that appears regularly in the indigenous press; frequently in headlines. Typically, an Uzbek article pegged to a conference on translations recalled that Uzbek literary development had been influenced since

early days by translations from Persian and Arabic, beginning with the *Thousand and One Nights*, long before Russian works began to be translated into the language - a far cry from the once familiar image of dark stagnation until the advent of the Russian "elder brother."<sup>23</sup> The downgrading of Russian influence also at times favors the West, as in an announcement that in 1970 Uzbek theatrical repertoires would include plays "Western European, Russian and from fraternal peoples" - in that order.<sup>24</sup>

Other recent expressions of *mirasism* have been observance of the 2,500th anniversary of Samarkand (with associated complaints in the press about neglect of local religious monuments), the holding of a Tashkent conference on Lenin and the Culture of the Peoples of the East on November 25-26, 1969 and the promulgation in November 1969 of a Law on Preservation of Monuments for the Uzbek SSR.<sup>25</sup>

The Soviet Moslems are conscious that, in the perspective of their total recorded history, they have been exposed to Russian and communist influence only briefly. Samarkand, in today's Uzbekistan, has recently been celebrating its 2,500th anniversary, or fifty times the fifty years, marked with fanfare in 1967 by the Soviet regime. Russian troops did not complete their occupation of Central Asia until little more than a century ago, and even afterward Moslem princes retained considerable authority. A tsarist official who visited Bukhara in the first decade of this century was decorated on behalf of the Emir with the Order of Iskander, the highest decoration in Bukhara,<sup>26</sup> a reminder that since Alexander the Great (known to Moslems as Iskander) the locality had been surviving foreign invasions.

The civilization found by Russian troops when they finally marched into Central Asia had been moulded by Islam for a full one thousand years; its descendants are today demonstrating pride in their origins. Central Asians are recalling that during the Middle Ages, before the great caravan routes fell into disuse, there were important seats of Moslem learning among the Sarts, urban forbears of today's Uzbeks and Tadzhiks, and that some of their scholars, like Avicenna (ibn Sina), achieved enduring fame in history.

In the Caucasus, the Azeris and other Islamic peoples also trace their roots back to antiquity. The ethnic awareness of the Azeris is shaped by

the fact that the part of Azerbaidzhan now under Soviet rule was not permanently annexed by Russia until the first part of the last century. Its capital of Baku became a petroleum and industrial center in pre-Revolutionary days, with the first indigenous proletariat and the first socialist movement among the Empire's Moslems.

Along the Volga, the Tatars, whose seat of Kazan was also an ancient Islamic center, came under Russian hegemony earlier in their history in the 16th century. Despite recurring campaigns of Russification and forced conversion to Christianity they stubbornly maintained a solid measure of linguistic and cultural integrity.<sup>27</sup> Close exposure to the Russians, and through them to Western ideas, stimulated Tatar nationalism instead of deterring it. Tatar intellectuals, backed by a wealthy native bourgeoisie and deriving inspiration both from the West and from Islamic reform movements in countries like Turkey, provided Moslems in the Russian Empire with their most vigorous leadership before, during, and in the first years after the Revolution. Sultan Galiev, whose vision of building a specifically Asian Communist state led to his imprisonment under Lenin and his execution under Stalin, was able to strike a spark in the Third World long after his death.<sup>28</sup>

Moslem historiography no longer accepts, as it did in Stalin's day, that annexation of Moslem territories by the tsars was a "progressive" phenomenon. One scholar has even gone so far as to refer pointedly to the "national liberation struggle" of the Uzbek people (see Box 2) and to name the Russians as one of the traditional enemies without the customary qualification that Soviet rule has removed the basis for historic enmities. A Kazakh writer lamented in 1969 that Chinese communist encroachment on his land was only the latest in a series of invasions through the ages, including those of the "white tsar" from the North (see Box 3).

### **Quest for Autonomy under Soviet Rule**

If Moslem nationalism owes much of its content to the current resurrection of the pre-Revolutionary past with its accompanying stress on cultural particularism, it is from Soviet socialism as applied to the Moslem peoples that the trend derives its essential ideological importance. Soviet Asian writers have hinted persistently that the sovereignty of their

republics, while affected by the expediency of delegating certain national rights to the central federal authority, is more than a paper concept. The high frequency of allusions to the constitutional "right of secession" of the Soviet republics is especially suggestive, although no

one has gone so far as to advocate publicly that it be invoked.

On November 5, eve of the 1969 celebration of the October Revolution, newspapers in the five capitals of the Central Asian Soviet

The question of the people's liberation struggle and its reflection in literature may be defined and investigated at all phases of our literary history... It was not possible that the popular liberation movements conducted by our people against the twin oppressions of the tsarist colonizers and rural exploiters (events of 1892 and 1898, popular uprising of 1916) and the revolutionary struggles of 1905 and 1917 should not find expression in literature.

-- Ghulam Karimov  
Doctor of Philological Science

Source: "Tarih, Khálq vâ Adâbiyat (History, the People and Literature),  
*Ozbekistan Mâdaniyati*, Tashkent, April 1, 1969, pp. 2-3.

Oh, land my cradle, noble country of my forefathers, Motherland! Who has not been lured to you, who has not wished to trample your fertile slopes! The Dzhungarian invaders from the East, Kokand from the South, the White Tsar who violated your peace from the North, and Hitler (sic) with his sudden onslaught from the West...

-- Tel'man Zhanuzakov

Source: "Shekaradaghi Shaiqas" (Combat on the Border, an account of a Sino-Soviet border clash), *Qazaq Edebiyeti*, Alma Ata, August 23, 1969, p. 2.

Republics appeared with a "joint issue" dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary of a letter written by Lenin in which he called, *inter alia*, for "elimination of vestiges of Great Russian chauvinism" in Soviet Turkestan.<sup>29</sup> The letter, a "personal" message from Lenin to members of the Turkestan Commission, had presaged the high tide of Moslem nationalism under Soviet rule.<sup>30</sup> This bit of history was underscored on the same day by an Uzbek scholar's article in Tashkent's Uzbek-language daily, in which he recalled that in its early period the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic "was given the right to organize armed forces and have direct relations with foreign countries." The author also stressed the independent origin and distinct roots of communism among the Moslems of Turkestan ("the first Soviet state in the East"), the "voluntary" nature of federal ties to the RSFSR, and Lenin's supposed insistence on deferential treatment by representatives of the center of Party and state organs in Turkestan.<sup>31</sup>

Allusions like these, to the permissive period of the 1920's before "national autonomy" was

press of the Moslem republics with peculiar intensity. Against the background of recent trends, they are clearly more than empty rituals.

The emphasis on sovereign rights received a new dimension not long ago when a publication of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences quoted an official document on settlement of differences between socialist states. Significantly, this was in the context of an article on the rights of the Uzbek SSR. This was tantamount to proposing that henceforth disagreements between Moscow and the union republics should be considered the equivalent of disagreements between the USSR and the countries of Comecon, and dealt with on the same "voluntary" basis (see Box 4).

The concept of *gosudarstvennost'* (the quality of being a state) has received wide development in recent literature dealing with the union republics both in Moscow and the republican capitals. In the relatively liberal climate of the Czechoslovak spring of 1968, Moscow's State Publishing House for Juridical Literature brought out an anthology devoted to the "national *gosudarstvennost'* of the union

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republics" in which jurists from each union republic stressed its separate institutional principles. A foreword described how Lenin had revised his own ideas about the national question from his early opposition to federalism and self-determination as harmful to the class struggle to the realization after the October Revolution that federation was the only way in which to halt dismemberment of the Soviet state.<sup>32</sup>

A major policy declaration on the current status of the Uzbek SSR was issued in mid-1969 in the form of an article by Iadgar Nasriddinova, then chairman of the Presidium of the

republican Supreme Soviet, published simultaneously in the two Party journals *Kommunist Uzbekistana* (Russian) and *Ozbekistan Kommunisti* (Uzbek). Like other communications on the rights of the Moslem republics, it gave prominence to the assertion that Lenin had "resolutely defended the right of the peoples to self-determination up to and including secession and formation of an independent state." She recalled that the 1917 "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia," promulgated after the Bolsheviks came to power, had specified that "the policy of playing off one people against another which was carried out by tsarism was to be replaced by

In the nature of socialism there are none of the contradictions inherent in the nature of capitalism. Any disagreement between socialist nations which may arise in the course of events, due to differences in the level of their economic development, social structure and international situation, and related to their national idiosyncrasies, can and must be settled successfully on the basis of proletarian internationalism, and by means of comradely discussion and voluntary fraternal co-operation. Such disagreements must not break the united front of the socialist nations against imperialism.

Source: This quotation, from the document adopted in 1969 by the International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow, was used to illustrate an article dealing with the rights of the Soviet union republics which was published in *Fân vâ Turmush*, Tashkent, an organ of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, August, 1969, p. 15. It was erroneously identified as a statement by L. I. Brezhnev.

4

V. I. Lenin wrote in 1914: "... And we stand of course for the opportunity to learn the great Russian language for every inhabitant of Russia. There is only one thing that we do not wish -- the element of compulsion ... Those who by virtue of their life and work require knowledge of the Russian language will learn it without the stick.."

-- Lead editorial in Uzbek newspaper

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Source: *Ozbekistan Mâdâniyâti*, Tashkent, April 15, 1969, p. 1.

a policy of *voluntary and honest union* of the peoples of Russia, founded on complete mutual trust" (emphasis supplied). Her article also quoted at length from the Soviet government's appeal "To All Toiling Moslems of Russia and the East" (November 20, 1917):

Henceforth your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions are declared free and inviolable. Organize your national life freely and without hindrance. That is your right. Know that your rights, like the rights of all peoples of Russia, are protected by the entire might of the Revolution and its organs, the Soviets of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants Deputies.

It is interesting to note that in making the usual qualification about the guiding role of the Communist Party and thus avoiding the error of

the Czechoslovak revisionists, Nasriddinova did not specify whether she meant the Soviet or the Uzbek Communist Party, either of which could have been understood in the context.<sup>33</sup>

In identifying Lenin with "the right of the peoples to self-determination," Nasriddinova was repeating what has become a standard practice of Central Asian political writing - using Leninist quotations to buttress every argument for national rights. Saturation treatment of Lenin's 100th anniversary in Central Asian media (part of a nationwide campaign) provided a splendid peg for this device. Typical was a front-page Uzbek editorial (see Box 5) citing Lenin's opposition to the compulsory teaching of Russian. In all of this, Lenin emerges as a

kind of supranational idol (indeed, portraits of him in local media seem to emphasize his Tatar cheekbones) who has come to replace the Russian "elder brother" as the bearer and guide of national revolution. "Lenin's noble teaching about heritage" has even been invoked as the authority for promoting such *miras*-oriented activities as study of the *shashmaqam*, a classical Bukharan musical instrument.<sup>34</sup> It is perhaps noteworthy in this political context that the quoting of Lenin, a time-honored device of revisionists and reformers, was used in parallel fashion by the Soviet Ukrainian nationalist Ivan Dziuba in his book (published only in the West) criticizing Russification in the Ukraine.<sup>35</sup>

### Out of Isolation

It is difficult to assess the role of economic factors in national consciousness. Clearly, Uzbekistan and the other Asian republics have been on the receiving end of substantial investment inputs from the central government in Moscow. At the same time, their economic level remains well below the All-Union average. Moreover, there is some evidence of sensitivity to the form of economic cooperation within the Union. Uzbekistan remains largely a producer of raw materials: especially cotton, in which the Republic is the second largest producer in the world. One Uzbek writer, in an article published in a local party journal, complained that two-thirds of Uzbekistan's cotton-textile requirements must be supplied from other parts of the Soviet Union. In other words, Uzbekistan's cotton is exported and then reimported in the form of manufactured goods, in the classic pattern of colonial exploitation. The Uzbek author of the article wrote approvingly of steps now being taken to diversify the Uzbek economy, and thus make it more self-sufficient.<sup>36</sup>

There is evidence from some quarters that greater decentralization is sought in order to enhance republican autonomy, especially in the areas of planning and distribution. In the aftermath of the Czechoslovak occupation, at least one Party spokesman in Central Asia revealed that eastern European revisionism had struck a chord among the Soviet minorities; he denounced "separatism and self-isolation" engendered by other "models of socialism."<sup>37</sup>

Soviet Moslems, like other ethnic minorities of the country, have been wooed in propaganda

in *Jen Min Ji Pao* has branded the present Soviet leaders as "new tsars" who have "completely betrayed the national policy of Lenin and Stalin." It charged that a 1967 demonstration in Chimkent (Kazakhstan) was put down with tanks, and that one staged in April 1968 by Crimean Tatars living in exile in Chirchik (Uzbekistan) was subjected to "ruthless suppression."<sup>38</sup> There has been little to suggest that the Moslem nationalities, despite their common Asian origin, have been particularly responsive to Peking's overtures, perhaps due to widespread reports that fraternal minorities living in Sinkiang have been systematically deprived of their rights by the Chinese. There was, however, an intriguing Uzbek echo of Peking's challenge to Moscow in the Nasriddinova article mentioned earlier, which declared that "Soviet construction in Central Asia has not been mechanically copying the experience of Central Russia," thus echoing a phrase - "mechanical copying" - which had been used by Peking back in 1956 in one of its earliest efforts to resist the imposition of Moscow policies and methods.<sup>39</sup>

The opening of the Moslem regions to outside influence has by no means been limited to Communist countries. Visits by foreign delegations, especially from Middle East and other Third World nations, are now a regular feature of life in such cities as Baku and Tashkent. There are large numbers of Asian, African and Latin American students. In addition, Soviet Moslems are assigned to diplomatic and other missions abroad, notably in the Middle East. International conferences have been hosted by such Central Asian cities as Samarkand (UNESCO-sponsored symposium on Timuride culture held in September 1969<sup>40</sup>) and Alma-Ata (international symposium on Lenin's teaching on national-liberation revolutions and the present stage of the developing countries).<sup>41</sup> Uzbekistan, the most populous Moslem republic, has alone reported these foreign ties: exports of goods to 90 foreign countries, cultural ties with 91 countries, 600 specialists assigned to work in developing countries, and the hosting since 1958 of more than 30 international meetings (including the 1966 Indo-Pakistani peace conference in Tashkent).<sup>42</sup> One should also mention the influence of radio broadcasts from foreign countries, among them Radio Liberty's in the languages of each union republic, as well as



Tatar, Bashkir and Uighur. The Voice of America has added Uzbek-language broadcasts to its schedule.

Despite political and economic inhibiting factors, the aspirations of the Moslem nationalities will continue to be influenced by rising demographic and other social pressures. If in the process of Sovietization the Moslem elites become to some extent bilingual, the mass of available data suggest that in terms of social assimilation they are largely untouched.<sup>43</sup> As the process of elite formation continues, as

other attributes of nationhood are strengthened in the Moslem republics, pressures for further recognition of national rights (and autonomy) will inevitably maintain their growth. In dealing with these pressures, the Moscow leadership will face a choice between head-on confrontation or manipulation of underlying social trends, conceivably through enforced assimilation, or a reduction in the rate of elite formation. In either case, it will have to weigh carefully any moves which might threaten the internal stability of the country or its prestige abroad.

<sup>1</sup>The term "Moslem" is used throughout this article to denote historical and cultural affiliation, not necessarily religious belief or practice.

<sup>2</sup>Jamal Kamol, "Samarqandu Bukhara bu..." (Samarkand and Bukhara, These...), *Sharq Yulduzi*, Tashkent, 1969, No. 9, p. 117.

<sup>3</sup>Kazakhstan, largest of these republics, is regarded by Soviet geographers as separate from Central Asia. It has been the object, especially in its northern and western regions, of intensive immigration from the European SSR. By the 1959 census, the Republic's population was more than one-half European. In recent years there have been indications that the demographic trend may have reversed, due not only to higher Asian birth-rates but also to a slackening in recruitment of Europeans for immigration and a tendency of immigrants not to remain. Dinmuhamed Kunaev, first secretary of the Republican Communist Party, said at a party meeting in December 1969 that industrial labor turnover in Kazakhstan had amounted to 50 percent during that year. (See D. Kunaev, report at plenary session of Kazakh Central Committee, *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, Alma Ata, Dec. 25, 1969, pp. 1 ff.)

<sup>4</sup>See Geoffrey Wheeler, "The Muslims of Central Asia", *Problems of Communism*, Washington, 1967, Vol. XVI, No. 5, p. 74, for a listing of Moslem nationalities by ethnic classification.

<sup>5</sup>One of the most comprehensive Soviet treatments is L. I. Klimovich, *Islam* (second edition), Moscow, 1965, pp. 214-285.

<sup>6</sup>*Narodnoie khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969g.* (USSR Statistical Yearbook for 1969), Moscow, 1969, p. 371.

<sup>7</sup>Private communication.

<sup>8</sup>An article by a Soviet scholar mentioned a study of mixed marriages in Ashkhabad, capital of the Turkmen SSR, where "during the period under study the percentage of marriages of mixed nationalities was generally low, only male Turkmen contracted mixed marriages, and not a single case was registered of a multinational marriage involving Turkmen women." L. N. Terent'eva, "Opredeleniie svoiei natsional'noi prinadlezhnosti podrostkami v natsional'nom meshannom seme'ia kh," (Determination of National Affiliation by Minors in Nationally Mixed Families), *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, 1969, No. 3, 25n.

<sup>9</sup>Cf. G. Hodnett, "What's in a Nation?" *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XVI, No. 5, pp. 2 ff.

<sup>10</sup>V. S. Markov, "Sovetskii narod - novaia istoricheskaia obshchest'nyi liudei," (The Soviet People is a New Historical Community of Human Beings), *Voprosy filosofii*, Moscow, 1969, No. 3, pp. 156-158.

<sup>11</sup>A. Osman, "Ozbek adabii tilining ba'zi masalari," (Certain Problems of the Uzbek Literary Language), *Sovet Ozbekistani*, May 24, 1969, p. 3.

<sup>12</sup>G. Burbiel, "Like the Proverbial Phoenix, The Rich and Resilient Tatar Writing Re-emerges as a National Tool," *Mid East*, Washington, October 1969, p. 45.

<sup>13</sup>M. Neuwirt, "Paper Allocation Rivalry and National Pressures in the USSR," *Radio Liberty Research Papers*, New York, 1969, No. 31.

<sup>14</sup>*Pechat' SSSR v 1970 g.*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 158-160, 188-190.

<sup>15</sup>M. Rywkin, "Central Asia and the Price of Sovietization," *Problems of Communism*, 1964, Vol. XIII, No. 1, p. 11.

<sup>16</sup>The Institute for the Study of the USSR, *Prominent Personalities in the USSR*, The Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, New Jersey, 1968, pp. 759 ff. for 1966 data. *Ozbekistan madaniyati*, Tashkent, March 6, 1971, p. 1, for 1971 figures.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.* and Rywkin, *Russia in Central Asia*, New York, Collier Books, 1963, p. 121.

<sup>18</sup>The Institute for the Study of the USSR, *op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup>Rywkin, "Central Asia and the Price of Sovietization," p. 14.

<sup>20</sup>*Narodnoie khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 g.*, Moscow, 1971, p. 690.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 697.

<sup>22</sup>David C. Montgomery, "An American Student in Tashkent," *Asian Affairs*, London, Feb. 1972, p. 35.

<sup>23</sup>Gulnarä Ghäfurova, Tārijmā hāqidi mulahāzālār," (Thoughts about Translation), *Ozbekistan Madaniyati*, Tashkent, November 25, 1969, p. 3.

<sup>24</sup>Editorial, "Sāhnā Kyzgusidā," (In the Mirror of the Stage), *OM*, January 9, 1970, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup>A detailed account of such manifestations has been compiled by David Nissman, "Recent Developments in the Study of the Uzbek Central Asian Heritage," *Radio Liberty Research Paper*, No. 35, New York, March, 1970.

<sup>26</sup>Count K. K. Pahlen, *Mission to Turkestan* (ed. Richard A. Pierce), London, Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 64.

<sup>27</sup>A. Bennigsen, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, New York, Praeger, 1968.

<sup>28</sup>David Rousset and Francois Bondy, "Entretien avec Ahmed Ben Bella," (Conversation with Ahmed Ben Bella), *Preuves*, Paris, 1963, No. 153, p. 36.

<sup>29</sup>The newspapers are *Pravda Vostoka*, Tashkent; *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, Alma Ata; *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, Dushanbe; *Sovetskaia Kirgiziia*, Frunze; and *Turkmenaskaia Iskra*, Ashkhabad. In fact, the "Joint issue" seems to have consisted of

from each republic. This information is based on the Tashkent edition.

<sup>30</sup>A. Bennigsen, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, *op. cit.*, p. 98. The Turkestan Commission "overhauled administrative policy in a sense favorable to the Muslims." Bennigsen writes further: "In addition, thanks to its pledges of wide autonomy and of respect for the cultural and religious institutions of Islam, the Turkestan Commission managed to win numerous adherents to the new regime from radical nationalists among the *jadid* left wing, from the most revolutionary-minded of the Young Bukharans and from the Young Khivans."

<sup>31</sup>A. Eshanov, "Lenin Ziyasi bilan," (With Lenin's Light), *Sovet Ozbekistani*, Tashkent, November 5, 1969, p. 2.

<sup>32</sup>D. L. Zlatopol'skii, ed., *Natsional'naia gosudarstvennost' soiuznykh respublik*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 5ff.

<sup>33</sup>Ia. Nasriddinova, "Sozdanie i razvitiie Uzbekskoi Sovetskoi natsional'noi gosudarstvennosti," (The Creation and Development of Uzbek Soviet National State-ness), *Kommunist Uzbekistana*, Tashkent, 1969, No. 6, pp. 3-20; Ia. Nasriddinova, "O'zbekistan Sovet millii davlatning barpa bolishi va rivajlanishi," (The Creation and Development of the Soviet National State of Uzbekistan), *Ozbekistan Kommunisti*, Tashkent, 1969, No. 6, pp. 3-19. One is tempted to see in the discrepancy between the two titles more than a translator's caprice.

<sup>34</sup>Nissman, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>35</sup>Ivan Dziuba, *Internatsionalizm chy rusyfikatsiia*, "Suchasnist," Munich, 1968. Published in English translation as Ivan Dziuba, *Internationalism or Russification*, London, George Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1968.

<sup>36</sup>A. Aminova, "Strukturnyye sdvigi v ekonomicheskikh svyaziakh Uzbekistana," Tashkent, 1972, *Kommunist Uzbekistana*, No. 1, pp. 55ff.

<sup>37</sup>Ch. Abutalipov, "Marksistsko-Leninskoie uchenie o proletarskom internatsionalizme i sovremennost'," (Marxist-Leninist Teaching on Proletarian Internationalism and the Present Day), *Kommunist Uzbekistana*, Tashkent, No. 11.

<sup>38</sup>New China News Agency, "The New Tsars Are the Common Enemy of the People of All Nationalities of the Soviet Union," text of article in *Jen Min Ji Pao*, Peking, June 24, 1969.

<sup>39</sup>Ia. Nasriddinova, *op. cit.*

<sup>40</sup>G. Lipshits and V. Popondopulo, "Samarqandda Khalkara simpozium," (International Symposium in Samarkand), *OM*, September 26, 1969.

<sup>41</sup>*Qazaq Adabiyeti*, Alma Ata, October 4, 1969, p. 1.

<sup>42</sup>*Natsional'naia gosudarstvennost' soiuznykh respublik*, p. 207.

<sup>43</sup>Montgomery (*op. cit.*, p. 37) offers this glimpse of social segregation even among urban youth: "In the student dormitory, social life was usually voluntarily separated along racial lines. The Europeans and the Turkic peoples kept with their respective groups."

LATIN, Buenos Aires  
10 November 1972 (Excerpts)

SEARCH FOR COMMUNIST GUERRILLA HIJACKERS

by Jose Zuniga--The police have intensified their raids against alleged guerrilla hideouts in this capital city and in Monterrey. It is expected that within the next few hours additional members of the League of Armed Communists who hijacked a Mexicana Airlines aircraft on Wednesday will be arrested.

Police reported that they are searching for six leaders of the urban guerrillas who got away on a previous raid when 24 persons were arrested. With regard to the extradition request, the Attorney General's Office said that either tomorrow or on Monday Mexico would ask Cuban officials for preventive custody of the guerrillas--the first step to be undertaken in an extradition request.

Security measures were intensified today at the Monterrey airport, approximately 1,000 kms north of Mexico City. Local police are searching for the guerrillas, who presumably have several hideouts in the city according to confessions of five guerrillas who were freed as a result of the hijacking. Police also said that while under arrest the members of the League of Armed Communists admitted they had various training camps in the city and in Sierra Madre in Nuevo Leon State.

Today, for the first time, the Mexican press openly reported the existence of urban guerrillas in the country, while government officials and congressmen branded them "common criminals."

Secretary of Government Mario Moya said: "Cuba will have to adhere to the law and negotiate the extradition that Mexico will request, because the hijackers are criminals, not political prisoners or leaders of any cause." Since Fidel Castro's government has been in power, on six occasions Mexico has requested the extradition of fugitives--Mexicans and one U.S. citizen--but Cuba only agreed concerning the U.S. citizen in 1961. In 1970, the last time a Mexican aircraft was hijacked to Havana, relations between the two countries reached their lowest level. Indeed, they reached such a low degree that there was fear of a diplomatic rupture.

Leaders of the Monterrey banking center, the Nuevo Leon Chamber of Industries, the Monterrey National Chamber of Commerce, the Nuevo Leon Real Estate Chamber and the Nuevo Leon Labor Federation today published a petition in the newspaper asking President Luis Echeverria to sever relations with Cuba if it refuses to extradite the hijackers and their accomplices. The petition stated: "We will no longer tolerate the Cuban Republic as the breeding ground for all Latin American subversive movements and the safest refuge for all kinds of criminals."

WASHINGTON POST  
11 November 1972

## Mexico Asks Cuba To Return Hijackers

CPYRGHT

MEXICO CITY, Nov. 10 (UPI) — Mexico will ask Cuba to send back the 13 fugitives involved in Wednesday's dramatic hijacking of a Mexicana Airlines Jetliner, but extradition seemed doubtful. Unofficial sources said that al-

though Mexico and Cuba do have an extradition treaty, Cuba has turned down six Mexican extradition requests in the last two years. Interior Secretary Maria Moya Palencia indirectly lambasted Cuba Thursday for ac-

cepting the hijackers. "If all nations acted according to international extradition laws instead of protecting the perpetrators of these crimes, these things could be avoided," he said.

INFORMEX, Mexico City  
16 November 1972 (Excerpts)

### CUBA ASKED TO RETURN HIJACKERS, WEAPONS, RANSOM

[Excerpts] Mexico City, 15 Nov--The Mexican Government today asked the Cuban Government to arrest and return the criminals who flew to Havana aboard a passenger airplane skyjacked a week ago in Monterrey. The extradition request also asked for the return of the weapons, the ammunition and the \$320,000 delivered to the skyjackers.

The crimes of armed robbery, illegal restriction of freedom, intimidation and others of which the kidnapers have been accused are included in various paragraphs of Article 2 of the extradition treaty which has been in effect between the two governments since 1930.

HAVANA RADIO  
15 November 1972

CPYRGHT

### CUBA'S OFFICIAL POSITION ON HIJACKINGS

Our Revolutionary Government has issued a statement dated 14 November 1972 in which it says that Yankee imperialism invented and encouraged the hijacking of planes in full flight during the first years of the Cuban revolution, on beginning its plans of subversion and aggression against our people. The statement adds: It also invented the economic blockade, mercenary aggressions and piratical attacks from CIA boats disguised as merchant vessels from bases located in Central American countries and in the United States itself. In the early years our country was subjected to a wave of hijackings of planes, which landed at U.S. airports, and of boats which reached the coasts of that country. To carry out such acts, occasionally repugnant crimes were committed in which the protagonists arrived in the United States with the still-warm body of a murdered Cuban pilot or sailor.

The statement issued by the Cuban Revolutionary Government continues: Yankee imperialism encouraged illegal entries from Cuba into the United States and vice versa for the purpose of subversion and propaganda. Such an unlawful climate of unpunished piracy

and violation of the most elementary norms of civilized life escalated the serious problem of plane hijackings and other terroristic acts to their present disquieting proportions, which now affect the entire international community.

CPYRGHT

Our Revolutionary Government further states: No technical remedy, no legal or political recourse has been found to effectively counteract the problem. It emphasizes that it has not been possible, nor will it be easy, to draft an international agreement because, among other reasons, a broad climate of illegality, terror, aggression and violence still prevails in the world, as this constitutes the official U.S. policy in many parts of the world, as in Southeast Asia.

When, as a logical, inexorable consequence of a policy that did not respect legal or moral principles, the hijacking of planes boomeranged against the hijackers themselves, Cuba, the first victim of hijackings, in turn became the point of forced landings for a large number of the planes hijacked in the United States.

The Revolutionary Government states that the perpetrators of those hijackings, whose motives ranged from political reasons to mental alienation, saw our country as a site where the United States itself had destroyed all legal international instruments to act against them. Nonetheless, Cuba unwaveringly abstained from welcoming, rewarding or encouraging--by publicity or other means--the perpetrators of those acts. However, the problem could not be resolved by Cuba unilaterally, without any reciprocity from the United States regarding similar acts that have affected our country.

In an attempt to cope with the problem with the hijacking of planes and other similar crimes, the Revolutionary Government enacted Law No 1226 of 16 September 1969 [date as heard] on the basis of bilateral agreements with countries involved in these problems, among which is precisely the United States. In the opinion of the Cuban Government, this is the only rapid, suitable and effective means of counteracting the wave of plane hijackings and similar serious violations that endanger human lives. Further on, the declaration states: Two weeks ago, when a Boeing 727 Eastern Airlines plane was hijacked and flown to Havana, the Cuban Government reiterated the aforestated criterion to the United States, which had requested steps be taken. In view of that incident, the U.S. Government sent notes by means of the Swiss Embassy which were answered by our government through its Foreign Ministry. In its reply note, our government pointed out that it had proceeded to provide facilities for the immediate return of the plane, its crew members and its passengers and that it was investigating the motivation, circumstances and acts that had been committed pertaining to it.

The Government of Cuba states that it cannot be in its interest, nor does it in any way desire, for the territory of Cuba be used as a refuge for persons who are responsible for common criminal acts that occur anywhere in U.S. territory. It adds: Nor is the Cuban Government in any manner interested in promoting the hijacking of planes, seagoing vessels or illegal entries into or exits from that country's territory through violation of immigration, sanitation or similar laws.

Nonetheless, the Government of Cuba, the statement says, cannot resolve such questions unilaterally or in isolation without a reciprocal and broad commitment on this matter by the United States.

In its reply to the State Department, our government notes: There are individuals on U.S. territory who commit brutal acts against the Cuban people and territory such as the piratical attack on the Boca de Sama port last year with the grievous loss of Cuban lives. The statement adds that in the State of Florida there is open recruiting of individuals who plan and carry out acts against Cuban vessels, such as the Cuban fishing boats Agulja and Plataforma IV, which were wrecked and sunk off Andros Island. Boats constantly leave Florida to penetrate Cuban territorial waters, reach our coasts and facilitate the transportation of persons between Cuba and the United States,

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thereby violating both countries' laws. Illegal exits from Cuba and subsequent illegal entry into the United States have certainly been promoted for many years as part of a policy geared to hurt our country by every possible means.

It is our understanding that these acts and many other previous ones--which need not be repeated and emphasized in this note--have fomented this climate of violations and illegalities, the consequences of which both countries are suffering at this time. It is difficult for the Cuban Government to imagine that U.S. authorities cannot investigate, clear up and take adequate measures to punish, discourage and avert such acts.

We believe, Cuba's Revolutionary Government stresses, that both countries are interested in taking steps to resolve this problem, which recurs systematically and more or less frequently. On its part, the Government of Cuba is willing, and without delay, to take steps which might lead to the adoption of a broad agreement on this specific question provided the U.S. Government, on its part, shows an equal willingness and interest.

The Cuban Revolutionary Government continues: We understand that this is a problem between the two countries which can be resolved in a relatively short time and which, in addition, would redound to a positive solution of incidents that cause hardships to other countries in that they have spread to the international field. If the U.S. Government so desires, demarches leading to the aforementioned agreement on measures to be taken regarding the hijacking of planes and vessels and illegal entries and exits between the territories of the two countries can be undertaken through the mission representing its interests in Cuba--the Swiss Embassy. By succinctly stating its position on these problems, the means and the practical way to resolve them, Cuba expects to learn the position of the United States on the matter.

To the note which the Cuban Revolutionary Government sent on 29 October 1972 through the Foreign Ministry to the Swiss Embassy, the U.S. Government replied that its content was being studied. Only about a week later, on 10 or 11 November, as everyone now knows, one of the most dramatic incidents in the history of hijacking occurred in the United States.

The declaration issued by the Cuban Revolutionary Government then dwells at length on the itinerary of the Southern Airways DC-9 plane--the hours it was in flight, the shooting which U.S. officials carried out at McCoy Air Base in Florida and its emergency landing at Rancho Boyeros airport.

In another passage of the declaration, it is stated: The Government of Cuba issues this declaration so that national and international opinion can know its position vis-a-vis these serious problems and the measures which, in its judgment, should be taken to effectively combat them. Such measures can be adopted immediately, depending on the U.S. Government's reply. Although that government continues to maintain a policy of blockade and aggression against Cuba, our esteem for the people of the United States and the international community is what motivates our constructive position regarding this problem, the declaration of the Cuban Revolutionary Government says in conclusion.

HAVANA RADIO  
15 November 1972

CPYRGHT

DELEGATE TO UN REITERATES STAND ON AIR PIRACY

Cuban UN delegate Dr Fernandez Alvarez Tablo has stated before the UN Juridical Committee that as long the piratic actions against our country are implicitly accepted, it is absurd to ask Cuba for unilateral assistance in connection with cases of violence. He thus reiterated our country's position regarding the widely discussed topic of international terrorism. He stated that the concept of international cooperation based on an inequitable law is unacceptable to Cubans.

Dr Alvarez Tablo went on to state that it is impossible to make any sense out of or see any content in the term "international terrorism" unless it is linked with what has been happening in Southeast Asia for the past decade. He asserted that his country flatly rejects any resolution to prevent the national liberation movements from using violence to gain their noble objectives.

If revolutionary violence falls within the concept of international terrorism, the diplomat added, the actions and reprisals against Vietnamese cities and hamlets become even more detestful and criminal. He declared that armed revolutionary struggle is one form of expression of the people's right to self-determination. To deny the legality of the just and necessary national liberation war means a rejection of reason and history, the Cuban delegate concluded.